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Chapter 1  Nature of Human Cognition and Language 
 
1.1. Perception and Conception 
 One of the fundamental and controversial topics in cognitive science is how 
human beings conceptualize the world around them.  This ultimate query has been 
pursued, followed by the premise that the two notions of perception and conception are 
crucial to make explicit the nature of human cognition.  It is remarkable, for this 
specific topic, that a wide variety of researchers across the cognitive sciences have 
proposed increasingly sophisticated and powerful theories of perceptually-based 
cognition.  In particular, Barsalou and Prinz (1997) argue that cognition is inherently 
perceptual, sharing systems with perception at both the cognitive and the neural levels, 
and propose a theory of “perceptual symbol systems.”  The basic tenet of this theory 
is that when we perceive an entity (‘a chair’ for example), the shape of the entity is 
extracted from the perception and stored in memory to function as a symbol.  That is, 
a perceptual symbol results from an extraction process that selects some subset of a 
perceptual state and stores it as a mental image.  More specifically, perceptual 
symbols are constituted by the brain in such a way that a set of neurons in perceptual 
systems capture information about perceived entities or events.  For instance, in 
perceiving an entity, a configuration of neurons in the visual system becomes active 
and the perceptual symbol that represents it is constituted.  This means, therefore, that 
the first step in exploring the relationship between perception and conception is to 
realize that perceptual experiences provide an important source of information about 
the world.  This perspective might be accepted by the empiricism, which claims that 
it is because we are able to have certain perceptual experiences in response to external 
features of the environment that we have developed conceptual capacities, and the 
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relevant ones, in turn, allow us to assess the nature of these experiences.  Noteworthy 
in this respect is Bueno’s (2013) insightful research.  He has highly valued the 
importance of perceptual experience to shape the mind of human beings, claiming that 
our mind is shaped, in most part, by the visual experiences we have, and these 
experiences provide visual information about the environment which can be structured 
to form conceptions.  Furthermore, in a similar vein, Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) 
also argue that many concepts are organized based on perceptual similarities and 
perceptual processes guide the construction of abstract concepts, resulting in the 
conclusion that concepts usually stem from perception, and that the vestiges of these 
perceptual origins exist for the vast majority of concepts, as the following: 
 
(1) Contrary to the Greek philosophers’ polarized dichotomy between perception and 
cognition, we have seen that there is good reason to believe that cognitive 
processes borrow from perceptual ones.  [...]  The points to be taken from these 
parallels are: (a) that properties typically associated with abstract cognition are 
often present in perceptual systems, (b) perceptual systems have mechanisms that 
are useful for more abstract cognition and provide new insights into how 
higher-order cognition may operate and (c) patterns of correlations between 
perceptual and conceptual processes suggest that they share common mechanisms.  
While the evidence for (c) is admittedly correlational rather than causal, additional 
considerations with respect to the evolution and development of mental abilities 
suggest that these correlations may often be due to conceptual processes 
borrowing from perceptual ones. 




In this way, they argue that concepts share processing mechanisms from perception, 
and propose that mechanisms used to scan perceptions are also used to scan the content 
of concepts, concluding that concepts rely on perception.  From this empirical point 
of view, it follows that every mental contact basically depends on perceptual 
experience and concepts are acquired as the result of the interaction with the 
environment.  That is, the repetition of certain stimuli in the physical world and the 
resulting perceptual experiences form a network of interconnections that eventually 
produces particular concepts.  
 My next concern to be addressed is whether or not the boundary between 
perception and conception should always be distinctive in a case where we perceive a 
given entity in our physical world and understand what it is in our conceptual sphere.  
This fundamental issue stems from the naive idea that experiences in our daily life 
convincingly suggest that in a normal situation, our perception and conception are 
going on in parallel.  In other words, viewing and understanding of an entity occur at 
nearly the same time, as an undifferentiated integration.  
 In this respect, Ramachandran’s (2011) following remark from a neuroscientific 
point of view is very insightful: 
 
(2) In order to understand perception, [...]  We must think, instead, of symbolic 
descriptions that represent the scenes and objects [...]  These symbolic encodings 
are created partly in your retina itself but mostly in your brain.  Once there, they 
are parceled and transformed and combined in the extensive network of visual 
brain areas that eventually let you recognize objects.  Of course, the vast majority 
of this processing goes on behind the scenes without entering your conscious 
awareness, which is why it feels effortless and obvious, [...] 
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(Ramachandran 2011: 47-48) 
 
As quoted above, neurons in the brain encode meaning and evoke the semantic 
association of an object; i.e., when we see an object our brain creates symbolic 
encoding through the extensive network of the visual portion of the brain, eventually 
letting us recognize the object.  This processing goes on automatically or 
unconsciously in our brain.  What is important here is that we perceive an entity with 
a direct interaction with it in the physical world and recognize it by referring to or 
matching with its corresponding perceptual symbol in our conceptual sphere in the 
sense of Barsalou and Prinz (1997).  In this respect, Ramachandran (2011: 246) has 
advanced a very intriguing discussion.  According to him, very early in human 
evolution the brain developed the ability to create first-order sensory representation of 
external objects ― a rat’s brain, for example, has only a first-order representation of a 
cat as a furry, moving thing to avoid reflexively.  The human brain, in the course of 
its evolution, established a second brain which creates metarepresentation (i.e., 
representation of representation), which enables us to recognize a given entity.  That 
is, there exists an unconscious processing of internally objectified cognition of a 
perceived entity in the brain.  More specifically, the representation of a perceived 
entity, referred to as a perceptual representation, is obtained through direct interaction 
with it, and it is stored in the brain as its metarepresentation or mental representation.  
It follows therefore that the cognition of an entity is a process in which we match the 
representation of a perceived entity with its corresponding mental representation.  
Furthermore, the metarepreserantion is formed not only by the abstraction of a given 
representation but also with certain mental activities; it is because of this mechanism 
that a cat, for example, appears to us as a mammal, a predator, a pet, an enemy of dogs, 
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and so forth.  Thus, we can diagram the mechanisms of the formation of a concept 















Keeping this in mind, as the next step for further elucidation of human cognition, I will 
consider the relationship between cognition and metacognition in the next section. 
 
1.2. Cognition and Metacognition 
 The previous section has revealed that the two notions of perception and 
conception are crucial to make explicit the nature of human cognition.  I have been 
suggesting that when we view an object or an event and understand what it is, our 
perception and conception are going concurrently; i.e., viewing and understanding of 
an entity occur almost simultaneously via the processing in the brain illustrated in 
Figure 1.1: Formation of Concept and Cognition of Entity 
Perception of an entity 
in the physical world 
 
First-order sensory 
representation of the entity 
in the brain 
Creation of meta-representation 
of the entity in the brain 
(establishment of the concept) 
(a) Formation of concept in the brain 
 
Cognition of the entity 
(b) Cognition of an entity 
Perception of an entity 
in the physical world 
First-order sensory 
representation of the entity 
in the brain 
 










Figure 1.1(b).  What should be noticed here for further elucidation of human 
cognition is that when we focus on an object or an event we do not feel the existence 
of ourselves as an object to be observed on the one hand, whereas in the meanwhile we 
have an ability to internally perceive what we are doing while we are doing something 
on the other.  This latter ability is termed metacognition.  In passing, motivated by 
the establishment of this ability, human beings can observe the on-going actions of 
their own objectively in their mind.  Important here for our discussion is that the 
metacognition is a mental mechanism which results from the cognitive operation 
where conception is detached from perception.  That is, it is because of this isolation 
of conception from perception that we can see what we are doing from an objective 
viewpoint.  The two phases of cognition (i.e., to fuse with or detach from perception 
and conception) are of vital importance for elucidating the relationship between the 
human mind and language.  For this reason, in what follows, I will present an 
overview of the relationship between cognition and metacognition. 
 The term metacognition was originally referred to as the knowledge about and 
the regulation of one’s cognitive activities in the learning process, and metacognitive 
processes are defined as specialized mechanisms for monitoring and controlling 
regular cognitive processes in one’s brain.  More specifically, Dunlosky and Metcalfe 
(2009) illustrated three facets of metacognition: metacognitive monitoring, 
metacognitive control, and metacognitive knowledge.  Metacognitive monitoring 
refers to assessing or evaluating the ongoing progress or current state of a particular 
cognitive activity, and metacognitive control pertains to regulating an ongoing 
cognitive activity, such as stopping the activity, deciding to continue it, or changing it 
in midstream.  Metacognitive knowledge pertains to declarative knowledge about 
cognition which is composed of facts, beliefs, and episodes stored in one’s long-term 
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memory.  Researchers revealed that a theory of mind, which refers to our ability to 
conjecture another person’s mental states by which to interpret his behaviors from his 
vantage point, develops somewhere between the ages of 3 to 5 years and in the years 
thereafter, metacognitive knowledge develops (see Veenman et al. (2006)).1   
 Notable in this respect is the theory proposed by Nelson and Narens (1994). 
Their contribution to the cognitive processing of human brain is a unified definition of 
metacognition and its components; i.e., the distinction between an “object-level,” 
where cognitive activities take place and a “meta-level” which governs the object-level, 









According to this theory, the meta-level modifies the object-level, in such a way that 
the information from the meta-level either changes the state of the object-level process 
or changes the object-level process per se, resulting in motivation of some kind of 
action at the object-level.  On the other hand, the meta-level is informed by the 
object-level, which changes the state of the meta-level’s model of the situation.  
                                                 
1  Ramachandran (2011: 144) remarks that a theory of mind is not only useful for intuiting what 
 is happening in the minds of friends, strangers, and enemies; but in the unique case of Homo
 sapiens, it may also have dramatically increased the insight we have into our own minds’ 
 workings. 




Flow of  
information 
Figure 1.2: Framework of Metacognition and Cognition 
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Furthermore, on the basis of this distinction, they argue that the metacognitive system 
contains two kinds of dominance relations (i.e., control versus monitoring) in terms of 
the direction of the flow of information.  “Control” refers to affecting behavior 
whereas “monitoring” refers to obtaining information about what is occurring at the 
object-level.  Therefore, there are two general flows of information between the two 
levels, as shown in Figure 1.2, where information about the state of the object-level is 
conveyed to the meta-level and information about the meta-level is transmitted to the 
object-level through control processes.   
 As noted, metacognitive processes are performed in one’s brain.  In this respect, 
from a viewpoint of neuroscience, Ramachandran (2011) remarks the importance of 
the role of the mirror-neuron in viewing the world from another person’s point of view 
both spatially and metaphorically, and argues that this system has turned inward, 
enabling a representation of one’s own mind which leads to “self-consciousness.”  
Furthermore, he has revealed this mechanism by resorting to the role of the right 
hemisphere in the brain, as the following: 
 
(3) One job of the right hemisphere is to take a detached, big-picture view of yourself 
 and your situation.  This job also extends to allowing you to “see” yourself from 
 an outsider’s point of view.  For example, when you are rehearsing a lecture, you 
 may imagine watching yourself from the audience pacing up and down the 
podium. 
(Ramachandran 2011: 272) 
 
 The point here to be addressed in terms of the relationship between human 
cognition and linguistic manifestation is whether or not metacognitive activities by 
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definition require conscious processing.  A possible answer to this query is that 
metacognition must be conscious in its origin, as some researchers claimed.  It is 
straightforward in a case where we refer to our metacognitive knowledge to solve our 
current problem; i.e., for this specific purpose, the metacognitive processes are explicit, 
which involve deliberate processes of reasoning (see Veenman 2006).  Many 
researchers, however, argued whether metacognition necessarily requires conscious 
processing or not, concluding that metacognitive activities appear on a less conscious 
level; for instance, if ideas about oneself have been firmly established or if the activity 
of checking oneself has become a regular habit, self-monitoring processes recede into 
the background of the cognitive process.  That is, while the strategies of 
metacognition might be explicit or explicitly learned, the selection (and use) of 
strategies was entirely implicit.  In this respect, Sun and Mathews (2003) argue that 
metacognitive processes are implicit in a variety of circumstances; in particular, when 
such processes are well practiced so that no explicit deliberation is necessary.  
Therefore, it is true that explicit metacognitive processes may be (explicitly) learned 
but may be assimilated into implicit metacognitive processes, through a gradual 
process, resulting in an integral part of regular cognitive processes.   
 I have argued thus far that there are two phases of cognition; i.e., one is on-going 
cognition which is activated in the case where we perceive an entity through our direct 
interaction with it and recognize what it is, and the other is metacognition which is 
activated in the case where we monitor our current situation.  In passing, the two 
phases of cognition are closely related with “episodic memories” in the realm of 
cognitive science (see McIsaas and Eich 2002).   That is, when we recollect an 
episode or an event from our personal past, we can take the perspective of an 
autonomous observer or spectator, so that we can see ourselves as actors in the 
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remembered scene.  This mode of remembering is referred to as “observer memory” 
or “observer vantage point.”  On the other hand, we can experience the event through 
our own eyes, as if we were looking outward, watching the event unfold anew before 
us.  This mode of remembering is termed “field memory” or “field vantage point.”  
The point is that there is no doubt that these two modes of retrieving past events reflect 
the same conceptualizing mechanism as the one argued thus far.  On the basis of 
postulation that either of the two modes in question is motivated by some factor or 
another depending on the situations and driven by unconscious mental operation (i.e., 
on-going cognition or metacognition), it is plausible that the same entrenchment holds 
in the case where we perceive an entity in the physical world and recognize it in the 
conceptual sphere, resulting in language diversity depending on the conventionalized 
modes of cognition of speakers in those languages.  In other words, the two phases of 
cognition are in fact crucial to elucidate the preferred conceptualization of events by 
speakers of different languages and the corresponding diversity in linguistic 
manifestations.  I will present examples of language diversity as a case study in 
section 1.5.  Before the discussion, in what follows, we will witness the importance 
of this perspective to reveal the nature of human language. 
 
1.3. Genius of Cognitive Perspective 
 The discussion thus far is crucial to understand the foundation of Langacker ’s 
linguistic theory known as Cognitive Grammar, which presupposes a conceptualist 
account of meaning and semantic structure.  What is important in regard of the 
formulation of a conceptualist semantics is that Cognitive Grammar posits the role of 
spatial visual experience as an important facet in shaping human cognition.  
Langacker (1995) argues that there exists extensive parallelism between perception 
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and conception, and that certain aspects of visual perception instantiate more general 
features of cognition, arguing that numerous aspects of construal that are quite 
important linguistically can reasonably be interpreted as general conceptual analogs of 
phenomena well known in visual perception.   
 Figure 1.3 depicts visual perception, in which the viewer (V) represents the 
subject of perception, maximal field of view (MF) indicates a particular direction the 
viewer faces, the viewing frame (VF), referred to as the onstage region by using a 
theater metaphor, is the area in which the viewer’s focused observation is rendered, the 
focus (F) is the object of perception, and the dashed arrow represents the perceptual 
relationship between the viewer and the focus, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Some constructs that apply to visual perception. 
   (Langacker 1995: 155) 
 
 Langacker (ibid.) also argues that conceptual notions are reasonably analyzed as 
manifestations of corresponding perceptual notions, as illustrated in Figure 1.4.  
Corresponding to the viewer is the conceptualizer (C) as the subject of conception.  
The maximal scope (MS) comprises the full content of a given conceptualization.  
The immediate scope (IS) is the conceptual analog of the onstage region.  Profile is 
the object of conception as a specific focus of attention.  The dashed arrow represents 
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the construal relationship wherein the conceptualizer entertains the overall 
conception and structures it in a certain manner.  
 
       
      Figure 1.4: Conceptual notions corresponding to the perceptual notions 
      (ibid.: 156) 
 
 In this way, regarding conception as an abstract analog of perception can naturally 
be followed by the fact that Cognitive Grammar inclines to imagistic accounts.  
Image schemas, which play crucial roles for conceptual structures, are based on 
schematized patterns of activity abstracted from everyday bodily experience, 
especially pertaining to vision, space, motion, and force.2  In other words, image 
schemas are regarded as preconceptual structures that give rise to more elaborate and 
more abstract conceptions through combination and metaphorical projection.  For 
example, the concept ENTER can be analyzed as a combination of the image schemas 
(i.e., object, source-path-goal, and container-content), as illustrated in Figure 1.5. 
                                                 
2  In this respect, Langacker (1995) argues as follows: 
(i)  I suggest that certain aspects of visual perception instantiate more general features of
   cognition, so that we can validly posit abstract analogs for numerous constructs useful in  
  describing vision. 
(Langacker 1995: 155) 
(ii) Numerous aspects of construal that are quite important linguistically can reasonably be 














 A close perusal of Langacker’s theory finds as a necessary consequence that 
what is important for fully understanding the genius of Cognitive Grammar is to 
realize that there is no clear boundary between perception and conception when we 
perceive an entity and understand what it is.  Specifically, it might be said that the 
perceptual relationship in Figure 1.3 and the conceptual relationship in Figure 1.4 are 
superimposed with each other, in a case where we directly interact with an entity in the 
physical world.  Here, our perception and conception are going on in parallel as an 
undifferentiated processing.  In this normal situation, as already noted, we focuses on 
an object or event and do not feel the existence of our cognitive processing.   This 
can be straightforward by referring to Langcker’s description about the mechanism of 
the notion of viewing illustrated in Figure 1.3, as shown in (4): 
 
(4) For us, all of Figure 1 falls within the viewing frame and constitutes the focus.  
But V is not looking at Figure 1 ― rather, V is in Figure 1 looking at the ‘stage’ 
(the area labeled VF in the diagram), and specifically at F, from an offstage 
vantage point.  By directing his gaze outward in this fashion, V effectively 
(Langacker 2008: 33) 
 
ENTER 
Object Container-Content Source-Path-Goal 
Figure 1.5: Image Schemas and Concepts 
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excludes himself from VF (the locus of attention and region of visual acuity) and 
places himself at the extreme margin of the maximal field of view.  V thus has 
only a vague and partial view of himself, at the periphery, if he sees himself at 
all.3   
(Langacker 1995: 161-162) 
 
Interestingly enough, this description can be applicable to the ‘visual ego’ by Gibson 
(1986), as shown in Figure 1.6. 
 
                      
 
 
Figure 1.6 above shows the field of view of a human observer who is facing the corner 
of the room.  One of the important facets about a field of view in its own sense is that 
it has its boundary, as illustrated in the figure, which definitely corresponds to the 
notion of viewing frame (VF) by Langacker (1995).  More intriguing here is Gibson’s 
description about the field of view, as quoted in (5).  It is substantially the same as 
Langacker’s description about visual perception in (4). 
 
                                                 
3 Here, Figure 1 in (4) corresponds to Figure 1.3 in this chapter. 
Figure 1.6: Visual Ego  (Gibson 1986: 113 ) 
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(5) Turning the head is looking around; displacing it is locomotion.  The head can be 
turned on a vertical axis as in looking from side to side, on a horizontal axis as in 
looking up and down, and even on sagittal axis as in tilting the head.  The sky 
will always enter the field in looking up, and the ground will always enter the field 
in looking down. 
(Gibson 1986: 117-118) 
 
In this respect, Langacker’s following remark is very suggestive.  That is, the 
established concept of an entity through perception and its cognitive processing are 
two sides of the same coin. 
 
(6) Moreover, since all conceptions are dynamic (residing in processing activity), 
there is no boundary between simple concepts and certain basic cognitive abilities.  
We can describe focal red as either a minimal concept or else the ability to 
perceive this color.  Instead of describing contrast, group and extension as 
configraltional concepts, we can equally well speak of the ability to detect a 
contrast, to group a set of constitutive entities, and to mentally scan through a 
domain. 
(Langacker 2008: 34) 
  
 Our discussion here is further substantiated by Langacker’s (2008) two notions 
of ‘engaged cognition’ and ‘disengaged cognition.’4  First of all, we live in a real 
world, so the world we construct is grounded in our experience.  We interact with our 
                                                 
4  As noted, it is important to notice that the distinction between ‘engaged cognition’ and 
 ‘disengaged cognition’ substantially corresponds to the one between ‘object-level’ and 
 ‘meta-level’ in Nelson and Narens (1994). 
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surroundings through physical processes involving sensory and motor activity, which 
is known as ‘embodiment’ in the realm of cognitive linguistics  Figure 1.7(a) 
represents ‘engaged cognition,’ in which we directly interact with an entity in the 
world (W) at the physical level.  This interaction is indicated by the double arrow.  A 
in this figure indicates a processing activity that constitutes the interactive experience.  
On the other hand, Figure 1.7(b) shows comparable processing which takes place 
without engagement.  Crucial here is the fact that without direct perception we can 
conjure up, for example, the visual image of a cat or the auditory image of a baby 
crying.  This is because we can simulate our experience; i.e., simulation is the nature 
of our mental experience.  A’ represents a simulation of A, which comes to occur 









What is important in this mechanism is that the relationship between perception and 
conception is to be implied in the two types of cognition (i.e., engaged cognition and 
disengaged cognition).  I’m suggesting that in the engaged cognition, our perception 
and conception are going on in parallel.  In other words, viewing and understanding 
of an entity occur at almost the same time.  On the other hand, the disengaged 
cognition is a mental mechanism which results from the cognitive operation by which 
Figure 1.7: Engaged Cognition and Disengaged Cognition 
Body Brain A’ 




(a) Engaged Cognition 
W 
(Langacker 2008: 535) 
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conception is detached from perception.  Therefore, the disengaged cognition pertains 
to the conceptual world.   In this way, to fuse with and detach from perception and 
cognition are quite natural in our daily experience.  
 This perspective is explicitly reinforced by Nakamura’s (2004, 2009) insightful 
argumentation on the nature of human cognition.  He argues that when we observe an 
entity (a thing or an event), we understand what the entity is through our direct 
physical interaction with it.  He terms this type of cognition INTERACTIONAL 
MODE OF COGNITION (henceforth I-mode cognition).  This cognition model is 
diagramed as Figure 1.8 (adapted from Nakamura 2009: 359). 
 








The ellipse depicts the DOMAIN OF COGNITION, the circle labeled (C) shows the 
conceptualizer, and the circle with an arrow represents an event.  The double-headed 
arrow indicates some interaction between the conceptualizer and the event.  The 
broken-line arrow stands for a cognitive process to construe the event.  Therefore, in 
Figure 1.8: Interactional Mode of Cognition 
ellipse: domain of cognition 
C: Conceptualize 
① double-headed arrow: physical interaction with an observed event 
② broken arrow: cognitive process（e.g. gazing an event） 
③ square: cognitive image created by the conceptualizer’s cognitive  
processing 
    
(Nakamura 2009: 359) 
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this type of cognition, perception which activates the direct interaction with an event 
and cognition by which the conceptualizer construes it are in the same domain of 
cognition, as undifferentiated integration. 
 He also claims that we tend to view the world as if we were not involved in the 
interactions. We displace ourselves from the interactions and view the world from 
outside of the domain of cognition.  This type of cognition is called DISPLACED 
MODE OF COGNITION (henceforth D-mode cognition).  Figure 1.9 below 
illustrates this cognition (adapted from Nakamura 2009:363).  This conceptual shift 
from I-mode to D-mode is termed DESUBJECTIFICATION.  
 
      
  
 
This type of cognition, as Nakamura (2009) argues, is a metacognition of the situation 
(including the conceptualizer per se as a special case).  Therefore, it represents the 
conceptual world which the conceptualizer entertains.5    
                                                 
5  The basic tenet of Cognitive Grammar is “meaning resides in conceptualization,” and it is 
 through this conceptual processing that entities are construed.  This means that the conceptual 
 world in which the meaning of an expression resides in Cognitive Grammar is equated with that 
 of Nakamura’s displaced mode of cognition.   
 




1.4. Locus of Meaning and Description of Linguistic Phenomena 
  I have thus far overviewed the nature of human cognition in terms of the 
relationship between perception and conception.  On the basis of this mental 
mechanism which human beings have developed in the course of their biological 
evolution, I must clarify, as the ultimate query in cognitive linguistics, what we 
actually mean by characterizing or describing linguistic meanings.  What is important 
here is that the meanings of linguistic expressions exist in the minds of the speakers 
who produce and understand the expressions and thus they do not exist independently 
of the human mind.   That is, our linguistic knowledge is conceptually grounded and 
the locus of meaning a given linguistic expression evokes is in our mind (or in the 
brain).  This perspective naturally leads to the idea that the reality of the description 
of linguistic phenomena lies in the mental processing of the conceptualizer in his 
conceptual sphere, which is congruent with the basic tenet of Cognitive Grammar; i.e., 
“meaning resides in conceptualization.” 6  To sum up, what should primarily be 
noted is that to describe the meaning of an expression is to describe the conceptual 
structures evoked by the expression which constitute a given mental experience.   
 My primary concern is to explicate the nature of language in terms of human 
cognition.  For this purpose, my present research is twofold.  One is the 
consideration of the correlation between the ways of viewing the world and linguistic 
manifestations.  More specifically, it is intriguing to investigate how the 
conventionalized view of the world by the conceptualizer influences his cognition and 
expressive ways.   The other is to explore how perception influences conception.  In 
other words, my research in this portion is to reveal how conceptual structures of 
                                                 
6  Langacker (2008:30-31) argues that the term ‘conceptualization’ is broadly defined to 




linguistic constructions are based on or originated in perception.  Important is that the 
nature of mental experience is reflected more directly in visual images.  Recall here 
that Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) argue that perceptual processes guide the 
construction of abstract concepts and the vestiges of perceptual origins exist for the 
vast majority of concepts.  Also, as noted, image schemas are schematized patterns of 
activities abstracted from everyday bodily experience, which naturally leads to an 
image-schematic approach to conceptual structure, allowing a principled basis for 
characterizing many facets of semantic and grammatical structure. 
 In the next section, I will discuss my first topic; i.e., the interrelationship 
between the ways of viewing the world and linguistic manifestations in terms of 
typological study of languages. 
 
1.5.  Two Phases (or Modes) of Cognition and Language Diversity 
 In the previous subsections, I have explicated the nature of human cognition in 
terms of the relationship between perception and conception on the one hand, and of 
the conceptual mechanism of metacognition on the other.  As I have repeatedly 
argued, when we view an entity (i.e., an object or an event) and understand what it is, 
our perception and conception are going on in parallel, whereas, at the same time, we 
can observe the on-going actions of our own objectively in our mind.  This mental 
mechanism is termed metacognition, which results from the cognitive operation where 
conception is detached from perception.  It is because of the isolation of conception 
from perception that we can see what we are doing from an objective viewpoint.   
 The two phases of cognition are crucial for elucidating the relationship between 
the human mind and language, because linguistic structures are conceptual tools for 
imposing particular ways of viewing a situation and their meanings inhere in the 
21 
 
cognitive process by which the conceptualizer apprehends a given situation and 
construes it for expressive purposes.  On this basis, this section will reveal that the 
preferred tendency of the entrenched mode of cognition has much to do with language 
diversity.  Typological studies of languages from the modes of cognition can be 
proved to be quite natural by resorting to Slobin’s (2004) argument below: 
 
(7) [...] languages differ systematically in rhetorical style ― that is, the ways in 
which events are analyzed and described in discourse. [...]  I want to propose that 
rhetorical style is determined by the relative accessibility of various means of 
expression, such as lexical items and construction types.  That is, ease of 
processing is a major factor in giving language-particular shape to narratives.  At 
the same time, cultural practices and preferences reinforce habitual patterns of 
expression.           
(Slobin 2004: 5) 
 
That is, ‘the relative accessibility of various means of expression’ or ‘ease of 
processing’ stems from the conventionalization of a preferred construal or viewing of 
situations motivated by either phase of cognition of the two in the course of language 
acquisition.   
 
1.5.1. Modes of Cognition and Coding/Uncoding of Event Participants 
 In this subsection, to make the two phases of human cognition more explicit, I 
would like to observe the correlation between the conventionalized viewing of 
situations by speakers of a given language and the resulting language diversity.  At 
the outset, let us begin by observing the situation illustrated in Figure 1.10 and its 
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linguistic manifestations in the Japanese, Korean, and English languages respectively. 
 
              
 
 
Crucial here is that speakers of the Japanese and Korean languages are likely to code 
just the core process (i.e., break), as indicated in (8a) and (8b), whereas the 
grammatical subject and object are required to be expressed in English, as in (8c). 
 
(8) a. koware-ta. 
  break-PAST 
 b. gojangnat-da. 
  break- PAST 
 c. I broke it. 
 
The difference in the expressive ways among languages is naturally resorted to which 
of the two phases or modes of cognition is activated.  The linguistic data above show 
that Japanese and Korean speakers have a strong tendency of coding what they see 
within their own viewing frame.  In this viewing arrangement, as illustrated in Figure 
1.11(a), the conceptualizer cannot see himself and thus the uncoding of the 
grammatical subject (i.e., the initiator of the process) results.  By contrast, speakers of 
Figure 1.10: Observed Event  
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English have a strong tendency of viewing an event through the metacognition of that 
event, as shown in Figure 1.11(b).  In this viewing arrangement, the conceptualizer 
can entertain the event as a whole in the brain by establishing his bird’s-eye view and 
he can internally see himself in his viewing frame, resulting in the coding of the 
grammatical subject.  In addition, one thing to be noted here is that the Japanese and 
the Korean people’s view is equated with what is termed ‘visual ego’ quoted from 











 The point to be addressed in the next stage is why speakers of English can obtain a 
bird’s-eye view.  What I am suggesting here is that this mechanism stems from the 
nature of the language in which the speakers describe an event.  That is, in the case 
where the language which the speakers manipulate as a native language needs an overt 
grammatical subject, they have to identify what it is in the described event, and their 
recognition of the subject needs a viewing frame wide enough to mentally encompass 
the whole event, which necessarily leads to the frame of bird’s-eye view as the result 
of the activation of metacognition in the brain.  The validity of this perspective can be 
(a) 

























Figure 1.11: Viewing Arrangements 
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supported by Tomasello’s (2003) following remark.  He points out the significance of 
the notion of grammatical subject in the acquisition of the English language as follows: 
 
(9)  The English subject is a very specialized syntactic role that involves a number of 
different functions, many of which do not occur together in the same category in 
other languages.  [ . . . ]  Following Croft (2001), one possible explanation for 
the late acquisition of English subject is that, in reality, each abstract 
construction such as transitive, intransitive, passive, and there-construction 
actually has its own subject.  The generalized notion of the subject role in an 
utterance or construction ― which children would have to have mastered to 
perform well in most of the experiments ― represents the finding of a set of 
commonalities among these many and varied construction-specific subjects.  
That is, subject represents a syntactic role in something like a highly general 
Subject-Predicate construction at the most schematic level of constructional 
hierarchy.   
  (Tomasello 2003: 168-169)  
 
 On the other hand, in the Japanese and Korean languages, the corresponding 
elements (i.e., the grammatical subject and object) do not have to be coded in this 
situation.  Rather, Japanese and Korean speakers tend to construe an event through 
their conventionalized view as the result of the vantage point within the viewing frame 
in which the event unfolds.  In this viewing frame, what is being seen is just the 
process of the machine’s being broken.  Furthermore, in this case, the machine does 
not necessarily have to be coded to the extent that it is obvious from the context or in 
the case where the joint attention is established between the speaker and hearer.  In 
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other words, in this viewing arrangement, the conceptualizer can refer to a given entity 
without resorting to the coding of it or its linguistic expression.  Rather, in this case, 
the real object in the situation (i.e., in the physical world) and the coded process 
(‘kowareta (= broke)’ in (10a)) are integrated to form the complete meaning.  
 The differentiation of the two modes of cognition can naturally accommodate 
Ikegami’s (1991) following remark.7 
 
(10)  In order to give a better idea of what the BECOME-language is, it will be helpful  
  to compare it and the DO-language with the pair of linguistic types called 
‘accusative’ type and ‘ergative’ type.  [...]  The ergative type language, on the 
other hand, has typically the following two constructions: 
 Ergative + Verb + Nominative (or Absolutive)  
 Nominative (or Absolutive) + Verb. 
Common to the two constructions is the portion, ‘Nominative (or Absolutive) + 
Verb,’ which represents a process something (in the nominative or absolutive 
case) undergoes.  The optional element is Ergative, which represents the 
initiator of the process.  For the ergative type language, therefore, the basic 
feature is to represent an event in terms of ‘something BECOMEs’ and the 
initiator of the process, whether in the capacity of the causer or the agent, is an 
optionally represented element. 
(Ikegami 1991: 319-320) 
 
What I am suggesting is that Japanese speakers have established the mode of cognition 
                                                 
7  Ikegami (1991) classifies the Japanese language as a BECOME-language and the English 
 language as a DO-language. 
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illustrated in Figure 1.11(a) in the course of the acquisition of their own native 
language and therefore, in the case where they perceive an entity and express it in their 
language, the range of entities to be coded is limited within his viewing frame, 
resulting in the elevated conceptual autonomy of a process per se.  Therefore, in this 
type of cognition, the initiator of a process is added as an optional element if it is 
needed.  In this respect, it can be said that the Korean language has certain 
commonality with the Japanese language.  That is, speakers of both languages are 
likely to feel processes per se to be rather conceptually autonomous to the effect that 
they do not feel awkward in evoking or conjuring up the respective processes like 
those in (11a-c) and (12a-c) without resorting to particular agents or initiators.   
 
(11) a. te-wo      arau. 
  hand-ACC  wash 
 b. eiga-wo    miru 
  movie-ACC watch 
  c. kuruma-wo kau 
  car-ACC    buy 
(12) a. son-eul      ssitda. 
  hand-ACC   wash 
     b. yeonghwa-reul  boda 
  movie-ACC   watch 
     c. cha-reul   sada. 
  car-ACC  buy 
 
In addition, on the basis of this mode of cognition, in the case where they need to add 
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the initiator of a given process in the current discourse, Japanese and Korean speakers 
express who or what it is with the topic maker wa in Japanese or neun/eun in Korean, 
as in (13a-b). 
 
(13) a. John-wa    kuruma-wo  kau. 
   John-TOP   car-ACC    buy. 
 b. John- eun  cha-reul    sada. 
 John-TOP    car-ACC    buy. 
 
1.5.2. Two Modes of Cognition and Cognitive Abilities in Activation 
 Nakamura’s (2009) two modes of cognition (i.e., I-mode and D-mode) 
convincingly make explicit the expressive differences between the English and 
Japanese languages on the one hand, and some commonality between the Korean and 
Japanese languages on the other.  Crucial here is that Nakamura (ibid.) argues that the 
respective modes reflect different cognitive abilities which human beings have 
developed in the course of their biological evolution.  That is, I-mode of cognition 
reflects the reference point ability whereas D-mode of cognition is based on the 
figure/ground organization.   
 The reference point ability is one of the fundamental and ubiquitous manners of 
cognition in the human mind; i.e., the ability to invoke the conception of one entity for 
purposes of establishing mental contact with another (i.e., the target).  Initially, the 
entity serving as a reference point has a certain cognitive salience, either intrinsically 
or contextually; i.e., it is of high accessibility to the conceptualizer, creating the 
potential for the activation of any element in the dominion.  However, it is the target 
that becomes prominent in the sense of being the focus of the conceptualizer’s 
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conception when it is identified, with the reference point entity receding into the 
background.  In this way, the reference point phenomenon is inherently dynamic.  
Langacker (1993) argues the inherent asymmetry between a reference point and its 
target and proposed the “salience principle” in terms of how human beings single out 
an entity as a reference point, as shown in (14): 
 
(14) Salience Principle: 
 human > non-human, concrete > abstract, whole > part, visible > invisible 
                                                   (Langacker 1993: 30) 
 
To sum up, by virtue of our reference point ability, we can mention one entity that is 
salient and easily accessed, and thereby direct the addressee’s attention to the intended 
target.   
 A typical phenomenon of the reference point construction is “topic constructions.” 
In contrast to a ‘subject’-‘predicate’ relation explicitly adopted in English, a 
predominant structural pattern in the Japanese and Korean languages is one of 
‘topic’-‘comment,’ as shown in sentences (15a-b).   
 
(15) a. Zo-wa      hana-ga     nagai. 
  elephant-TOP   trunk-NOM  be long-PRES   
 b. Kokkiri-neun   ko-ga       gilda 
  elephant -TOP  trunk-NOM   be long-PRES 
 
Here, we can regard the topic phrase as representing an abstract ‘place’ or a ‘location’ 
in which the state of ‘the trunk being long’ exists.  More specifically, the meaning of 
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wa or nun is to function as a space builder, which is straightforward in the following 
sentences: 
 
(16) a. Tokyo -wa   hito-ga   ooi. 
  Tokyo-TOP    people-NOM   be many-PRES   
 b. Tokyo-ni-wa    hito-ga   ooi. 
  Tokyo-LOC-TOP  people-NOM  be many-PRES   
(17) a. Seoul-eun    saram-i       man-ta.   
  Seoul-TOP   people-NOM  be many-PRES 
 b. Seoul-e-neun      saram-i       man-ta. 
  Seoul-LOC-TOP   people-NOM  be many-PRES 
 
 The concept of figure/ground organization, which originally came from Gestalt 
psychology and is exemplified by the famous picture of “Rubin’s Goblet,” forms a 
fundamental and valid feature of our pattern of cognition.  In the psychological sense 
of the terms, the figure within a scene is an entity perceived as standing out from the 
ground and is accorded prominence as the pivotal entity around which the scene is 
organized.  These notions (i.e., the figure and ground) are central to the 
characterization of grammatical structures of the English language.  For example, 
when we observe a given situation, we normally single out a certain entity as the 
perceptually prominent figure standing out from the ground and code it as the 
grammatical subject.  In a locative relation like (18), it is said that the book is 
conceptualized as the figure. 
 
(18)  The book is on the table. 
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 Noteworthy here, with regard to the factors governing the choice of the figure, 
Yamanashi (2004:160) remarks that the figure/ground asymmetry follows the principle, 
as shown in (19): 
 
(19) Figure / Ground Principle: 
  smaller > bigger, movable > stationary, concrete > abstract, animate >  
  inanimate, thing > space 
 
1.5.3. Conceptualizer’s Vantage Points and Conceptualization of Events 
 Observations of the linguistic data thus far and the two modes of cognition 
provided by Nakamura (2004, 2009) lead naturally to the following cognitive 
principles: 
 
(20) Conceptualizer’s vantage points and conceptualization of events 
 (A) Japanese and Korean speakers have a strong tendency of construing an 
event through their conventionalized view which results from the vantage 
point within the setting in which the event unfolds, and describe it by 
activating their reference point ability. 
 (B) English speakers have a strong tendency of construing an event outside the 
setting objectively and describe it according to the figure/ground 
organization.  
 
The respective principles above can be illustrated in Figure 1.12 (a) and (b), 
respectively.8  The validity of the principles (20A) and (20B) above can be advocated 
                                                 
8   Figure 1.12(b) has a close affinity with the ‘canonical event model’ provided by Langacker 
 (1991: 285). 
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 Linguistic phenomena which support the principle (20A-B) include the English 
dangling participles and their counterparts in the Japanese and Korean languages. 
As noted, Japanese and Korean speakers construe an event from the vantage point 
within the setting (or situation) in which the event unfolds whereas English speakers 
construe an event outside the setting and describe it from an objectified vantage point.  
For this reason, in the case where there exist two events in a situation to be described, 
English speakers tend to focus the logical relationship between them, which is 
indicated by the two broken-line arrows in Figure 1.13(a).  From this vantage point, 
the conceptualizer can easily realize that the rock in question is interpreted as the 
grammatical object of Event 1, which is in turn construed as the grammatical subject 
of Event 2.  Thus, the expression seen from a distance in (21a) results whereas 
sentence (21b) is judged to be unnatural or ungrammatical.  On the other hand, 
Japanese sentence (22) and Korean sentence (23) reveal that the meaning of Event 1 is 
Figure 1.12: Conceptualizer’s Vantage Points 
setting 
tr lm 
tr : trajector 
lm : landmark 
A B 
flow of conceptualizer’s mental access 
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equated with the cognitive process followed by the speaker who holds a direct 
interaction with the rock, which is indicated by the broken-line arrow from the 
conceptualizer to Event 2 in Figure 1.13(b).  To put it another way, Event 1 is the 
linguistic manifestation of the conceptualizer’s mental access to Event 2.  For this 
reason, Event 1 (i.e., see from a distance) cannot be coded in a passive voice. 
 
(21) a. Seen from a distance, the rock looks like a human face.  
 b. ?Jogging through the park, a brilliant idea suddenly came to me. 
 (Declerck 1991: 463) 
 
(22) Tooku-kara   miru-to,  sono iwa-wa   hito-no-kao-ni      mieru. 
    from a distance   see-when   DET  rock-TOP   human's face-DAT   look like- PRES  
(23) Meonde-seo   bo-myeun,  geu  bawi-neun saram-ui   eolgul-lo  boinda 









 Our next example is the following difference in ways of coding, which can also be 




Event 1 Event 2 
Figure 1.13: Conceptualizer’s Mental Access 





(24) a. Eki-de    Mary-ni    atta. 
       Station-LOC   Mary-DAT  meet-PAST 
 b. Yeog-eseo    Mary-reul    mannatda. 
       Station-LOC  Mary-ACC  meet-PAST 
 c. I met Mary in the station. 
 
In (24a, b), the location in which the described event occurred is coded in the 
sentence-initial position.  This is because Japanese and Korean speakers tend to 
express an event to be described with their reference point ability activated.  I’m 
suggesting that the relationship between the location and the event corresponds to the 
one between the whole and its part.  Therefore, the former is preferred to be 
recognized as the reference point whereby the target is to be identified.  By contrast, 
in (24c), speakers of English are likely to construe a described event outside the setting 
and describe it according to the principle of figure/ground organization.  In this mode 
of cognition, the speaker can visualize himself (i.e., I) in his mind and therefore he 
tends to recognize himself as the primary figure (i.e., trajector), resulting in the 
representation as the grammatical subject.  The other participant Mary, by contrast, is 
recognized as the secondary figure (i.e., landmark) and is coded as the grammatical 
object.   
 Our perspective here can also accommodate the difference in the linear order 
between the main clause and its subordinate clause.  Observe the following linguistic 
data: 
 
(25) a. Stephanie-wa  ie-ni    modoru-to,     Christopher-ni  denwa    shita. 
    Stephanie-TOP    house-LOC  come back-when DAT  Christopher-DAT    telephone   do-PAST 
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 b. Stephanie-neun  jib-e     dorawa-seo,  Christopher-ege   jeonhwa    hayeotda. 
    Stephanie-TOP    house- LOC   come back-when  Christopher-DAT    telephone     do-PAST 
(26) a. When Stephanie came back home, she called Christopher. 
 b. Stephanie called Christopher when she came back home. 
 c. When she came back home, Stephanie called Christopher.  
 
In the Japanese and Korean languages, adverbial clauses should precede the main 
clauses.  This is because adverbial clauses function as a reference point whereby the 
semantics of main clauses are to be identified, as illustrated in Figure 1.14(a).  By 
contrast, speakers of English construe a situation from outside through an objectified 
viewpoint, as shown in Figure 1.14(b).  Crucial in this perspective is that speakers of 
English tend to focus the logical relation between two described events.  For this 
reason, the linear order between the main clause and its subordinate clause is irrelevant 
without the consideration in slight semantic difference from a functional viewpoint of 







 The principles (20A, B) also account for the difference in the narrative system 
among languages.  It is well known that the English language has ‘indirect speech’ as 
well as ‘direct speech,’ but the Korean and Japanese languages have only ‘direct 
speech.’  Observe the following linguistic data: 
(a) (b) 
C 
Event 1 Event 2 
Figure 1.14: Conceptualizer’s Perspective 
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(27) a. Mary said, “I am a member of the team.” 
 b. Mary said that she was a member of the team. 
(28) a. Mary-wa   sono  team-no   member  da    to     itta. 
  Mary-TOP  DET  team-POSS  member   be-PRES   COMP  say-PAST 
 b. John-un  geu  team-ui   member  da        rago   malhaetda. 
  John -TOP  DET  team- POSS  member    be-PRES    COMP  say-PAST. 
 
To be noticed here is that in the Korean and Japanese languages, the verb in the 
complement clause is expressed in the present tense form, as shown in (28a, b), 
regardless of the past tense form of the main clause verbs.   This is because Korean 
and Japanese speakers tend to construe and describe an event as it is in the setting.  In 
this conceptualization, the content to be expressed in the complement clause is viewed 
through the perspective of ‘the speaker’s present,’ and thus the present tense form 
results.  By contrast, speakers of English are likely to construe an event outside the 
setting and describe it from an objectified viewpoint, which means that the past event 
(i.e., Mary said, “I am a member of the team.”) is construed as the one detached from 
the speaker’s “here and now,” as shown in Figure 1.15 and therefore the utterance of “I 
am a member of the team” is situated at a specific past time, which leads to the 

















1.5.4. Two Modes of Cognition and Lexicalization of Motion Events 
 In I-mode of cognition, as Nakamura (2009) argues, the conceptualizer recognizes 
what an entity (a thing or an event) is through his direct physical interaction with it in 
the domain of cognition.  Based on this hallmark of I-mode of cognition, I argued in 
the previous subsections that in this mode of cognition, the conceptualizer’s perception 
and conception are developing at nearly the same time.  In contrast, D-mode of 
cognition reveals that the conceptualizer processes an event in his conceptual sphere 
by the cognitive operation of metacognition of that event.  It follows that the domain 
where the event is located is separated from the one where the conceptualizer exists, as 
illustrated in Figure 1.9.  I claimed that the crucial point in this mode of cognition is 
that the conceptualizer’s conception is detached from the integrated whole (i.e., the 
state of undifferentiation between his perception and conception).  
 The undifferentiation or separation between perception and conception is crucial 
to understand the nature of the relationship between human cognition and linguistic 
manifestations.   Essential here is the distinction between conceived time and 
processing time.  The basic and significant tenet of Cognitive Grammar is that an 
expression’s meaning is not just the conceptual content it evokes ― equally important 
is how that content is construed, which leads to the idea that meaning resides in 
conceptualization.   Conceptualization necessarily consists in processing activity by 
the conceptualizer and the time through which this activity occurs is termed 
processing time; i.e., time as the medium of conception.  On the other hand, events 
being or to be observed occur along a time axis and the time which figures in their 
conception is called conceived time.  The point here is that conceived time belongs 




 To make the two notions more explicit, observe the following expressions. 
 
(29) a. The balloon is rising slowly. 
 b. The hill gently rises from the bank of the river. 
 
Sentence (29a) describes the physical motion of balloon and therefore it is moving 
along a spatial path through conceived time.  What is important here is that the 
conceptualizer construes this actual motion event by tracking the mover’s progress 
along the spatial path through processing time.  Thus, in this case, the conceived time 
and processing time are progressing in parallel.  On the other hand, sentence (29b) 
describes a situation that is totally static.  In this case, conceived time has no 
significant role in the expression’s objective content.  Rather, the meaning of the verb 
rise resides in the conceptualizer’s mental scanning of the situation; i.e., his mental 
path through processing time.  Langacker (2008:529) illustrates the difference 
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 As noted above, Nakamura (ibid.) argues that speakers of Japanese have a strong 
tendency to activate I-mode of cognition to interpret an event whereas speakers of 
English have a strong tendency to activate D-mode of cognition.  On the basis of the 
characteristics of respective modes of cognition, I argue that conceived time and 
processing time develop in parallel when the conceptualizer construes an event by 
activating I-mode of cognition, which is because his perception and conception of that 
event unfold simultaneously, but the two types of time can be separated in the case of 
D-mode of cognition.  My suggestion is that the separation between conceived time 
and processing time makes it possible to convert ‘processes’ into ‘atempral complex 
relations’ like prepositions and particles.  In this respect, Langacker’s (2008) 
following analysis is crucial to understand this mechanism. 
 
(30)  In the CG analysis, the crucial difference resides not in content but in construal.  
There are two aspects in which the verb construes the content temporally and the 
preposition atemporally.  First, the verb specifically invokes conceived time (t) 
and portrays the complex relationship as developing along this axis.  While the 
temporal dimension is not excluded from the preposition’s meaning, neither is it 
focused ― it remains in the background and may even be absent altogether.  
Second, the verb highlights temporality by scanning through the component states 
sequentially (indicated by the bar along the time arrow), whereas the preposition 
achieves a holistic view by scanning them in summary fashion.  














To sum up, the notion of atemporal complex relation results from the cognitive effect 
of backgrounding of conceived time which a process evokes. 
 This perspective is closely related to the difference between “satellite-framed 
language” and “verb-framed language.”  According to Talmy (2000), a “motion 
event” ― the movement of an entity changing its location from one point in space to 
another ― is composed of various semantic/conceptual elements, including “motion” 
(change of location through movement), “figure” (the moving entity), “path” (the 
trajectory through which the figure moves), and “manner” (the way in which the entity 
moves).  He argues that languages tend to adopt one of two major patterns in terms of 
how the path of motion is lexicalized; i.e., in some languages, particles and 
prepositions (e.g., up, across, into), which are termed “satellite,” are the preferred 
means for expressing a path, and in others, it is verbs (e.g., ascend, cross, enter) which 
serve the corresponding function.  On the basis of this analysis, he named languages 
that express a path mainly in satellite “satellite-framed languages,” and those which 
typically express a path in verbs “verb-framed languages.”  He also argued that 
satellite-framed languages include English, German, Mandarin Chinese, and French, 
and verb-framed languages include Spanish, Turkish, Japanese, and Korean. 
(Langacker 2008: 117) 















 Our concern here is why speakers of Japanese express the notion of path by using 
verbs, whereas speakers of English express the corresponding notions by using 
particles or prepositions.  In this respect, my perspective is that the difference in 
expressive ways of the notion of path mentioned above corresponds to either 
simultaneousness or separation between conceived time and processing time.  
Observe the following linguistic data. 
 
(31) a. Taro-wa   oyoi-de   kawa-wo   watatta. 
  Taro-TOP   swim-BY  river-ACC  cross-PAST 
 b. Taro-wa   kawa-wo   oyoi-de    watatta. 
  Taro-TOP  river-ACC  swim-BY  cross-PAST 
 b. Taro swam across the river. 
 
As shown in sentence (31a, b), the Japanese language can contain multiple verbs (i.e., 
oyogu (swim) and (wataru (cross) in this case) in one and the same clause.  By 
contrast, the English language can have only one verb in a clause and the notion of 
path is expressed by a preposition (i.e., across in this example).  This means that 
there is nothing that Japanese speakers do but code a process in a verb because they 
construe the process by activating I-mode of cognition where conceived time and 
processing time develop simultaneously.  My claim can be reinforced by the data (32a, 
b) below, where the Korean language also reflects I-mode of cognition. 
 
(32) a. Inho-neun   heeomch-yeo  gang-eul    geonneot-da. 
 Inho-TOP    swim-BY    river-ACC   cross-PAST 
 b. Inho-neun   gang-eul   heeomch-yeo  genneot-da. 
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  Inho-TOP   river-ACC  swim-BY     cross-PAST 
 
1.5.5.  Relative Tendency or Cline between Two Modes of Cognition  
  In the previous subsections, we observed some commonalities between the Korean 
and Japanese languages, which stem from the same mode of cognition which speakers 
of both languages activate in the conceptualization of an event.   It is true, however, 
that there are some differences between the two languages.  One example is the 
difference in the voice system (the passive voice in particular) between the Korean and 
Japanese languages.   
 At the outset of our discussion, observe the following English data: 
 
(33) a. The enemy destroyed the city. 
 b. The city was destroyed by the enemy. 
(34)  John lives in this town.  
 
As indicated above, speakers of English need an entity functioning as a grammatical 
object to passivize the sentence.  For this reason, they cannot passivize the sentence 
(34).  This is because, as Langacker (1991) argues, passivazation in English is based 
on the conceptual processing by which an entity construed as the patient of an event is 
foregrounded or focused for some reasons, including the principle of cohesion with the 
preceding sentences, whereby the entity, which is normally interpreted as a landmark, 













 As for the Japanese language, the difference between transitive and intransitive 
verbs is irrelevant to the grammatical phenomenon of passivization, as shown in 
(35a-c) and (36a, b).  For this reason, intransitive passive sentences in (35a-c) are 
quite natural. 
 
(35) a. Ame-ni    furareta. 
   Rain-DAT  fall-PASS-PAST 
  b. Tomodachi-ni  korareta. 
   Friend-DAT   come-PASS-PAST 
  c. Akachan-ni   nakareta. 
   Baby-DAT   cry-PASS-PAST 
(36) a Suri-ni     saifu-wo    nusumareta. 
   Pickpocket-DAT  purse-ACC  steal-PASS-PAST 
  b. Hanako-ni   computer-wo     kowasareta. 
   Hanako-DAT  computer-ACC   break-PASS-PAST 
 
Recall here that Japanese speakers tend to construe an event through a direct 
interaction with it within the setting and describe it through activating their reference 
event 






point ability. This perspective naturally leads to the idea that Japanese passive 
sentences originally focuses on a relationship between the speaker and the event 
described, which makes it possible for Japanese speakers to describe a given event in a 
passive voice in the case where the event causes the speaker some trouble, as shown in 
Figure 1.19(a) and (b), where the instigation of the trouble is indicated by the 







More specifically, the peculiarity of the viewing which Japanese speakers have 
established through the acquisition of their native language implies the elevated 
attenuation of the sensibility of perceiving the logical relationship between the speaker 
and a described event as being active or passive.  What I mean is that the 
conceptualization of events as being active or passive results from the cognitive 
processing of tr/lm alignment between participants.  The original meaning of 
Japanese ‘rareru’ is that an entity emerges spontaneously (Onoe (2003)), which means 
that the nature of the Japanese ‘rareru’ construction lies in expressing the 
conceptualizer’s spontaneous emotion or sentiment toward an event with which he has 
a direct interaction.10  This conceptualizing process can be illustrated as Figure 1.20. 
                                                 
9   Ikegami (2011) remarks from a historical point of view that this type of passive construction 
 was the only way for Japanese speakers to use passive sentences, and expressions such as “The 
 award was given to John” is a result of the influence form European languages. 





Figure 1.19: Adversative Passive Constructions 













Figure 1.20 illustrates that a certain emotion or sentiment emerges in the speaker’s 
mind by some stimulus through a direct interaction with an entity, which invokes the 
conception of a comparison scale pertaining to the degree of a particular experiential 
inclination or a certain value judgment and specifies that the entity falls within that 
portion of the scale located beyond the norm (n). 
 In this respect, the Korean language has a different linguistic manifestation.  
That is, intransitive passives are judged to be unacceptable, as shown in (37). 
 
(37) *Na-nun  pi-ey    nayli-ci-ess-ta. 
 I-TOP   rain-BY  fall-PASS-PAST-DEC 
(Washio 2008: 44) 
 
Rather, the corresponding expression for Japanese sentence (38a) is sentence (38b), 
which distinctly reflects the cognitive processing of tr/lm alignment between 
participants.  This means that speakers of the Korean language have established a 
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higher sensibility of perceiving the logical relationship between the speaker and a 
described event as being active or passive than Japanese speakers have.  This 
perspective without doubt stems from D-mode of cognition. 
 
(38) a. Inu-ni     hoerare-ta. 
      dog-DAT  bark-PASS-PAST 
 b. Gae-ga    nahan-te  jit-da. 
        dog-NOM  I-DAT   bark-PAST 
 
In addition, my claim can be supported by the following data: 
 
(39) a.  Sensei-ni     homerare-ta. 
  Teacher-DAT praise-PASS-PAST 
 b. Seonsennim-i    nahan-te  chingchan-eul  het-da 
  Teacher-NOM   I-DAT   preise-ACC  give-PAST 
 c. Seonsennim-hante  chingchan-eul  badat-da 
  Teacher-from  praise-ACC   get-PAST 
       
Sentences (39b, c) show that speakers of the Korean language tend to objectify an 
action (‘praise’ in this example) by the conceptual operation of nominalization and 
regard it as rather an autonomous entity.  It is because of such conceptual autonomy 
that the entity is construed to be an object that one can give or get.  
  The observation thus far has revealed that Japanese and Korean speakers have 
some commonality in ways of conceptualizing entities in that both speakers have a 
strong tendency of activating I-mode of cognition.  Based on this mode of 
46 
 
conceptualization, however, speakers of the Korean language have acquired the 
sensibility of the logical relation between participants (including the speaker) in the 
event being perceived.   This means that the Korean language can be analyzed as 
occupying the position between English and Japanese in the tendency of viewing in 
terms of I-mode/D-mode of cognition.  
 
1.6. From Perception to Conception ― Construal of Entities  
 As already mentioned, my primary concern is to explore the nature of language 
in terms of human cognition, and for this purpose, my dissertation is twofold.  One is 
the investigation of the interrelationship between the ways of the conceptualizer’s 
viewing the world and linguistic manifestations.   The other is to reveal how 
conceptual structures of linguistic constructions are based on or originated in 
perception.  In what follows, I will overview the latter query as the preliminary 
intermediary of the main discussion of my dissertation. 
 The basic tenet of Cognitive Grammar is that an expression’s meaning is not just 
the conceptual content it evokes.  What this means is that every linguistic expression 
reflects how the conceptualizer construes the content.  That is, the theoretical focus of 
Cognitive Grammar lies in the elucidation or elaborate description of conceptual 
structures of linguistic phenomena, but not of perceptual phenomena per se.  The 
spirit of Langacker’s view is to foreground the importance of visual perception to 
explicate the construal or cognitive processing of an entity by human beings, as the 
following: 
 
(40) It is hard to resist the visual metaphor, where content is likened to a scene and 
construal to a particular way of viewing it.  Importantly, CG does not claim that 
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all meanings are based on space and visual perception, but the visual metaphor 
does suggest a way to classify the many facets of construal, if only for expository 
purposes.  In viewing a scene, what we actually see depends on how closely we 
examine it, what we choose to look at, which elements we pay most attention to, 
and where we view it from.  The corresponding labels I will use, for broad 
classes of construal phenomena, are specificity, focusing, prominence, and 
perspective.  
    (Langacker 2008: 55) 
  
  Here, I will make a brief overview of the respective conceptual analogs of human 
perceptual experience; i.e., specificity, focusing, prominence, and perspective  
below.  First, the notion of ‘specificity,’ a conceptual analog of perceptual 
accurateness, is about the level of precision and detail at which an entity being 
described is characterized.  For example, we can describe entities (i.e., things or 
events) with greater specificity or a fine-grained detail, as illustrated in (41a, b).   
 
(41) a. rodent → rat → large brown rat → large brown rat with halitosis 
  b. Something happened. → A person perceived a rodent. → A girl saw a  
    porcupine. 
       (Langacker 2008: 56) 
 
These expressive ways depend on how precisely we should give particular information 
to the hearer.   
Second, the notion of ‘focusing’ includes the selection of conceptual content for 
linguistic presentation, and therefore it is relevant to the relative notions of ‘figure’ and 
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‘ground.’  It is quite a common experience that in focusing our attention on 
something, we unconsciously give prominence to some elements of a scene.  That is, 
as Gestalt psychology demonstrated, we automatically arrange the elements of a visual 
scene into a salient figure and a non-salient background, or ground.  For example, 
when we look out of the window, we may see a tree silhouetted against the sky.  Here, 
the tree is the figure and the sky serves as the background.  However, in a situation 
where a bird comes flying by and perches on the treetop, it is, in turn, the bird that 
becomes the figure and relatively the tree recedes into the background.  In general, 
the figure tends to be more clearly visible, more mobile, better delineated and smaller 
in size than the ground, and therefore attracts our particular attention and interest.  In 
the psychological sense of the term, the figure within a scene is an entity perceived as 
standing out from the ground and is accorded prominence as the pivotal entity around 
which the scene is organized.  These notions (i.e., the figure and ground) are central 
to the characterization of grammatical structures.  In a locative relation like (42), it is 
said that the clock is conceptualized as the figure. 
 
(42) The clock is above the fireplace. 
 
 Third, the term ‘prominence’ (or ‘salience’) includes the two notions of ‘profiling’ 
and ‘trajector/landmark alignment.’  As the basis of its meaning, a linguistic 
expression embodies a certain part of conceptual content, which is termed its 
conceptual base.  In Cognitive Grammar, an expression’s conceptual base is identified 
as its maximal scope.   An expression’s profile stands out as the specific focus of 
attention within its immediate scope.  In other words, the profile is characterized as 










In conceptualizing an elbow, the notion of body functions as maximal scope and the 
notion of arm as immediate scope. 
 When a relation is profiled, varying degrees of prominence are conferred on its 
participants.  In Cognitive Grammar, the most prominent participant is termed 
trajector (tr), which can be characterized as the primary figure within the profiled 
relationship.  Some other participant which is rendered prominence is called a 
landmark (i.e., the second primary figure). 
 Fourth, the term ‘perspective’ is the viewing arrangement which shows the 
relationship between a viewer and an entity being viewed.  Every linguistic 
expression invokes not a neutral conception of the situation described, but rather one 
that embodies a particular viewing arrangement by the conceptuaizer; the effects of the 
specific arrangement on the situation’s appearance constitute an inherent aspect of the 
expression’s semantic value. 
 One component of the viewing arrangement is a presupposed vantage point (i.e., 
the position from which a scene is viewed).  In the default case, the vantage point is 
the actual location that the speaker and hearer occupy.  However, the same objective 
situation can be observed and described from different vantage points, resulting in 
different construals.  As depicted in (43), the choice of go vs. come indicates whether 






Figure 1.21: Maximal and Immediate Scopes of elbow 
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the speaker is maintaining his own vantage point or adopting that of the listener. 
 
(43) a. I’ll go to your apartment tomorrow. 
 b. I’ll come to your apartment tomorrow. 
 
 This viewing relationship is also relevant to the semantics of grammatical 
structures because the path of mental access is one facet of the conceptualization 
evoked by linguistic expressions and constitutes a subtle difference in their meanings.  
For example, observe the following sentences: 
 
(44) a. An ugly scar extends from his elbow to his wrist. 
 b. An ugly scar extends from his wrist to his elbow. 
                                    (Langacker 2001d: 9) 
(45) a. Your camera is upstairs, in the bedroom, in the closet, on the top shelf. 
 b. Your camera is on the top shelf, in the closet, in the bedroom, upstairs. 
                                    (ibid.: 13) 
 
The two expressions in (44) describe precisely the same objective situation but slightly 
differ in meaning.  The contrast between (44a) and (44b) resides in the direction of 
mental scanning; i.e., the conceptualizer’s path of mental access in building up to the 
full conception of the overall configuration.  Similarly, sentences in (45) correspond 
to two different ways of accessing the full conceptualization.  In (45a) the conceptual 
processing is that of “zooming in,” with each locative expression in the sequence 
specifying a location for the subject, whereas sentence (45b) follows the “zooming 
out” strategy.  What should be noted here is that in the “zooming in” strategy, the 
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semantic relationship between a locative expression and the following one is the one in 
which the former delimits the latter’s location, while with regard to the “zooming out” 
strategy, the latter is the added description to the former.   
It is well known that the function (or effect) of the stylistic inversion is to guide a 
reader or hearer to the target entity.  In this respect, it is preferable that the starting 
element should be an entity of high prominence or accessibility.  The following 
examples indicate that the relationship between a whole and its part constitutes a 
natural path of access; i.e., a whole has priority, for a part is usually characterized with 
respect to its place or function within the whole, which is consonant with the salience 
principle (14).   
 
(46) a. Upstairs, in the bedroom, in the closet, on the top shelf was his missing  
  camera. 
 b.??On the top shelf, in the closet, in the bedroom, upstairs was his missing  
 camera. 
                                               (ibid.14) 
 
What is important here is that in (46a), the reference point chain is maintained; i.e., the 
ordering or directionality from a reference point to its target is in consonance with the 
accessibility of entities, which reflects the fundamental conceptual processing in our 
minds.   
 
1.6.1.  Conceptual Structures of Linguistic Expressions 
 I have thus far argued that understanding the interrelationship between 
perception and conception is crucial to make explicit the nature of human language, 
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and that numerous aspects of construal which are quite important linguistically can be 
interpreted as general conceptual analogs of visual perception.  My primary concern 
is without doubt about conceptualizations or cognitive processes which reside in the 
meanings of linguistic expressions.  The main purpose of this dissertation is to 
describe conceptual structures of linguistic expressions from a cognitive perspective.  
Specifically, I will discuss how linguistic expressions or constructions reflect concepts 
originated in perception.  To make the discussion more efficient, my research is 
divided into three parts, depending on the affinity of conceptual processing by which 
to characterize constructions.  The following is preliminary overview of the 
respective parts. 
 
1.6.2. Conceptual Space and Linguistic Manifestations 
  Linguistic structures are conceptual tools for imposing particular ways of 
viewing a situation by the conceptualizer.  In other words, this viewing relationship is 
relevant to the semantics of grammatical structures because the path of mental access 
is a vital facet of the conceptualization reflected in linguistic expressions and 
constitutes a subtle difference in their meanings.  I will reveal in Part I of this 
dissertation that a lot of linguistic manifestations can be best elucidated in terms of 
spatial-cognitive processing which is a conceptual analog of visual perception. 
 Here, as a preliminary discussion, I would like to make an overview of the 
correlation between tense forms (i.e., present/past forms) and their implied meanings.  
In this respect, Langacker (1991: 245-249) argues that a proximal/distal contrast in 
visual perception has its corresponding analog in the epistemic sphere, on the basis of 
which he insists persuasively that the tenses are grounding elements which situate an 
event being described in a certain location relative to the ground (i.e., the speech event, 
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its participants (the speaker and hearer) and its circumstances).   
 Observe the difference in cognitive processing between the complement events in 
(47b) and (48a, b): 
 
(47) a.  Mary is pregnant. 
 b. John said that Mary was pregnant. 
(48) a. Bill said that John loves Mary. 
 b. Sally told me that John is very depressed.  
 
The complement event in sentence (47b) is situated outside his/her dominion of 
epistemic control (D2), as depicted in Figure 1.22(a), in that the conceptualizer has 
accessed that event via the matrix subject’s viewing frame, which is represented by the 
broken arrows.  On the other hand, in (48), the present form in the corresponding 
clause represents that the conceptualizer has interpreted the event as being proximal, 
which results from the cognition that it is in his/her dominion of epistemic control, as 



























It should be noted here that the schematic characterization of the past tense form lies in 
the conceptualization in which the speaker situates a described event out of his/her 








 The perspective discussed above is naturally applicable to the distinction between 
tense forms in conditionals, which reflects the viewing relationship between a speaker 
and a conceived situation.  Observe the following sentences: 
 
(49) a.  A:  Your secretary’s going to have a baby.   
   B:  That’s nice for her, but if she’s going to have a baby, I will have to do 
    all the paperwork myself. 
 b. If it rains tomorrow, we may have to cancel the trip. 
  c. If you park your car here, it may be damaged by those children.                                                                                            
(50)  a. If he took a taxi, he would have a better chance of getting there in time.  
 b. If I came into a fortune, I would give up working.  
  c. I would tell you the answer to that question if I knew it. 
  d. If I had a computer, I could get on with my work much more quickly. 
 
With conditionals, the speaker sets up a hypothetical world or mental space wherein 
event 
speaker’s dominion 




the protasis holds and claims that the apodosis should also hold.  Therefore, there 
exists a predictive relationship between the two events.  In (49), the present tense 
form represents the speaker’s proximal epistemic stance towards the content of the 
conditional, which does not allow us to predict whether or not the speaker has other 
options explicitly in mind.  On the other hand, distanced forms such as (50) represent 
the speaker’s negative epistemic stance towards the content of the conditional and 
bring the unexpressed alternate option into more prominence; i.e., the speaker does not 
think the described future world will match the real future (see Dancygier and 
Sweetser 1996).    
 My concern here is why the past tense, when used in conditionals, leads us to 
infer the speaker’s negative epistemic stance.  I suggest that the conceptualizer’s 
construal of that event as being out of his/her dominion can lead to his/her negative 
epistemic stance toward it.  To make my point more explicit, let us begin by 
observing the following linguistic data: 
 
(51) a. John overstepped his bounds. 
 b. That is outside my field. 
 c. The lecture is beyond my comprehension. 
 d. His remark is beyond my endurance. 
 
Examples in (51) show that the subject entities are situated out of the relevant 
dominions, as sketched in Figure 1.23, resulting in the speaker’s negative epistemic 
stance toward those entities.  This mode of conceptualization, as a result of the 
metaphrocal extension, is analogous to that in the data exemplified in (51), which 
naturally leads to a possible implication of a speaker’s negative epistemic stance 
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towards an event being described. 
 In Part I, which is highly relevant to this, I will discuss two linguistic phenomena; 
one is the semantic difference between infinitives and gerunds, and the other is the 
English there-constructions.  In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I will argue that the 
semantic difference between infinitives and gerunds results in conceptual spaces where 
a described event is situated; i.e., a referent coded in an infinitive is conceptualized 
within the control domain of the matrix subject or the speaker whereas the counterpart 
coded in a gerund is conceptualized as being out of that domain.  Chapter 4 will argue 
that the peculiarity of there-constructions lies in the discrepancy of conceptual layers 
where the speaker and hearer entertain a given event, which is the conceptual analog of 
visual perception in the case where we view an entity as being proximal or distal.  I 
will reveal that in there-constructions, the speaker presents an abstract mental space by 
introducing there, functioning as a reference point and situates an event in that space, 
serving as a target, and the event is interpreted as a virtual one (to put it another way, a 
virtual instance) by the hearer.  Thus, the construction imposes a given 
conceptualization where a described event is construed holistically by way of summary 
scanning and manipulated as a unitary entity. 
 
1.6.3. Cognitive Domains and Linguistic Meanings 
Linguistic meaning involves both conceptual content and the construal imposed 
on that content.  Following the basic tenets of Cognitive Grammar, every expression 
invokes a set of cognitive domains as the basis for its meaning.  The term “domain” is 
interpreted as indicating any kind of conception or realm of experience and knowledge 
with respect to which a given entity is construed.  Langacker (1991, 2001) divides the 
notion of domain into two types: basic and non-basic domains.  Basic domains are 
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thought of as realms within which conceptualization can occur and specific concepts 
can emerge.  For instance, time and space are not concepts per se but simply the 
temporal and spatial extensionality in which specific concepts manifest themselves and 
changes unfold.  On the other hand, non-basic domains are regarded as concepts in 
terms of which a target entity is construed.  To take the expression glass as an 
example, Langacker argues, there are some domains that evidently figure in its 
conceptual characterization: (1) Space (as a basic domain), (2) Shape, (3) Function, (4) 
Material, (5) Size, and (6) Others (domains pertaining to cost, washing, storage, 
dropping and breaking, and so on).  Crucial here is to inquire about where cognitive 
domains come from.  In this respect, what can be immediately noticed in this example 
is that quite a few domains are originated in our perception.  This observation can be 
reinforced by Langacker’s (2008) following remark: 
 
(52) What is a domain, exactly?  To serve its purpose, the term is broadly interpreted  
as indicating any kind of conception or realm of experience.  Among the 
domains figuring in the content of figure 2.5, for example, are space, the 
sensation of wetness, the specific concept WATER (partly defined in terms of 
wetness), the more schematic concept LIQUID (immanent in WATER), the 
conception of a container and its content, the more elaborate conception of filling 
a container with liquid, notions of volume and equality (hence equality of 
volume), as well as our knowledge of the cultural practice of filling a glass with 














I’m suggesting that the origin of cognitive domains lies in our direct interaction with 
entities in the physical world; that is, cognitive domains come from our perceptual 
activities through bodily experience, and the concepts thus established, in turn, render 
us a certain viewpoint by which to construe an entity to be described.   
What is important in Cognitive Grammar is that non-basic domains overlap with 
one another, often to the extent of full inclusion, and that there exist varying degrees of 
centrality exhibited by the domains.  Specifically, the relative centrality of 
constitutive domains is one facet of linguistic meaning and crucial for the 
characterization of lexical items.  This mechanism is quite natural once we consider 
the situation where we construe an entity; i.e., we can view it from multiple aspects or 
angles.   To understand this more explicitly, consider the phenomenon referred to as 
the verbalization of nouns.  A general tendency of this linguistic phenomenon is that 
a verbalized noun retains the primary concept of its origin as a requisite subpart.  For 
example, the noun telegraph is thought to be an instrument of communication, i.e., a 
tool for sending a written message or information to someone at a distance.  In the 
conceptual process of verbalization of such nouns, the domain of “function” can be 
construed as being more central, which leads to the acceptability of the sentence John 
Figure 2.5: Alternative Construals (= Figure 1.24 in this paper) 
Conceptual 
Content 
Construal1 Construal2 Construal3 Construal4 




telegraphed Bill the news.   
 Part II exemplifies the importance of this perspective ― the domain centrality in 
particular ― to elucidate the nature of linguistic structures and the meaning an 
expression evokes.  Chapter 5 will reveal that the English verb have designates a 
relationship between two entities in such a way that one entity serving as a trajector in 
the current discourse space is characterized by the other (i.e., landmark) which is in the 
dominion provided by the trajector.  The establishment of have’s import is based on 
the relative centrality of its constitutive domains, depending on which cognitive 
domain in the matrix is in focus or foregrounded.  In Chapter 6, I will argue that the 
consideration of the semantic difference between the English ditransitive constructions 
and their to/for-dative counterparts demonstrates that the conceptualization of an event 
encoded in either construction can be analyzed as containing the two possible central 
domains (i.e., the domain of the interpersonal relationship and that of the 
source-path-goal image schema), and that the relative centrality between them has 
much to do with its linguistic manifestation.   
 
1.6.4. Conceptual Autonomy and Dependence 
 Cognitive Grammar makes special claims about the notional basis of 
fundamental grammatical categories.  Two fundamental classes are definable in terms 
of the nature of a designated entity (this notion is maximally inclusive, subsuming both 
region and relation); that is, a nominal predication (i.e., noun) designates a region in 
some domain, while a relational predication designates either an atemporal relation 
(i.e., adjective, adverb, and preposition) or a temporal relation (i.e., verb).  This 
assumption claims that the distinction among grammatical categories does not lie in 
the conceptual content of an entity, but rather in the way the content is accessed. 
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In this way, a nominal predication differs from a relational predication in that the 
former designates a thing, while the latter designates either a process or an atemporal 
relation.  In addition, these two fundamental categories are contrastive in terms of the 
notions of autonomy and dependence.  Langacker (1987) defines these notions as 
follows:  
 
(53) a.  autonomous structure:  A semantic or phonological structure that “exists  
   on its own,” not presupposing another structure for  
   its manifestation; [...]    
 b.  dependent structure:  A semantic or phonological structure that presup- 
   poses another for its manifestation.  
                                 (Langacker 1987b: 486,488) 
 
By definition, any relational predication can be regarded as conceptually dependent, 
since it requires for its conceptualization some intrinsic reference to entities that 
participate in the relation.  The conception of a physical object like a tree or a cat, by 
contrast, is more autonomous, because we can conceptualize a cat without activating to 
any significant degree the notion of its participation in a relationship with other objects.  
Therefore, ‘things’ are regarded typically as autonomous entities and relations as 
dependent entities.   
 The distinction, however, is a matter of degree.  Consider first the meaning of 
an arc.  It presupposes the conception of a circle; only when a set of points is 
identified with a portion of a circle is it recognized as constituting an arc.  Therefore, 
the conception of a circle is an abstract domain that serves as the scope of predication 
in which an arc designates only a segment.  Another example is the meaning of 
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hypotenuse.  The conception of a right triangle functions as the base for a hypotenuse, 
whose profile is one of the constituent line segments.  Nouns of this sort are termed 
‘relational nouns.’  It can also be said that deverbal nouns are conceptually dependent 
to the extent that they are conceived of as evoking the notion of the event involved in 
its base as a semi-active concept.  Langacker (1987) argues that the verb explode and 
its nominalization explosion can both be used to describe the same event, but explode 
and explosion contrast semantically in that they employ different images to structure 
the same conceptual content, i.e., explode imposes a processual construal on the 
profiled event, whereas explosion portrays it as an abstract region.  This semantic 
contrast can be sketched in Figure 1.25(a, b): 








In Figure 1.25(a), the verb designates a process, comprising a series of component 
states scanned sequentially through conceived time, as is characterized in (54a).  The 
broken-line ellipse indicates the implicit region defined by the interconnection of the 
component states.  Within the verb itself, this latent region has no particular salience; 
standing in profile are the relational configurations of the individual component states, 
but not the region per se.  On the other hand, the nominalization takes the process 
designated by the verb as its base, and it selects for profiling the higher-order region 
(a) Verb (e.g. explode) (b) Nominalization (e.g. explosion) 
Figure 1.25: Difference between Verb and Nominalization 




comprising the component states, these states being profiled collectively by summary 
scanning, as defined in (54b).  
 
(54) Two modes of cognitive processing: 
  (a) Sequential scanning: 
    A mode of processing in which a series of component states are activated 
successively in non-cumulative fashion (i.e. a situation is followed in its 
evolution through conceived time, as in watching a film).  
  (b) Summary scanning: 
A mode of processing in which a set of specifications or a series of component 
states are activated successively yet cumulatively; thus, after a building-up 
phase, all facets of a complex structure are coactivated and simultaneously 
accessible.            
           (Langacker 1991: 553, 554) 
 
Consequently, nominal predications can be divided in three, as shown in (55):  
 
(55)  A. conceptually autonomous structure:  
   (i) autonomous nouns (e.g. tree, cat,...) 
    B. conceptually dependent structure:   
   (i) relational nouns (e.g. arc, hypotenuse,...)  
     (ii)  deverbal nouns (e.g. explosion, preparation,...) 
 
 What should be noticed here is that when viewed, a thing per se is construed to be 
conceptually autonomous, as diagramed in Figure 1.26(a), but in the case where we 
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perceive two entities in our visual field, as illustrated in Figure 1.26(b), we are inclined 














A good example of our concern might be exemplified by the historical semantic 
extension of ‘by.’  Observe the chronological description of the meanings in (56) and 
the corresponding linguistic data in (57) below: 
 
(56)  the chronological semantic extension of ‘by’  
 a.  Of position in space: at the side or edge of; in the vicinity of; near, close to,  
  beside. [c 898] 
 b.  Of time: in the course of, at, in, on (the time or date of an action or event).  
   [c1000] 










V = Viewer (subject of perception) 
MF = maximal field of view 
VF = viewing frame (onstage region) 
O = object of perception 





   [c1000] 
 d.  The sense of ‘means’ often passes into that of ‘attendant circumstances’, and  
   so approaches or reaches that of manner. [c1340] 
  e.  The sense of ‘means’ sometimes approaches or passes into that of ‘cause’ or  
   ‘reason’: Because of, on account of, in consequence of, through; in virtue of,  
    on the ground of. by so, by that: therefore. [1398] 
  f.  Introducing the principal agent.  This, which has now become a main use of  
   by, is hardly found before 15th c. [c1400] 
       (Oxford English Dictionary) 
 
(57)  a. Johnson was standing by the window. （spatial proximity） 
 b.  I shall have finished it by five o’clock.（temporal proximity） 
 c.  We judge a stranger by our home-bred ways. (mental or ideal proximity) 
  d.  The engine is driven by steam.（means） 
 e.  I was moved to tears just by thinking about it.（cause or reason） 
 f.  The play was written by Shakespeare. (agent) 
 
Sentence (57a) represents the spatial proximity between the two entities (i.e., Johnson 
and the window).  Crucial here is that each entity per se is regarded as being 
conceptually autonomous in that it does not presuppose another entity for its 
manifestation.  It is likely, however, that in our daily experience, we tend to identify 
or locate an entity in relation to another.  For this reason, in the case where two 
entities are in our visual field, we naturally construe them in that space, resulting in the 
spatial proximity between them.  The meaning of temporal proximity in (57b) 
originates in a metaphorical extension from the one of spatial proximity.  What 
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should be addressed here is that in each example of (57c-f), the relationship between 
an event (or a process) and an entity (a thing or a process) is focused by the 
conceptualizer.  Specifically, the respective events are motivated by the entities 
accompanied by ‘by.’  For example, in (57d), the process of the engine being driven 
is provided by steam, and in (57e), the process of being moved to tears is caused by the 
process of thinking about it. 
 The point here is that a conceptually autonomous entity in its own right is 
cognizable as dependent, or vice versa, by some motivating factor or another.  Part III 
will reveal that the notions of conceptual autonomy and dependence are crucial to 
elucidate some particular constructions.  I will discuss this matter through the 
consideration of three constructions: the English Possessive Constructions, the English 
atypical objects, and type/instance modifiers.  Chapter 7 demonstrates that possessive 
genitives, as Langacker (1993) argues, instantiate a reference point construction where 
both a possessive nominal and a possessed nominal are regarded as conceptually 
autonomous whereas in of-constructions, the concept designated by an of-phrase is 
intrinsic to the characterization of its head, which means that the head noun of this 
construction is conceptually dependent.   Chapter 8 attempts to characterize atypical 
object constructions (i.e., light verb constructions, certain V-NP-PP type idiomatic 
expressions, and cognate object constructions).  The discussions reveal that the 
atypicality of objects in the clause structures results from the shared semantic nature.  
That is, the characteristic of the semantic structures is that the relationship between a 
main verb and its object is equated with that between a schema and its instantiation.  
To put it another way, the object entity elaborates the overall structure of the process a 
verb denotes.  I will argue that this semantic relationship stems from the cognition 
that the concept described by the object is conceptually dependent because it 
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designates a relational notion and therefore can be construed as activating the 
underlying eventivity as a semi-active concept.  Chapter 9 argues that a type modifier 
is characterized as an integral subpart of a particular conception that a head noun 
designates, whereas an instance modifier is conceived of as identifying a specific 
instance denoted by a nominal.   Here, the instance is considered to be conceptually 
autonomous in that it has a particular referent in the physical world.  On the other 
hand, a noun representing a type is regarded to be relational and thus conceptually 
dependent because it bears a conceptual relationship with its type modifier  
 
Part I 
Conceptual Space and Semantics of Constructions 
 
 As I have overviewed in Chapter 1, the full elucidation of the relationship between 
human cognition and language needs to posit the role of our visual experience of space 
as a vital facet, which is based on the finding in cognitive science that there exists 
extensive parallelism between perception and cognition, and that numeral aspects of 
human conceptualization can be interpreted as general conceptual analogs of visual 
perception.  Part I focuses on the importance of conceptual space which is analogous 
to a perceptual one.  More specifically, when we perceive an entity we are likely to 
feel it to be proximal or distal in our visual field.  This means that there exists a 
boundary or a region in which we feel an entity to be proximal.   Cognitive Grammar 
posits that proximal/distal contrast in visual perception has its corresponding analog in 
the epistemic sphere, which is crucially important to elucidate the semantics of 
linguistic phenomena.  I have already observed in Chapter 1 that the notion of the 
domain of epistemic control is crucial to make explicit our conceptualization of an 
entity (i.e., a thing or an event).  In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I will argue that the 
semantic difference between infinitives and gerunds lies in the distinctive conceptual 
spaces where an event described is situated; i.e., a referent coded in an infinitive is 
conceptualized within the control domain of the matrix subject whereas the counterpart 
coded in a gerund is conceptualized as being out of that domain.  Chapter 4 will 
reveal that in there-constructions, the speaker presents an abstract mental space by 
introducing there, functioning as a reference point, and situates an event in that space, 
serving as a target.  The peculiarity of the there-construction stems from the 
discrepancy of conceptual layers where the speaker and hearer entertain a given event 
respectively, which are the conceptual analogs of visual perception.  That is, in the 
there-construction, the speaker has accepted the content as real, but the hearer 
understands it as a virtual instance by way of conjuring up the corresponding 
simulation which has been established and stored in his brain through his daily 
experience.  The point is that the event is interpreted as a virtual one (to put it another 
way, a virtual instance) by the hearer.  Thus, the construction imposes a 
conceptualization where a described event is construed holistically by way of summary 





Chapter 2  On the Semantic Structures of Infinitival and  
 Gerundive Complements 
 
2.1. Introductory Remarks 
Many analyses have been presented on the syntactic and semantic properties of 
infinitival and gerundive complements.  Bolinger (1968) characterizes infinitives as 
being “potential or hypothetical” and gerunds as a “reification.”  Similarly, Kiparsky 
and Kiparsky (1971) claim that the complements of factive predicates are reducible to 
gerunds whereas those of non-factive predicates are reducible to infinitives. 
From another point of view, Dixon (1991: 237) classifies infinitive complements 
into two types: “Modal To” complement and “Judgment To” complement.  “Modal 
To” complements relate to (the potentiality of) the subject of the complement clause’s 
becoming involved in the state or activity referred to by that clause while “Judgment 
To” complements refer to a judgment or opinion which the main clause subject makes.  
He also claims that gerunds denote “some activity or state as extended in time.”  
Furthermore, Dirven (1989: 118-125) argues that the infinitive denotes a single 
occurrence of an individualized event or state and therefore requires the implication of 
an agent whereas the gerund indicates the activity or state as an unbounded and 
non-individualized phenomenon.  
It is true that each of the analyses has partial validity as a means to account for 
the nature of infinitival and gerundive complements, but, as we will see later, each 
approach faces counterexamples.  This means that the previous studies cannot 
completely make explicit the nature of the two types of complements.  In this chapter, 
I will argue that the incomplete characterizations of infinitive and gerundive 
complements offered by previous studies result from an independently motivated 
70 
 
principle.  I argue that the semantic difference between infinitives and gerunds results 
in conceptual spaces where an event described is situated; i.e., a referent coded in an 
infinitive is conceptualized within the control domain of the matrix subject or the 
speaker whereas the a counterpart coded in a gerund is conceptualized as being out of 
that domain.   
In section 2.2, I will argue on the basis of these notions that infinitives and 
gerunds are to be differentiated from each other in that they have their own distinct 
modes of categorization and differ in the control domains, which gives a 
principle-based characterization to the respective semantic structures of the S+V+ to V 
and S+V+ V-ing.  In section 2.3, I will show that the principle presented in section 
2.2 is also applicable to the semantic structures of the S+V+O to V and S+V+ one’s 
V-ing, which gives further viability to my perspective on infinitival and gerundive 
complements.  
 
2.2. Semantics of S+V+ to V and S+V+ V-ing 
2.2.1. Semanitc Structures of S+V+ to V and S+V+ V-ing 
 My claim in this section is that the most convincing parameter for motivating 
the distinction between infinitival and gerundive complements is whether an entity or 
event to be described is conceptualized as being proximal or distal, which is closely 
related to the notions of conceptual dependence and autonomy (see Part III for further 
discussion).  In what follows, I will argue for the viability of my claim by resorting to 
three notions and their linguistic manifestations: objectification, nouniness, and 
controllability. 
First, I will consider the difference between infinitival and gerundive 
complements in terms of “objectification.”  Observe the following sentences. 
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(1)  a. I want to buy a new car.  
  b. *It was to buy a new car that I wanted.  
(2) a. *To answer the question was refused. 
 b. *To start early was agreed. 
 c. *To accept the bribe was wanted (by Herbert). 
(3) a.  John enjoyed playing the piano. 
 b.  It was playing the piano that John enjoyed.   (Wierzbicka 1988: 84) 
(4) a.  Getting into college was considered by John. 
 b.  It was getting into college that John considered.   
(Yasui ed. 1987: 366) 
                     
Sentences in (1-2) and (3-4) show that infinitival complements cannot be put in the 
focus position of a cleft-sentence, nor can they be passivized while gerundive 
complements can.1 It follows that infinitival complements cannot be conceived of as 
an independent information unit whereas a gerundive complement can be cognized as 
an independent information unit.  This means that sentences with infinitive 
complements are lower in the transitivity scale than those containing gerundive 
complements.  In other words, to-infinitive-taking verbs constitute a single concept 
together with their complements.  On the other hand, as sentences in (5) show, 
gerunds are suitable for describing objectified entities.  In (5a), the event going on a 
picnic is objectified as a target for discussion and in (5b), the act seeing the accident 
represents the event divorced from current discourse space. 
                                                 
1  The conceptual autonomy of the gerund can be supported by Ruwet’s (1991: 184) assertion 
 that “one of the conditions on the acceptability of passive sentences lies in a certain “referential 




(5) a. We discussed going on a picnic. 
 b. They reported seeing the accident. 
 
This perspective gives a natural solution to the question of why sentences like 
those in (6) take gerundive complements: 
 
(6) a. Mary recommends buying the big tins. 
 b. Bill suggested reading the instructions first. 
 c. John advised consulting a lawyer. 
 d. I advocate going there. 
 
The discrepancy between the agent of the matrix clause and its counterpart of the 
complement clause indicates that the concept denoted by the gerundive complement 
has a conceptually autonomous structure.  It is because of this objectification effect 
that in the structure of S+V+ V-ing, unlike the S+V+ to V construction, the doer of the 
complement clause is not necessarily the same person as the matrix subject.  What is 
to be notified here is that in sentences such as (5) and (6), the gerundive complements 
represent particular actions respectively, which contradicts Dirven’s above-mentioned 
analysis.  Rather, more important is that objectified or independent entities from their 
matrix subjects should be reified by gerundive complements.   
Second, the two complements are contrastive with each other in terms of 
“nouniness.”  It is well-known that the constituents of a coordinate construction must 
belong to the same syntactic category and have the same semantic function.  An 
infinitive, unlike a gerund, neither functions as an indirect object in ditransitive 
constructions nor co-occurs with a noun phrase in a coordinate construction, as shown 
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in (7) and (8): 
 
(7) a. We didn’t give doing that a second thought. 
 b. *We didn’t give to do that a second thought.     
                                        (Declerck 1991:466) 
 
(8) a.  Jane once liked watching television and physical exercise both. 
 b. * Jane once liked watching television and to play volleyball both. 
 c. * Jane once liked to watch television and physical exercise both. 
 d. * Jane once liked physical exercise and to watch television both.  
(Konishi 1980: 872) 
 
This observation suggests that infinitives are eventive or processual (i.e., a 
conceptually dependent concept) while gerunds are thing-like (i.e., a conceptually 
objectified or independent concept).   
Third, another factor that distinguishes the two constructions in question is the 
notion of “controllability,” which was originally proposed by Riddle (1975) as the 
semantic parameter for the distinction between infinitival and that-clause 
complements; i.e., the matrix subject in the S+V+ to V construction has control over 
the eventual completion of the event encoded in the complement clause, as in (9).  
 
(9) a. I’m aching to travel. 
 b. John desires to marry Mary. 
 c. We concluded to wait for fair weather. 
 d. John determined to prove his father’s innocence. 
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 e. We resolved to make an early start. 
 f.  Bill agreed to come with us. 
 g.  John decided to rebuild his house. 
 h. John consented to help her. 
 i.  Bill aims to improve his invention. 
 j.  John dared to repeat his statement. 
 k.  Mary proposed to catch the early train. 
 
Thus, the infinitival complement is unacceptable when it denotes a non-volitional 
action since this is a semantic contradiction, as in (10b): 
 
(10) a. I intended to hide the pen somewhere in the kitchen. 
 b. *I intended to mislay the pen somewhere in the kitchen.   
   
In the S+V+ V-ing constructions, on the other hand, the matrix subjects do not 
have any controllability over the events encoded in the gerundive complements, as 
shown in (11) as well as (6), regardless of the fulfillment of the events described in the 
complement clauses: 
 
(11) a. I remember posting the letter. 
 b. I forget locking the door. 
 c. I regret telling you such a story. 
 d. I will appreciate hearing from you soon. 
 e. Bill feared being left alone. 
 f. I can’t help thinking he is still alive. 
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 g. Bob admitted seeing John. 
 h. Mary confessed having stolen the purse. 
 i. John acknowledged having been defeated. 
 j. Can you visualize living on the moon? 
 
The discussions thus far confirm that the S+V+ to V construction encodes 
the events of the matrix and complement clauses as a single event whereas the 
S+V+V-ing them as two discrete events.  The infinitive complement differs from the 
gerundive complement in their own categorization.  The designatum of the former is 
included in the matrix subject’s control domain but that of the latter is excluded from it.  
The two structures can thus be characterized by the following principle: 
 
(12)   Cognitive characterization of S+V+ to V and S+V+ V-ing constructions: 
In the S+V+ to V construction, the matrix subject construes a process 
designated by the complement clause as being proximal.  It is cognized as 
being WITHIN the control domain of the matrix subject.  In the S+V+ V-ing 
construction, by contrast, an entity designated by the gerund is construed as 
being distal.  It is cognized as being OUT OF the control domain of the 
matrix subject. 
 
The characterization above makes explicit the nature of each construction in a unified 
fashion. Their semantic contrast lies in the difference between proximal and distal 
construal of an event by the referent of the matrix subject.  Therefore, their respective 











Figure 2.1(a) represents the semantic structure of the S+V+ to V.  The inner rectangle 
stands for the control domain of the matrix subject.  The small broken-line rectangle 
indicates that a concept depicted by the infinitive is construed as a processual episode.  
The dotted line stands for the correspondence between the matrix subject and an agent 
of the event denoted by the infinitive.  Crucial to this semantic structure is that the 
concept designated by the infinitive is conceptualized as lying within the control 
domain of the matrix subject which exerts an abstract energy force to the fulfillment of 
the event which the infinitival complement designates.   
On the other hand, by Figure 2.1(b) I mean that the concept designated by the 
gerund is construed as a thing-like entity and is conceptualized outside its matrix 
subject’s control domain.  Therefore, we can characterize the S+V+V-ing 
construction as a linguistic device which codes the subject entity as making mental 
contact with a concept in a distinct control domain from its own.2 
 
2.2.2.  S+V (emotion) + to V/ V-ing Constructions 
 A further difference is observed between the referents of the subjects and the 
                                                 
2  The above-mentioned peculiarity of gerundive complements (i.e., the action designated is 
 considered to be a general sense) results from this nature of gerunds. 
(a) (b) 






complements when the matrix verbs of the two constructions denote some kind of 
emotion: the asymmetrical energetic interaction between them.   
The to-infinitive-taking verb represents an active emotion and the gerund-taking 
verb a passive emotion, which the matrix subject’s referent exerts, as shown in the 
contrast between (13) and (14):3 
 
(13)  a. John claims to be the owner of the land. 
  b.  Mary intends to go to Europe. 
(14)  a.  I will appreciate hearing from you soon. 
  b.  Max enjoyed swimming. 
 
Accordingly, they give different kinds of semantic roles to their arguments, as 
illustrated below: 
 
(15) a.  Subject  + Verb +  to V 
       < Agent >  < Active emotion >   < Target > 
 b.  Subject  + Verb +   V-ing 
     < Experiencer > < Passive emotion >   < Stimulus > 
 
Thus, this contrast can be diagrammed in Figure 2.2(a-b): 
 
                                                 
3  The verb care may be said to be synonymous with the verb mind, as illustrated in the following: 
 (i) a. Do you mind if I smoke?  =  Do you care if I smoke? 
   b. He doesn’t mind what they say.  =  He doesn’t care what they say 
 However, the verb care cannot take a gerundive complement as its object entity: 
 (ii)  *Do you care my smoking? 
 The unacceptability of the sentence lies in the fact that the referent of care’s subject exerts an 











Crucial to the semantic structure sketched in Figure 2.2(a) is that the matrix subject 
exerts an active emotion over the event depicted by the infinitive.  The semantic 
structure of S+V+ V-ing, by contrast, can be diagrammed in Figure 2.2(b).  The 
left-hand small circle designates the referent of the subject and the right-hand large 
circle represents the entity encoded in the gerundive complement.  My intention in 
Figure 2.2(b) is to indicate that the entity encoded in the gerund serves as a kind of 
stimulus and the matrix subject is construed as an experiencer.  The arrow in the 
circle representing the subject entity denotes his or her emotion triggered by the 
stimulus. 
The complement selection of verbs that can take both types of complements is 
predictable from this perspective, depending on the construal of the event concerned.  
Observe the following data: 
 
(16) a. I like to go for a walk on Sundays. 
 b.  I like sitting in the garden when it is fine. 
 
(17) a. Mary feared to disturb his thought. 
  b. Bill feared being left alone. 
(a) (b) 
Figure 2.2:  Semantic Structures of S + V (emotion) + to V and 
   S + V (emotion) + V-ing 
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The verbs like and fear in (16a) and (17a) denote ACTIVE emotions to carry out the 
actions designated in the complements; thus they take the infinitive.  On the other 
hand, the same verbs in (16b) and (17b) represent PASSIVE emotions which are 
triggered by the conceptual contents denoted in the complements; therefore, they take 
the gerund.  This can be ensured by the two distinctive meanings of the respective 
words, as illustrated in (18): 
 
(18) a. like:  1. If you like something or someone, you think they are interesting,  
   enjoyable, or attractive. 
 2. If you say that you like to do something or that you like something  
  to be done, you mean that you prefer to do it or prefer it to be done. 
   b. fear: 1. If you fear something or someone, you are frightened because  
     you think they will harm you. 
 2. If you fear to do something, you are afraid to do it or you do 
 not wish to do it. 
                                   COBUILD (emphasis supplied) 
 
The contrast between active and passive emotions accounts for the semantic 
difference (a) and (b) in (19) and (20) in the same fashion: 
 
(19) a. John regrets telling you that lie. 
 b. We regret to inform you that you are to be dismissed next week. 
(20) a. I remember visiting Boston. 




The regret in (19a) denotes a feeling of disappointment that is caused by the event 
described in the gerundive complement whereas the regret in (19b) is used as a polite 
way of conveying the communicative content described in the that-complement.  The 
notion of “politeness” is just a manifestation of an active emotion.  In the same way, 
the remember in (20a) means that the experience of visiting Boston remains in the 
subject’s mind.  On the other hand, the remember in (20b) indicates that the referent 
of the matrix subject has an intention to visit Boston. 
In addition, some gerund-taking verbs designate the import that a particular 
concept encoded in the complement clause comes into (or appears in) the matrix 
subject’s mind, as exemplified in (21): 
 
(21) a. Can you visualize living on the moon? 
 b. I can’t fancy your doing it. 
 c. Can you imagine her doing such a thing? 
 d. I can’t envisage the plan’s working. 
 e. We are considering going to Canada. 
 f. Jane is anticipating receiving a gift from her uncle. 
 
This is attributable to the fact that the sentences above have similar semantic structures 
to Figure 2.2(b).  Thus, as far as sentences with verbs denoting emotion and 
visualization are concerned, the gerundive complement can be best characterized as a 






2.3. Semantics of S+V+O+ to V and S+V+ one’s V-ing 
2.3.1. Semantic Structures of S+V+O+ to V and S+V+ one’s V-ing 
In the previous section, I have claimed that in the S+V+ to V construction, the 
concept that the complement clause designates lies within the control domain of the 
matrix subject while in the S+V+ V-ing the corresponding concept lies outside the 
domain.  In this section, I argue that the same cognitive principle equally applies to 
both of the S+V+O+ to V and S+V+ one’s V-ing constructions.  In what follows, I 
will present the semantic structures of the two constructions with reference to two 
notable studies.  
Verspoor (1999) describes the nature of the S+V+O+ to V construction on the 
basis of Langacker’s (1991) characterization of to-infinitives: 
 
A to-infinitive expresses some sort of directness.  With an epistemic verb it 
expresses that an opinion is directly based on some personal or experiential 
knowledge and the to expresses that X is moving towards a categorical state Y.  
With a deontic verb it expresses that there is some direct contact between the 
subject of the main clause and the subject of the complement clause.  The to 
expresses the goal of an intention. 
 (i)  a. I believe him to be honest. 
  b. The president ordered the soldiers to attack.    
(Verspoor 1999: 525) 
 
Here, the difference between the complements of epistemic verbs and deontic verbs 
largely corresponds to Dixon’s distinction between “Judgment To” complements and 
“Modal To” complements.  As for the validity of the notion ‘directness,’ it can be 
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confirmed by observing the following sentences: 
 
(22) a. The newspapers report a UFO to be circling over Chicago. 
 b. The newspapers report that a UFO is circling over Chicago. 
(23) a. The chief inspector believed Smith’s murderer to be insane. 
 b. The chief inspector believed that Smith’s murderer was insane. 
(Davison 1984: 811) 
 
It has been claimed that an indefinite NP has two interpretations: specific and 
non-specific, and that in (22a), unlike (22b), the NP a UFO has a specific reading.  A 
similar distinction occurs for pragmatically different interpretations of definite 
descriptions; i.e., referential and attributive uses.  In the referential use as illustrated 
in (23a), the speaker has some particular entity in mind and the definite description is 
used as a way of pointing to it.  In the attributive sense as exemplified in (23b), on 
the other hand, the speaker does not need to have any particular entity in mind; the 
definite description is used to refer to whatever might fit the specification.  The 
S+V+O+ to V constructions in general rule out the attributive interpretation of the 
object entity. 
Izutsu (2000a) argues in more detail that the S+V+O+ to V construction has three 
major senses: caused process, desired process, and conceived process, which are 
subsumed under the schematic meaning of causation.  He claims that the caused, 
desired, and conceived processes can be differentiated from one another in terms of the 
kind of force-dynamic interaction (i.e., physical, emotive, or imaginative) and the 
world in which such a relationship is situated (i.e., physical or mental) (Izutsu 2000a: 
68), as shown in (24): 
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(24) A. Caused process: [S ---> O --->] physical 
 a. She forced/compelled/ coerced him to leave. 
 b. We told/ordered/persuaded him to leave. 
 c. They asked/coaxed/induced him to leave. 
 d. The guards allowed/permitted me to bring them in. 
   B.  Desired process: [S -e-> O --->] mental 
   a. I desire/want/like/wish/need you to come. 
   b. I trust/expect you to keep this secret. 
 C. Conceived process: [S -i-> O ---] mental 
 a. I believe John to be telling the truth. 
 b. We consider/think/assume them to be our friends. 
 
It follows from these analyses that the matrix subject of the S+V+O+ to V 
construction holds direct mental contact with its object entity and exerts some 
influence over the object’s fulfillment of a particular action denoted by the infinitive.  
Here, I characterize the prototype of this construction as an action chain or 
force-dynamic interaction, with an entity designated by the to-infinitive being within 
the control domain of the matrix subject, resulting in a single complex event as a 










By contrast, the S+V+ one’s V-ing construction cannot be interpreted in the same 
way as the S+V+O+ to V because the matrix subject in this construction exerts no 
influence over the entity encoded in the possessive form, as shown in (25):  
 
(25)  a. I remember John’s winning the lottery. 
  b.  I admired Mary’s singing ‘Salty Dog’ in church. 
 
This distinction can be accounted for in a principle-based way by our assumption that a 
concept designated by the infinitival complement lies within the control domain of its 
matrix subject whereas the corresponding one indicated by the gerundive complement 
lies outside the domain.   
Observe the following sentences: 
 
(26) a. I advised him to come back at once. 
 b.  I advised his coming back at once. 
 
Sentence (26a) implies direct contact between the manipulator (i.e., the matrix subject) 
and the manipulee (i.e., the accusative noun).  Direct manipulative contact 
necessarily implies spatial contiguity (i.e., co-presence at the same location), and the 
two events encoded in the main clause and the complement clause are construed as a 
single complex event (Givón 1993: 13).  On the other hand, sentence (26b) is more 
likely to involve indirect communication between the manipulator and the manipulee.  
The causing event and the caused event are construed as two independent events.   




(27) a.  I explained Adam’s refusing to come to the phone. 
 b. *I explained refusing to come to the phone.   (Konishi 1980: 524) 
 
In the case where the hearer cannot pragmatically identify the control domain in which 
the entity designated by the gerund is situated, the speaker refers to a reference point 
so that the hearer can establish mental contact with it.  From the observations above, 









Figure 2.4 is intended to make explicit that the entity which the gerundive 
complement designates is not in the matrix subject’s control domain.  The left-hand 
and right-hand circles stand for the subject and object entities, respectively.  The 
right-hand large circle represents the possessive form, which has dual function: that of 
indicating that the gerundive complement is outside its matrix subject’s control domain 
and that of specifying a reference point by which the conceptualizer establishes mental 
contact with a concept encoded in the gerund (Langacker 1993).   
The viability of the semantic structure sketched in Figure 2.4 can be ensured by 
the linguistic data below: 
 
Figure 2.4: Semantic Structure of S + V + one’s V-ing Construction 
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(28) a. I can't imagine their doing such a thing. 
 b. I can understand your being taken in.       (Konishi 1980: 1672) 
 c. I wouldn't want to even consider his stealing the key. 
 
In (28), the particular events described in the complement clauses designate past or 
future events.  They are not coincident with the time of speaking, resulting in the 
gerundive complements.  This means that they are outside the matrix subject’s 
control domain. 
Conversely, cognition verbs based on direct, physical perception such as ‘realize’ 
and ‘discover’ necessarily imply that the conceptual content described in the 
complement clause is coincident with the cognition the matrix verb denotes.  Thus, it 
should be reified by the infinitive clause.  Hence, the unacceptability of the sentences 
in (29) results. 
 
(29) a. *Everyone realized Joan's being completely drunk. 
 b. *Everyone discovered Joan's being completely drunk.   
                                          (Hooper 1975) 
 
2.3.2. Semantic Structure of S+V (cognition) +O+ to V 
It is well known that verbs of thinking and cognition impose an idiosyncratic 
constraint on their infinitival complements: in the S+V (cognition)+O+ to V 
construction, the to-infinitive complement must denote a general or habitual action, as 
shown in (30): 
 
(30) a. They understand him to be a distant relation. 
 b. I consider him to be the best candidate. 
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 c.  I believe him to be working very hard. 
 d. I believe her to beat her children.      
 e. I believe this plant to grow in a cold region. 
 f. I believe the judge to have taken bribes. 
 
The construction with cognition verbs results in unacceptability when the to infinitive 
designates a particular action, as in (31): 
 
(31) a. *They believe the judge to accept bribes. 
 b. *I believe Mary to arrive tomorrow. 
 c. *I consider him to solve the problem. 
 
In this subsection, I will argue that the S+V (cognition)+O+ to V construction is 
acceptable when it is interpreted as an extension from the prototype depicted in Figure 
2.3.  It should be noted here that sentences like those in (30) are formal in their 
stylistic effect as Thomson and Martinet (1984) and other researchers point out.  This 
is straightforwardly accounted for in line with our claim above; i.e., the prototype of 
the S+V+O+ to V construction manifests a causative relationship between the matrix 
and complement clauses where the matrix subject exercises direct influence over its 
object in projecting it toward the eventual completion of an action denoted by the 
infinitive clause.  The construction containing verbs of thinking or cognition is 
obviously low in prototypicality and thus the marginality of the expressions like I 
consider him to be the best candidate results.  In other words, it is this low 
prototypicality or markedness that leads to such a stylistic effect (i.e., formality).   
This marginality is quite a natural consequence when we realize that the primary 
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function of that-clauses is to represent a cognitive content (see Wierzbicka 1988).  It 
follows from this that verbs of cognition are likely to take a that-clause as their 
complements.   
What is evident from this low prototypicality is that crucial to the unacceptability 
of sentences in (31) is that the matrix subject is not construed to exert an abstract 
energy force over its object entity to accomplish an event denoted by the infinitive.  
Rather, the acceptability of sentences with cognition verbs such as (30) results from 
the fact that the to-infinitive represents a subjective judgment by the matrix subject’s 
referent, by which the linkage is established between the subject and the to-infinitive.  
This means that the construction as a whole is construed as belonging to one and the 
same control domain.  Consequently, the S+V(cognition) +O+ to V is recognized as 
an extension from the prototype sketched in Figure 2.3.  Its semantic structure can be 









Figure 2.5 represents the conceptualization as an integration of two cognitive 
processes.  First, the matrix subject and the object entity are in the same control 
domain with the former holding a direct mental contact with the latter.  Second, the 
conception encoded in the to infinitive denotes a manifestation of a subjective 




judgment by the matrix subject, which is indicated by the solid arrow.  This 
conceptualization enables us to construe the whole structure as belonging to one and 
the same control domain.   
The validity of Figure 2.5 is ensured by the fact that the event described in the 
complement clause coincides with the temporal frame of the matrix verb.  To make 
my point more explicit, I will refer to the aspectual distinction between ‘perfective’ 
and ‘imperfective’ processes.  The fundamental aspectual distinction for English 
verbs, as Langacker (1990: 85-97) argues, is between what he calls ‘perfective’ and 
‘imperfective’ processes in that the former portrays a situation as changing through 
time while the latter describes a stable situation.  “A perfective process is so called 
because it is bounded, i.e., its endpoints are included within the scope of predication in 
the temporal domain.  No such specification of bounding is made for an imperfective 
process; it profiles a stable situation that may extend indefinitely far beyond the scope 
of predication in either direction” (Langacker 1990:87-88).   
In this respect, not only the stative situation and progressive aspect in (30a-c) but 
also the habitual or repetitive actions in (30d-e) are construed as imperfective.  The 
perfect infinitive in (30f) can be construed as denoting the resultant state of the 
particular action designated by the verb and therefore the state is conceived of as 
imperfective.  Thus, the decisive factor in the acceptability of sentences of this type 
is whether conceptual contents designated by complement clauses are temporally 
unbounded and coincident with the immediate scope of the governing verbs, forming a 
single complex event, or are temporally bounded, residing outside the immediate scope 
as being separate from the matrix event. 




2.4. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter argued that the infinitival and gerundive complements differ from 
each other in their modes of conceptualization; i.e., the referent of the former is 
conceptualized WITHIN the control domain of the matrix subject whereas that of the 
latter is conceptualized as being OUT OF the domain.  This difference correctly 
predicts the matter of matching the semantics of each complement with that of the 
governing verbs.  The present research is in consonance with a fundamental claim of 
cognitive semantics: most important for the meaning of an expression is how the 
conceptualizer construes the situation to be described and portrays it for expressive 




Chapter 3  Complement Selection of Aspectual Verbs 
 
3.1. Introductory Remarks 
The English complementation system has been a topic of long-standing interest 
to linguists and many analyses have been presented on the syntactic and semantic 
properties of infinitival and gerundive complements. A traditional semantic-syntactic 
parameter between infinitival and gerundive complements has mainly relied on the 
principle that the former expresses something “hypothetical, future, unfulfilled,” 
whereas the latter denotes something “real, fulfilled.”  However, rigorous adherence 
to this principle meets with a lot of counterexamples.  The previous chapter has 
revealed that infinitives and gerunds are to be differentiated from each other in that 
they have distinct modes of conceptualization of their own; i.e., an event coded in a 
infinitival complement is located in the control domain of the matrix subject’s referent 
whereas an event coded in a gerundive complement is situated out of the domain.  
This means that acknowledging the parallelism between the speaker’s role as a 
conceptualizer vis-à-vis a grounded expression and the subject’s role with respect to a 
complement clause (see Langacker 1991:446-447), the crucial parameter between the 
two complements is whether a subject’s referent construes an entity encoded in the 
complement subjectively or objectively.    
An infinitival complement in the S+V+ to V construction is construed as being 
eventive (or processual) and the matrix subject has control over the completion of that 
event.  This reflects the cognition that the matrix subject’s referent conceptualizes the 
complement’s process more subjectively.  On the other hand, a matrix subject of the 
S+V+V-ing construction does not have any controllability over an event denoted in the 
complement.  Instead, a conception denoted in the gerundive complement has a 
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conceptually autonomous structure (i.e., a thing-like entity).  This reflects the 
conceptualization of the matrix subject’s construing the subordinate process more 
objectively as a unitary entity.  I have thus proposed in the previous chapter the 







            
 
My central claim in this chapter is that the same cognitive principle is equally 
applicable to the complement selection of aspectual verbs in spite of their own 
peculiarities. 
 
3.2. Peculiarities of Aspectual Verbs 
In this section, I will consider the complement selection of aspectual verbs and 
argue that it can be accounted for in a principled way by resorting to the conceptual 
difference between infinitives and gerunds.   
Importantly, aspectual verbs have commonality in that both an infinitival and a 
gerundive complement can be construed as being within the matrix subject’s control 
domain.  This peculiarity is ascribable to the fact that aspectual verbs denote the 
inception or termination of a process that a complement clause designates.  For this 
reason, the process, unlike sentence (1), does not constitute a semantic unit which is 





(b) S+V+ V-ing construction 
Figure 3.1: Semantic Structures of S+V+ to V and S+V+ V-ing 
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independent of the matrix subject, as exemplified in (2): 
 
(1) a. John enjoyed playing the piano. 
 b. It was playing the piano that John enjoyed.   
(2) a. John started snoring. 
 b. *It was snoring that John started.        
  (Wierzbicka 1988:84) 
 
In addition, as the second characteristic, events coded in complement clauses 
must be simultaneous with aspectual verbs.  Hence, the unacceptability of the 
following sentences results: 
 
(3) a. *John began having said something important. 
 b. *John began having eaten dinner. 
 c. *I finished having talked. 
 d. *She started having got caught. 
 
This peculiarity contrasts strikingly with sentences like those in (4) where the matrix 
verbs are not aspectual: 
 
(4) a. Mary confesses having stolen the purse. 
 b. John acknowledged having been defeated. 
 
In what follows, with these peculiarities in mind, I will characterize the semantic 
structures of aspectual verbs with infinitival or gerundive complements.  
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3.3. Semantic Structures of S+V (aspectual verbs) + to V / V-ing 
Notable here as the outset of our discussions is Izutsu’s (1997) insightful analysis 
of the conceptualization of phases a process involves.  He has defined the phases of 
inception and termination of an event as the following: 
 
(5) a. THE PAHSE OF INCEPTION (a tentative cross-linguistic definition) 
A change in which some ENERGETIC and DURATIONAL relation comes into 
existence in a setting.  
            (Izutsu 1997: 327) 
 
 b. THE PHASE OF TERMINATION (a tentative cross-linguistic definition) 
A change in which some ENERGETIC and DURATIONAL relation goes out of 
existence in a setting.   
         (ibid.: 338-339) 
 
Following him, the concept of the inception of an event coded in a complement clause 
can be characterized as (6): 
 
(6) The inception of an event means that an event coded in a complement comes into 
the subject’s immediate dominion. 
 
By this definition, the conceptualization of the inception of an event comprises two 
facets: one is the exertion of energy by the subject entity toward the appearance of a 
process the complement clause designates, and the other is the resultant appearance of 











                     
 
                                    
 
The viability of this semantic structure can be supported by Dixon’s (1984) 
analysis.  According to Dixon, for sentence (7a) to be appropriate, Mary had merely 
raised the stick but had not yet brought it down upon John’s head.  On the other hand, 
sentence (7b) could be said when she must have rained at least a few blows on him. 
 
(7) a. Mary began to hit John. 
 b. Mary began hitting John. 
 
His analysis can also be corroborated by the following sentences: 
 
(8) a. He began to say something, but his words broke into a rasping cough.   
 b. I started to interrupt, but he waved me to silence.      
      (Konishi 1980: 121, 494) 
S S 
: subject entity ; : exertion of energy ; : complement event ; 
: S’s control domain ; : S’s immediate dominion 
overall scope of predication 




The semantic contrast between (7a) and (7b) can be accounted for by resorting to 
which of the two facets is in focus or in the immediate scope of predication for 
expressive purposes.  What I am suggesting is that sentence (7a) is a linguistic 
manifestation of the semantic structure in which the first facet of the composite 
structure is in focus, whereas in sentence (7b) the second facet is in focus, as shown in 




                     











Crucial here is that in the S + begin to V construction, an event designated by an 
infinitival complement is construed as a process which appears as a result of the 
exertion of energy by the subject’s referent, while with regard to the S + begin V-ing 
construction, an event designated by a gerund is conceived of as a resultant existing 
S S 
overall scope of predication 
immediate scope of predication (or in focus) 
Figure 3.3  Semantic structure of S + Inceptive verb + to V 
overall scope of predication 
immediate scope of predication (or in focus) 




entity.  I suggest that if the small rectangle within the matrix subject’s control domain 
is regarded as an onstage region, it can be said that the first facet of the composite 
semantic structure is construed subjectively, whereas the second facet objectively.  
Therefore, there exists commonality in conceptualization between Figure 3.1 (a) and 
Figure 3.3 on the one hand, and between Figure 3.1 (b) and Figure 3.4 on the other. 
I will turn to the meaning of “end of an event,” which can be defined as the 
following: 
 
(9) The end of an event indicates that the disappearance of an event coded in a 
complement comes into the subject’s immediate dominion. 
 
By this definition, the conceptualization of the end of an event also comprises two 
facets: one is the exertion of energy by the subject entity toward the disappearance of a 
process the complement clause designates, and the other is the resultant disappearance 









With regard to the conceptualization of the end of an event, we can say that the second 
facet of the composite semantic structure is liable to be in focus by the default case, as 
S S 
Figure 3.5: Conceptual Structure of End of an Event 




exemplified by the difference in acceptability between sentences (10) and (11): 
 
(10) a. John finished reading the book. 
 b. Bill completed repairing the car. 
 c. Jim quit smoking. 
(11) a. *John finished to read the book. 
 b. *Bill completed to repair the car. 
 c. *Jim quit to smoke. 
 
This mode of conceptualization reflects the fact that verbs like finish, complete, and 
quit focus on the disappearance of an event per se.  Thus, the semantic structure can 
be depicted in Figure 3.6:1 
 
 





                                                 
1  My claim here is applicable to a verb like cease, which take a to-infinitive as well as a gerund 
 as its complement, as shown in (i): 
 (i) Lacy ceased to cry when she heard her parents come in the door. 
 The aspectual verb cease, as Wierzbicka (1988: 81) points out, suggests an ongoing process 
 which at first can be expected to continue but which at a certain point can be expected to come to 
 an end.  For this reason, the verb is quite compatible with a gradual change, as shown in (ii): 
 (ii)  a  Gradually, imperceptibly, the tremor/rain ceased/?stopped. 
  b. The noise stopped/?ceased as suddenly as it had started. 
 This means that we can analyze the infinitival complement of cease as the overall scope in Figure 
 3.5 being in focus. 
 
 
immediate scope (or in focus) 
overall scope of predication 
S S 




It should be noted here that the second facet of the semantic structure (i.e., the 
resultant disappearance of an event) cannot be manipulated or controlled by the matrix 
subject.  Furthermore, the objectification of the beginning or end of an event per se 
can be exemplified by the following sentence, which suggests that an objectively 
construed event is coded in a gerundive complement. 
 
(12)   The beginning/end of the semester is approaching. 
 
The relational predication approach profiles the interconnection between two entities; 
i.e., one entity, referred to as a trajector, moves from a position outside the 
neighborhood of another entity (i.e., landmark) to the final position within that 








In Figure 3.7, both the appearance and the disappearance of an event can be construed 
as being outside the landmark’s control domain.  It is obvious in this sense that the 
semantic structure depicted in Figure 3.7 is analogous to that in Figure 3.1 (b).  We 
can conclude that the complement selection of aspectual verbs conforms to the same 




Figure 3.7: Semantic Structure of approach 
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3.4. Semantics of Begin and Start 
3.4.1. Conceptual Difference between Infinitives and Gerunds 
As for S+V (begin / start)+ to V / V-ing constructions, it is well known that there 
exists a semantic constraint on the nature of a process coded in a gerundive 
complement.  Let us begin with observing the contrast in well-formedness between 
sentences in (13) and (14):   
 
(13) a. John began to see how it works. 
 b. *John began seeing how it works. 
(14) a. Nora started to know right from wrong. 
 b. *Nora started knowing right from wrong. 
 
Wierzbicka (1988: 86) points out, with regard to this contrast, that the crucial 
difference is that between a process and a state, arguing that aspectual verbs such as 
begin and start force us to interpret the following gerund as compatible with a dynamic, 
processual interpretation.   
In my view, this semantic constraint can straightforwardly be accounted for from 
two perspectives.  The first observation is the notional difference between perfective 
and imperfective processes.  Langacker (1990: 87-88) argues that a bounded process, 
which portrays a situation as changing through time, is termed ‘perfective’ because its 
initial and end points are included within the scope of predication in the temporal 
domain, whereas an unbounded process is called ‘imperfective’ because it profiles a 
stable situation that may extend indefinitely far beyond the scope of predication in 






        




It is evident from his analysis why imperfective processes cannot co-occur with the 
aspectual verb begin.  In the gerundive nominalization of an imperfective process, 
the initial and end points cannot be conceptualized within the region in the relevant 
domain, as depicted in Figure 3.9, and therefore the imperfective gerund does not have 








On the other hand, as the second perspective, imperfective verbs can co-occur 
with a to-infinitive, as exemplified in sentence (13a).  This linguistic phenomenon 
indicates that the infinitive to has a particular function which construes an event 
described as a perfective process.  This mechanism can also be predictable from 
Langacker’s (1991: 446) analysis, who argues that the infinitive to derives a complex 
atemporal relation that profiles all component states of the verb it combines with, and 
(a) Perfective process (b) Imperfective process 
scope scope 
Figure 3.8: Perfective and Imperfective Processes 
(Langacker 1990: 88) 
 
Figure 3.9: Gerundive Nominalization of Imperfective Process 
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has the notion of the path-goal image schema inherently, thereby the component states 
of a process being construable as a path leading to its completion.  Needless to say, 
the semantic structure depicted in Figure 3.2 can accommodate these observations.  
That is, the structure of begin/start to V focuses on the first facet of the semantic 
structure while that of begin/start V-ing on the second facet.  The former’s mode of 
conceptualization allows an imperfective process to be construed as a delimited entity 
with its initial and end points being evoked.  
Worthy to be addressed for further development of our discussions is that 
sentence (13a) is different from sentence (7a) in a crucial point.  The semantic role of 
the subject in (7a) is an agent and the event coded in the complement is a volitional 
action, whereas that of the subject in (13a) is rather an experiencer and the 
complement event is conceived of as non-volitional.  In the following subsection, I 
will consider this conceptual difference in terms of the notion of “subjectification.”  
 
3.4.2. Two Meanings of the Verb Begin 
Perlmutter (1970) argues that the verb begin has two deep structures: one is that 
of an intransitive verb like seem and happen, and the other is that of a transitive verb 
like try, condescend, and refuse.  Accordingly, a sentence like Zeke began to work 
would be structurally ambiguous, derived either by Raising from the deep structure 
(15a), or by Equi from the underlying structure (15b), as diagrammed respectively: 
 
                                
                                                                                              
                                                     



















However, following the tenets of Cognitive Grammar, our analysis only posits a single 
verb begin.  I claim that the two meanings result from two aspects of the verb begin: 
one is intentional (i.e., the force-dynamic relationship between a subject entity and a 
complement event) and the other is aspectual.  The relationship between the two 
types of begin can be naturally captured in terms of the notion of “subjectification,” 
which is immanent and ubiquitous in our conceptualization of any process. 
As noted in Chapter 1, every expression implies a construal relationship between 
the conceptualizer and the conception entertained.  Canonically, the conceptualizer 
remains offstage, functioning as the subject of conception, whereas the specific object 
of conception is the expression’s profile (i.e., the focal point within the immediate 
scope).  To the extent that this asymmetry maintains, the conceptualizer is construed 
subjectively, and the profile objectively.  What is important here is that the contrast 
between subjective and objective construal is a matter of vantage point and role of the 
conceptualizer in a viewing relationship.  The cognitive process of a shift from an 
objective construal of some entity to a more subjective one is termed 
“subjectification.”  Langacker (1999: Ch. 10) introduces the notion of “attenuation” 
in the degree of control exerted by a subject entity to explicate the process of 
“subjectification.”   
To make his claim more explicit, let us observe the two senses of be going to 
constructions, as exemplified in (16): 
 
(16) a. Sam was going to mail the letter but couldn’t find a mailbox. 
 b. Sam was going to mail the letter but never got around to it. 
 c. Something bad is going to happen ― I just know it. 
 d. There is going to be another storm tonight.     (Langacker 1999a: 303) 
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In the physical motion sense of (16a), the subject’s referent does not only move but 
also has the intention to carry out the infinitival event (i.e., lm) at the end of the spatial 
path.  In (16b), the subject’s activity is attenuated by virtue of having lost its physical 
motion but the intention toward the realization of the infinitival process still preserves.  
With regard to (16c-d), the subject no longer has any role in bringing about the 
infinitival event.  The progressive attenuation and diffusion in the locus of control 
can best be characterized in terms of the notion of subjectification, sketched in Figure 




            
           
             
                                           
                                                       
                                                   
 
 
In the initial configuration, an event described is a physical motion of the trajector 
through conceived time (t) and therefore it depicts an objectively construed, profiled 
relationship.  What is important here is that in this construal the conceptualizer (C) 
does some kind of mental scanning (or activity) carried out through processing time 
(T), which is represented by the dashed arrows.  On the other hand, as depicted in the 
second diagram, as far as the future sense of be going to is concerned, objective 
motion is lacking.  The profiled relationship resides in the conceptualizer locating the 




















(Langacker 1999a: 303) 
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situation by mentally scanning forward through time from some reference point (R).  
In other words, the conceptualizer traces a mental path along the temporal axis and 
situates the infinitival event downstream in the flow of time relevant to the reference 
point.  The future sense therefore results from this mechanism. 
The very same cognitive principle is applicable to the semantic difference among 
the sentences below: 
 
(17) a. John began to read a book. 
 b. John began to like his new teacher. 
 c. Oil began to gush from the well.  
 d. There began to be a commotion. 
 
The sentences show progressive attenuation in the degree of control exerted by the 
subject entities.  In (17a), the subject is construed as a volitional agent who brings 
about the event coded in the infinitival complement.  On the other hand, sentence 
(17b) shows that the subject is not a volitional agent but an experiencer with respect to 
the complement event.  Moreover, in (17c), the subject is inanimate and the outset of 
the event described is in profile.  This means that the sentence indicates further 
attenuation in the degree of subject control.  Finally, sentence (17d) merely presents a 
particular event in the current discourse space.  The respective semantic structures 
can be depicted in Figure 3.11: 
 
 
                              













3.4.3. Semantic Difference between Begin and Start 
The verbs begin and start are both in the same category of an inceptive verb.  
However, it is obvious that there is slight semantic difference between them.  In this 
subsection, I will consider this problem and make explicit the semantic nature of each 
verb. 
    First, observe the following contrast: 
 
(18) a. It slowly/gradually began to rain. 
 b. ?It slowly/gradually started to rain. 
(19) a. ?It slowly/gradually began raining. 
 b. ?It slowly/gradually started raining. 
 
The linguistic data in (18) and (19) indicate that an event which happens (or appears) 
slowly or gradually is liable to be coded in the form of the S+ begin to V construction.  
In addition, the linguistic data in (20) show that the verb begin is likely to co-occur 
with an infinitival complement rather than a gerundive complement, whereas the verb 




Figure 3.11: Subjectification of begin 
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(20) a. It began to rain.  >   It began raining. 
 b. It started raining.   >   It started to rain. 
 
This contrast can be best accounted for by postulating that the two verbs are different 
from each other in that they profile different portion of the inception of an event, as 









On the other hand, the semantic structure of an infinitive can be depicted in 
Figure 3.13, from Langacker’s (1991) characterization. 
 
 





The infinitive to, as noted, contains the notion of the source-path-goal image schema 
and profiles all the component states of the verb it combines with.  It is obvious from 
Figure 3.13  Semantic Structure of Infinitive 
MS/IS 
(a) Semantic Structure of begin (b) Semantic Structure of start 







this that the conception the verb begin designates has affinity with the conceptual 
structure of an infinitive, rather than the verb start, which denotes abrupt inception of 
an event as depicted in Figure 3.12 (b).  Thus, the verb start is likely to co-occur with 
a gerund rather than an infinitive.  This linguistic fact results from the semantic 
nature of a gerund; i.e., it is a nominalization of an event (i.e., a thing-like entity) and 
therefore the gradual nature is not in profile.   
 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I made explicit the semantics of infinitival and gerundive 
complements from the theoretical framework of Cognitive Grammar.  My central 
claim is that an event coded in an infinitival complement is located WITHIN the 
control domain of the matrix subject’s referent whereas that of the gerundive 
complement is situated OUT OF the domain.  This reflects the cognition that a 
subjectively construed entity is coded in an infinitival complement whereas an 
objectively construed entity is coded in a gerundive complement.  I exemplified that 




Chapter 4  There Constructions 
 
 In this chapter, I will investigate the nature of there-constructions in terms of the 
interrelationship between the speaker and hearer.  I overviewed in Chapter 1 that 
linguistic structures are conceptual tools for imposing particular ways of viewing a 
situation and their meanings inhere in the cognitive process by which the 
conceptualizer apprehends a given situation.  This chapter will argue that the 
peculiarity of the there-construction lies in the discrepancy of conceptual layers where 
the speaker and hearer entertain a given event, which is the conceptual analog of visual 
perception in the case where we view an entity as being proximal or distal.  That is, in 
the there-construction, the speaker has accepted the content as real, but the hearer 
understands it as a virtual instance by way of conjuring up the corresponding 
simulation which has been established and stored in his brain through his daily 
experience.  I will focus on the nature of an entity conceptualized in the virtual plane 
in the sense of Langacker (1999) and make explicit where the acceptability of 
there-constructions comes from 
 
4.1. Semantic Difference between There Constructions and Have Constructions 
 The first step of this investigation is to realize the semantic difference between 
have-constructions and there-constructions to describe the same objective situation.  
It has generally been believed that in some cases, the two constructions found in (1a, 
b) are paraphrases of each other.  This statement, however, seems true only in the 
case where a given event described by the verb have is construed in terms of the 




(1) a. There is a book on the table. 
 b. The table has a book on it. 
 
In addition, it should be noted here that the apparent paraphrasability does not mean 
that the two sentences have the same semantic value.  I am suggesting that the 
cognitive processing done by the conceptualizer can be quite different, depending on 
whether s/he codes an event to be described in a have-construction or in a 
there-construction.   
 To make explicit the difference between the two constructions, observe the 
following linguistic data: 
 
(2)  Att’y <= Attnorney>: then I advise you to get a taco burger, try that one. 
  Duke:  . . . the taco has meat in it.  I’ll try that one      (FICT) 
(3) a. The door has a fairly big opening in it at eye-level through which some  
  daylight filters, and the wall on either side of it is furnished with hooks. 
 b. ?There is a fairly big opening in the door at eye-level through which some  
   daylight filters, and the wall on either side of it is furnished with hooks.    
(Biber, Douglas et at. 1999: 956) 
 
In (2), the use of have (i.e., the taco has meat in it), instead of a there-construction, is 
motivated by the expression a taco burger in the previous utterance.  In addition, the 
higher acceptability of (3a) than that of (3b) is based on the fact that the nominal the 
door is a grounded entity in the current discourse space.  Therefore, it has been 
established and located with respect to the speech event by the speaker and hearer.  In 
this case, it is quite natural that the conceptualizer chooses the entity as a trajector and 
111 
 
describes the situation from that perspective. 
 Elucidating the nature of there-constructions is to recall that the logical subject, 
as is well known, must be an indefinite nominal.  With the indefinite article, it is 
crucial to notice the distinction between actuality and virtuality.  For example, a dog 
refers to a particular dog in (4a) and the clause containing the nominal is interpreted as 
being actual.  On the other hand, in (4b), the verb want is compatible with its object 
(i.e., a dog) being either actual or virtual, depending on whether the subject (i.e., John) 
has a specific dog in mind or not. 
 
(4) a. John has a dog. 
 b. John wants a dog. 
 
 With these notions (i.e., actuality and virtuality) in mind, observe the following 
data: 
 
(5) a. There was a woman standing outside and she said, “Oh what do you want?” 
 b. There are certain things to note as a consequence of that. 
 c. There are many theories about the beginning of drama in ancient Greece. 
 d. There were nearly 10 million Indians in America when the Europeans set foot  
  on the continent. 
 
The event described in each sentence above is interpreted as actual for the speaker; i.e., 
s/he has accepted it as established knowledge.  However, it should immediately be 
noted here that we need to recognize two layers of conceptualization: one pertaining to 
the speaker and the other to the hearer.  This is because the existential construction 
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with there functions as a natural starting point for the hearer to mentally access a new 
entity.1  In such a case, the hearer evokes a newly introduced event via the speaker’s 
conceptualization or “viewing frame” as the initial formation of the concept, because 
the event is necessarily part of the speaker’s knowledge, but not yet part of the hearer’s 
knowledge.  For this reason, the only thing the hearer does when s/he hears an 
utterance like those in (5a-d) is to conjure up the intended event in his/her mind.  That 
is, s/he conceptualizes it virtually to understand what the speaker means.2  This 










In Figure 4.1, the circle labeled S represents the speaker and H indicates the hearer.  
The ellipse labeled G represents ‘ground,’ which refers to the context of the speech 
event, comprising the participants in the event (i.e., the speaker and hearer), its time 
and place, the situational context, and shared knowledge of the speech-act participants.  
The dashed arrows between the speaker and hearer indicate the speech act.  The 
                                                 
1  In Cognitive Grammar, the notion of ‘entity’ is inclusive, subsuming both a thing and a  
 relation.  In my perspective, an entity provided by there-constructions is a relation, rather than 
 a thing.   
2  This analysis can be supported by Lakoff (1987).  He argues that a logical subject in 
 there-constructions is neither definite nor specific. 
＞ 












dashed arrow between the conceptualizer (i.e., the speaker or hearer) and the event 
indicates the mental path s/he follows.  Crucial at this point, as noted, is that an event 
coded in a there-construction does not yet pertain to the physical world for the hearer, 
but rather, it is in his/her mental world.3   
 My perspective here is undoubtedly related to the difference between “engaged 
cognition” and “disengaged cognition” in the sense of Langacker (2008).  The former 
cognition means that a person interacts directly, at the physical level, with something 
in the world.  On the other hand, the latter is the comparative processing which takes 
place without engagement in the absence of any current interaction with the world.  I 
am suggesting that the hearer understands the content of the utterance by the speaker 
via conjuring up the corresponding simulation which has been established and stored 
in his brain through his daily experience. 
 
4.2. Modes of Conceptualization of Events 
 The next step for explicating the conceptual nature of there-constructions is how 
the conceptualizer construes an entity presented by a there-construction.  I argue that 
in there-constructions, there exists a discrepancy in conceptual processing between the 
speaker and hearer; i.e., the hearer, triggered by there, construes a target event 
holistically by way of ‘summary scanning’ to understand what the speaker means.  
For this reason, in what follows, I would like to overview the two modes of cognitive 
processing: sequential scanning and summary scanning.   
 To fully understand these notions, imagine a case where we actually watch a ball 
role down an incline.  In this real-time viewing experience, the component states of 
                                                 
3  This analysis can be supported by Bolinger (1977), Nakau (1998), and Ueyama (2003).  In 
 particular, Bolinger argues that there’s function is to bring something into awareness, and the 
 more vivid on the stage an action is, the less appropriate there becomes.   
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the event (i.e., the portions of the process) are sequentially accessed through time, as 










This mode of processing is referred to as sequential scanning.  Essential here is the 
distinction between conceived time (t) and processing time (T).  As noted in Chapter 
1, the former is time as an object of conception: the time during which an event is 
conceived as occurring, indicated as t1 – t5.  Concurrently with this, the 
conceptualization of an event is a mental activity; the conceptualizing activity itself 
occurs during the span T1 – T5 of processing time which functions as the medium of 
conception.  That is, when we track a process through time, the tracking occurs in 
processing time and the event itself occurs in conceived time.   Figure 4.2 indicates 
that the respective component states are mentally accessed through processing time in 
order of their occurrence through conceived time.  
 On the other hand, we are capable of viewing events in another manner, sketched 
in Figure 4.3. 
 
 
t2 t3 t4 t5 
Figure 4.2: Sequential Scanning 
＞ ＞ ＞ ＞ 
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 













In this mode of conceptualization, the component states of an event undergo 
summation.  That is, they are mentally superimposed and as a result, all the 
component states are simultaneously active and form a single gestalt.   
 What is important here is that sequential and summary scanning should be 
thought of as two facets of the normal observation of events; we can either highlight 
the inherent sequentiality or impose a holistic construal, depending on which mode 
predominates.  For example, a verb per se implies sequential scanning, but when the 
same content is viewed in summary fashion the resulting expression pertains to another 
grammatical category (e.g. an infinitive or a participle). 
 Consider the following sentences: 
 
(6) a. We realize that you have to make a profit.4 
 b. His wife only pretended to believe his implausible story. 
 c. Portia really enjoyed walking along the beach.         
(Langacker 1991: 439) 
                                                 
4  Langacker (2008:413) argues that as for the complement clause in (6a), nominalization 
 applies to the full, finite clause, so internally the resulting nominal is clausal in form. 
Figure 4.3: Summary Scanning 
 
t1 t1-2 t1-3 t1-4 
＞ ＞ ＞ ＞ 
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 





Langacker (1991: 440) argues that by the very nature of a complement clause, the 
process it describes undergoes a kind of conceptual subordination, instead of being 
viewed as an independent object of thought.  His main point is that viewing the 
subordinate process as a main-clause participant implies a conceptual distancing 
whereby the process is construed holistically and manipulated as a unitary entity, 
resulting in summary scanning of the component states.  
 This analysis is worth addressing, because the speaker’s intention using there is 
to encourage the hearer to activate a “mental space” and conceptualize an intended 
target entity therein, which means that the entity is conceptually subordinated by there.  
Therefore, from the hearer’s view point, it is construed as a unitary entity, with the 
same conceptual distancing as the complement clauses in (6).  This cognitive process 
of building up the overall conception of a profiled relationship in summary fashion and 
constructing an image of the event as a whole is quite natural for us to capture the 
intended event.5  This naturally leads to the idea that the close affinity of an entity 
with a holistic view, by way of summary scanning, is responsible for the acceptability 
of the there-construction which contains it. 
 This analysis can be supported by an abundance of linguistic data. 
 
(7) a. *There danced a young girl in the ballroom. 
 b. *There sang a tall middle-aged woman on the stage. 
                                                 
5  This mode of conceptual processing is on a parallel with how we conceptualize conditionals, 
 negative expressions and fictive motions.  For example, in understanding the meaning of the 
 sentence If it were clear, we could see a wonderful panoramic view of the town from the top of the 
 mountain, one thing we do is to simulate the experience of seeing the view of the town virtually 
 in a holistic manner.  Also, when we grasp the import of a negative sentence like John does not 
 have any pets, the situation of his having pets is conjured up in order to exclude it from reality.  
 As for fictive motions, to take The mountain range goes from Mexico to Canada as an example, 
 we understand the meaning of the sentence by mentally scanning along a path and progressively 
 superimposing all the component states to form a single gestalt.  
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(8) a.  In all such relations there exists a set of mutual obligations in the economic  
  field. 
 b.  There stood an old clock in the hall opposite the front door. 
 c.  There emerged some new facts while we were working on the project. 
(9) a. *There was hit a man on the head. 
 b. *There were arrested three rioters in the park. 
(10) a.  There are placed many silver spoons on the table. 
 b.  There was born a baby to the Joneses. 
(11) a. ?There danced in the ballroom a young girl with a red headband. 
 b.  There was dancing in the ballroom a young girl with a red headband. 
(12) a. *There vanished a diamond ring from this drawer. 
 b.  There had vanished from the dresser two rings left by my mother. 
       (Kuno and Takami 2002: 59-63) 
 
As noted, a verb per se requires sequential scanning to conceptualize the process it 
describes.  The difference in acceptability between (7a, b) and (8a, b) lies in the 
conceptual distinction between perfective and imperfective verbs.  The former is 
characterized as being bounded in time, whereas the latter is not specifically bounded.  
Moreover, perfectives construe the profiled relationship as internally heterogeneous, 
involving some kind of change through time, while imperfectives construe it as a 
homogeneous, stable situation.  Hence verbs of action exemplified in (7a, b) tend to 
require sequential scanning to conceptualize them, as depicted in Figure 4.2.  In such 
cases, it is quite normal for us to pick up the entity of primary focus (i.e., the agent) as 
a trajector and describe the event from that perspective.  This conceptual processing 
is incompatible with the holistic way of viewing an event imposed by 
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there-constructions.  Hence, the unacceptability of the sentences results.  On the 
other hand, the nature of homogeneity which imperfective verbs imply, in effect, 
allows us to construe the event it describes holistically because of its stability, resulting 
in the acceptability of sentences in (8a, b) results.  Furthermore, as for verbs of 
appearance in (8c), the notion of appearance designates a change from nonexistence to 
existence of an entity.  Our recognition in general, however, tends to focus on its 
resultant state, with the change its component states describe being relatively 
backgrounded and the existence of the entity per se being foregrounded accordingly.  
The activation of our holistic view of the event is compatible with a there-construction.  
Moreover, concerning the difference in acceptability between (9) and (10), the clue is 
in the conceptual difference between two kinds of the verb be.  The effect of past 
participles is to convert the process specified by a verb into a complex atemporal 
relation by employing summary scanning rather than sequential scanning.  In actional 
passives like those in (9a, b), as Langacker (1991: 206) argues, the verb be functions as 
reimposing sequential scanning on an atemporal relation derived by the past participle.  
That is, it imposes a processual profile by scanning sequentially through its component 
states.  On the other hand, the component states of be in stative passives, exemplified 
in (10a, b), are construed as identical and thus in effect they are all elaborated 
simultaneously.  In addition, the function of the past participle in (10) is to derive a 
stative relation by confining the profile to the final, resultant state of the process,  For 
this reason, sentences in (10a, b) represent their resultant states as prominent (i.e., the 
state in which many silver spoons are set in (10a) and the existence of the baby as a 
result of the process in question in (10b)), with the sequential scanning being 
suspended to derive an atemporal relation, which enables the hearer to understand the 
event holistically, resulting in the acceptability of the sentences.  In (11b) and (12b), 
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the progressive is an imperfectivizing construction, imposing the summary construal 
on the event by suspending sequential scanning, and the function of the past participle 
in the perfect construction is to atemporalize the process the verb designates (i.e., 
construal of the process in summary fashion) and enhance the salience of a terminal 
component state of the underlying process, implying the completion of the event.   
Hence both the progressive and perfect forms impose the event to be construed 
holistically, resulting in the compatibility with there-constructions.6 
 
4.3. Conceptual Nature of There Constructions 
 The discussions thus far are enough to prove the difference between the 
conceptual processing by which an event is coded in a have-construction and the 
processing by which an event is coded in a there-construction.  In the former, the 
conceptualizer focuses on an entity in the current discourse space as a trajector, from 
which s/he describes the event.  As noted, with regard to have-constructions, its 
grammatical subject is a grounded entity.  The event which is described with respect 
to the subject is also grounded and located both in time and in reality.  By contrast, in 
there-constructions, the speaker presents an abstract mental space by introducing there, 
functioning as a reference point and situates an event in that space, serving as the 
target.7  What is important here is that an event located in a mental space provided by 
there is interpreted as a virtual one by the hearer; or to put it another way, a virtual 
instance.   Thus, the construction imposes a conceptualization where a described 
                                                 
6  Bolinger (1977: 95) argues that if something is out of sight and out of mind, as with a perfect 
 tense, there is appropriate to bring it into awareness.  
7  In there-constructions, the target is a proposition, rather than a thing.  To take there is a 
 picture on the wall as an example, the target is the proposition a picture-be-on the wall, rather 




event is construed holistically by way of summary scanning and manipulated as a 
unitary entity.    
 We are now in the final stage of revealing the intrinsic nature of 
there-constructions.  My central claim is that there-constructions reflect a dynamic 










In the first phase, as diagrammed in Figure 4.4(a), an abstract conceptual space is 
presented by introducing there, serving as a reference point.  In the next phase, the 
target event is conceptualized on that space, as depicted in Figure 4.4(b).  Crucial at 
this point, Langacker (1991: 439) argues, is that a finite clause subsumes the layered 
semantic functions of ‘grounding,’ ‘quantification,’ ‘instantiation,’ and ‘type 
specification’ (G(Q(I(T)))).  This means that the cognitive process of quantification 
precedes that of grounding.  This mechanism is crucial to a clear understanding of the 
idiosyncrasy of this construction; i.e., the discrepancy between the grammatical subject 
and the logical subject.  I argue that the agreement between a subject and a verb is 
established at the phase (b) when the conceptualizer recognizes the target proposition.  
Figure 4.4(c) shows that in the last phase, the entire clause is grounded and located in 
＞ ＞ 














time. It is true that the English there-construction in itself reflects 
reference-point/target conceptualization, but it is given a further conceptualization 
based on trajector/landmark alignment at the higher level of organization.  My 
suggestion is that the grammaticalization of there (from an adverbial indicating a 
specific place to an expletive designating an abstract setting) has stimulated the 
conceptualizer to employ the trajector/landmark conceptualization, relatively 
backgrounding the inherent reference-point/target conceptualization initially 
entertained, in the course of which there has established itself as the trajector of the 
entire clause, functioning as the grammatical subject.  In this sense, this construction 
can be regarded as a kind of double subject construction.  Thus, the discrepancy 
between the grammatical subject and the logical subject results. 
     
4.4. Conclusion 
 This chapter attempted to characterize there-constructions within the framework 
of Cognitive Grammar.  I argued that the peculiarity of the there-construction lies in 
the discrepancy of conceptual layers where the speaker and hearer entertain a given 
event, which is the conceptual analog of visual perception in the case where we view 
an entity as being proximal or distal.  The there-construction is a conceptual tool for 
the hearer to evoke a newly introduced event via the speaker’s viewing frame as the 
initial formation of the conception.  For this specific purpose, the hearer conjures up 
the event in the virtual plane by resorting to the corresponding simulation which is 
stored in his brain through his daily experience.  Thus, the target event of 
there-constructions is conceptualized as a virtual instance and it is conceptually 
subordinated by there, resulting in the construal of it as a holistically viewed event by 
way of summary scanning.  The peculiarity of the there-construction lies in the 
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conceptual mechanism. The discussion thus far has proved that the characterization of 
the there-construction is fully tenable by examining abundant linguistic data. 
Part II 
Cognitive Domains and Conceptualization of Events 
 
As I have overviewed in Chapter 1, every expression invokes a set of cognitive 
domains as the basis for its meaning.  The domains indicate any kind of conception or 
realm of experience and knowledge with respect to which a given entity is construed.  
I have suggested that the origin of cognitive domains lies in our direct interaction with 
entities in the physical world; that is, they come from our perceptual activities through 
our bodily experience, and the cognitive domains thus established, in turn, render us a 
certain viewpoint by which to construe an entity to be described.  Part II exemplifies 
the importance of this perspective ―  the domain centrality in particular ―  to 
elucidate the nature of linguistic structures.  Chapter 5 reveals that the English verb 
have designates a relationship between two entities in such a way that one entity 
serving as a trajector in the current discourse space is characterized by the other (i.e., 
landmark) which is in the dominion provided by the trajector.  The establishment of 
have’s varieties of imports is based on the relative centrality of its constitutive domains, 
depending on which cognitive domain in the domain matrix is in focus or 
foregrounded.  In Chapter 6, I will argue that the analysis of the semantic difference 
between the English ditransitive constructions and their to/for-dative counterparts 
reveals that the conceptualization of an event encoded in either construction contains 
the two possible central domains; i.e., the domain of the interpersonal relationship and 
that of the source-path-goal image schema, and that the relative centrality between 
them has much to do with its linguistic manifestation either as a ditransitive 
construction or as a to/for-dative construction.  
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Chapter 5  Have Constructions  
 
 The English verb have designates a relationship between two entities in such a 
way that one entity serving as a trajector in the current discourse space is characterized 
by the other (i.e., landmark) which is in the dominion provided by the trajector.  This 
chapter will reveal that the establishment of have’s import is based on the relative 
centrality of its constitutive domains, depending on which cognitive domain in the 
matrix is in focus or foregrounded.  In addition, I will consider the semantics of 
S+have+NP+V construction in terms of cognitive domains, and argue that two 
possible meanings of this construction (i.e., causative meaning and affected meaning) 
are triggered by the activation of the domain of controllability and the degree of 
attenuation of the subject’s immediate physical control over its complement event (i.e., 
NP+V).  More specifically, the advanced attenuation of the control reflects the 
conceptualizar’s focus on the relationship between the matrix subject and its 
complement event in itself, which evokes the construal of the subject’s referent as an 
experiencer, resulting in the affected meaning of the construction. 
 
5.1. Langacker’s (1991, 1999) Analysis 
 Langacker (1991, 1999) argues that the verb have is characterized as profiling a 
reference point relationship between two entities in such a way that the sentential 
subject serves as a reference point and the object as the target, as diagrammed in 
Figure 5.1:1 
                                                 
1  When a relationship is profiled, varying degrees of prominence are conferred on its 
 participants.  The most prominent participant is called the trajector as the primary focus of 
 attention.  That is, the entity is construed as being evaluated or described.  The landmark is 
 an entity of secondary focus.   












In this conceptual model, Langacker (1999) argues, have’s trajector (i.e., the 
grammatical subject) is characterized either as an active experiencer or simply as a 
point of reference, which depends on whether or not the subject’s referent exerts 
control over the object (i.e., the target), as exemplified in the following sentences: 
 
(1) a. John has a book under his arm. 
 b. Bill has a stiff shoulder. 
 c. The hotel has many spacious guest rooms. 
 
In sentence (1a), the subject has physical control over the object, whereas in sentence 
(1b) the subject’s experiential role is highlighted.  Furthermore, sentence (1c) 
exemplifies greater attenuation in the degree of control exerted by the subject over its 
object, with the subject’s referent serving simply as a reference point.  It is important 
to note here is that in any case, a variety of linguistic data support the characterization 















Figure 5.1: Semantic Structure of have 
(Langacker 1999: 183) 
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(2) a. We have a lot of snow in winter. 
 b. We have a good view of the mountains. 
 c. Harry has pity for Bill. 
 
In sentences (2a-c), as well as (1a-b), each subject is conceived of as an experiencer 
and the object’s referent is situated in that dominion.   
 Worthy of further discussion is the fact that Langacker (1999: Ch. 10) successfully 
accounted for the gradual attenuation of the subject’s immediate physical control over 
the object by resorting to the notion of “subjectification.”  He argues that every 
expression implies a construal relationship between the conceptualizer and what is 
conceptualized.  Canonically, the conceptualizer remains offstage in a metaphorical 
sense of the term, functioning as an implicit subject of conception, whereas an onstage 
object of conception is the expression’s profile (i.e., what it designates).  To the 
extent that this asymmetry is maintained, the conceptualizer is construed subjectively, 
and the profile objectively.  What is important here is that the contrast between the 
subjective and objective construal is a matter of the conceptualizer’s role in a viewing 
relationship.  The cognitive process of a shift from an objective construal of an event 
to a more subjective one is termed “subjectification,” which can be explained by the 
relative relationship between “attenuation” in the degree of control exerted by a 
subject entity and the remaining conceptualizer’s mental scanning.   
 Thus, the conceptual processing of each of the sentences (1a-c) can be 















Figure 5.2(a) indicates that the possessor (R) exercises immediate control over the 
possessed (T): the verb have profiles the control relationship which is onstage and 
objectively construed.  In Figure 5.2(b), the degree of R’s control over T is attenuated 
and the grammatical subject is interpreted as a passive experiencer.  Furthermore, in 
Figure 5.2(c), the subject’s role is essentially limited to its reference point function.  
In this case, some evoked connection between R and T enables the offstage 
conceptualizer to mentally access the target, which takes on a crucial facet of the 
meaning of sentence (1c). 
 Thus, Langacker’s analysis of have is intriguing and persuasive in that it gives a 
natural explanation of the semantic relationship between (3a) and (3b) and of have’s 
semantic extension shown in (4). 
 
(3) a. John’s car 
 b. John has a car. 
 
(4) Semantic extension of have 
a. ＜GRASP＞ 
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 To hold in hand, in keeping, or possession; to hold or possess as property,  
 or as something at one’s disposal.       [ Beowulf (Z.), c888] 
b. ＜POSSESS THE RELATION＞ 
 To hold or possess, in a weakened sense; the relation being other than that of 
property or tenancy (.) The relation is often reciprocal: the father has a son, the son 
has a father; the king has subjects, his subjects have a king; (…) a man has a house, 
the house has an owner or tenant. 
          [c1000] 
c. ＜TO BE POSSESSED OR AFFECTED WITH＞ 
To be possessed or affected with (something physical or mental); to be subjected to; 
to experience; to enjoy or suffer.  (e.g. He had very bad health.)   [c1000] 
         (Hayase 2002: 218) 
 
The semantic extension of have in (4) can be accounted for straightforwardly by 
resorting to the notion of subjectification.  In (3a, b), the two expressions differ from 
each other in that that the former profiles a thing while the latter designates a process.  
More specifically, in the former, the trajector is identified with the element designated 
by the modified noun, and the landmark corresponds to the entity profiled by the 
possessor nominal, whereas the verb have assigns trajector status to the reference point, 
and landmark status to the target.  What is crucial, however, is that they both evoke a 
reference point relationship, and in construing a given scene, we obviously have some 
flexibility as to where we direct the spotlight of primary and secondary focal 
prominence. 
 However, all things considered, the reference point ability per se is a 
fundamental and ubiquitous aspect of human cognition and therefore accommodates a 
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variety of linguistic phenomena.2  This leads to the idea that another perspective 
might be needed, in addition to the analysis based on the reference point model, in 
order to complete the inherent semantics of the verb have.  I will therefore argue in 
the next section that the notion of “cognitive domains” is crucial to the full 
characterization of have and the elucidation of how its meaning should be predicted.   
 
5.2. Cognitive Domains 
 As noted in chapter 1, one of the basic tenets of Cognitive Grammar is that every 
expression is characterized relative to cognitive domains, i.e., it invokes a set of 
domains as the basis for its meaning.  The term “domain” is meant to indicate any 
kind of conception of experience and knowledge in terms of which a given entity is 
construed.  The set of domains an expression invokes is called the “domain matrix.”  
Important here is that it is not the case that all the constitutive domains have equal 
status.  Rather, there exist varying degrees of centrality ― the relative centrality of 
those domains is an important facet of linguistic meaning and crucial for the 
characterization of an expression.  The constitutive domains are activated with 
                                                 
2  In fact, in addition to possessive constructions and have constructions, certain stylistic 
 inversions that serve to introduce an element into a given scene can be accounted for in the same 
 fashion, as exemplified in (i): 
 (i)  In front of the house stood an old woman. 
 In (i), the initial prepositional phrase directs our attention to a particular location in which the 
 new element (i.e., an old woman) is then established.  This shift in focus from the locative 
 frame to the element established therein recalls a dynamic aspect of the reference point model. 
  Furthermore, the reference point model can also accommodate some semantic extensions of 
 entities.  Metonymy, for example, can be defined as a phenomenon whereby an expression that 
 normally designates one entity is used instead to designate another, associated entity, as 
 exemplified in (ii).  We can thus recognize that metonymy basically reflects our reference point 
 ability. 
 (ii) a. Have you read Shakespeare? 
 b. The kettle is boiling. 
 c. Mary always wears GAP. 
 
 
                                                                
130 
 
certain probabilities, and contexts provided in the discourse contribute to focus 
attention on a certain domain within its domain matrix.  To make this point more 
explicit, observe the following data: 
 
(5) a. The photograph is torn. 
 b. The photograph is out of focus. 
 c. The photograph was awarded a prize.    (Tayor 2002: 442-443) 
 
Taylor (2002) argues that the concept [PHOTOGRAPH] is characterized against a 
number of different domains such as (1) Material object, (2) Technology, (3) Aesthetic 
value, and so on.  Sentence (5a) draws on the notion of a photograph as a material 
object (i.e., a piece of paper).  Therefore, in this usage, the domain of material object 
is in focus.  On the other hand, sentence (5b) activates the notion of a photograph as 
a visual image created by a certain technology.  Thus, the domain of technology is 
foregrounded.  Moreover, sentence (5c) focuses on the aesthetic value of a 
photograph (i.e., the artistic skill of its creator).   
 
5.3. Conceptualization of Possession and Constitutive Domains 
 Nakau (1998) divides the meanings of ‘have’ into two subclasses: possessive 
‘have’ and existential ‘have’ from a syntactic point of view.  My central claim is that 
the two notions are not distinctive, but rather that they are related to each other.  This 
perspective is in fact supported by Langacker’s analysis in that he has succeeded in 
capturing the relationship between the two notions by resorting to the phenomenon of 
“subjectification.”  On this basis, a point of crucial importance is what motivates the 
meaning of have as indicating either the notion of possession or that of existence.  
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My suggestion here is to analyze the notion of possession into its conceptual 
components and extract the relevant cognitive domains to be evoked, as shown below: 
 
(6)  The notion of possession and relevant cognitive domains 
 ＜conceptual components of possession＞ ＜relevant cognitive domains＞ 
1. action for possessing an entity ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ action (D1) 
2. energy force to keep the obtained entity in the region of the possessor・・・・
 controllability (D2) 
3. location where the possessed entity is placed ・・・・・・・・・・location (D3) 
4. relation which exists between the possessor and the possessed ・・・ relation (D4) 









 It should immediately be noticed here that the notion of ‘possession’ involves the 
notion of ‘existence’ as one of the constitutive domains in the domain matrix, which 
allows us to capture the two notions as an inclusion relation, rather than two 
independent ones.  Analyzing the notion of ‘possession’ in terms of its constitutive 
cognitive domains has certain validity to the extent that it can give a natural 
explication to the polysemy of ‘have,’ by arguing that the meaning of ‘have’ results 
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from a matter of which domain is foregrounded within its constitutive matrix ― the 
import of ‘have’ is established as ‘possession,’ ‘relation’ or ‘existence,’ depending on 
which cognitive domain is in focus or highlighted. 
 
5.4.  Semantics of Have and Cognitive Domains 
 The English verb have in itself expresses an imperfective process3, which means 
that the notion of action (D1) is irrelevant here.  Rather, relevant to have are the 
domains of ‘controllability,’ ‘location,’ ‘relation,’ and ‘existence.’  Observing the 
linguistic data below from this perspective reveals the relationships between the 
subject and the object, as the following shows: 
 
                         (relationship between the subject and the object) 
(7)  a. Be careful ― the robber has a gun in his hand.    (immediate control) 
 b. John has a new computer.            (potential control) 
 c. Children and men, especially, have a right to express those feelings.  
 (potential control) 
 d. Sally has three grandchildren.        (kinship (relation)) 
 e. Marvin has frequent headaches.           (potential relation) 
 f. Sheridan has brown eyes.        (intrinsic relation) 
  g. We have some vast open areas in the United States.     (location) 
 h. This house has four bedrooms.              (location) 
 i. The Grand Canyon has an interesting geological history.      (location) 
 j. John has a lot of things to do.              (existence) 
                                                 
3  An imperfective process is a term in Cognitive Grammar for specifying that it is unbounded  
 within the temporal scope of predication and its component states are construed as being  
 effectively identical.  
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 k. But it really would be nice to have a young person about the house.   
(existence) 
 
In (7a), the relationship between the sentential subject and its object is one of 
immediate control because the robber holds a gun actually in the given situation.  For 
this reason, the volitionality the subject exerts is very high.  In (7b), the subject (i.e., 
John) possesses a computer, but a normal interpretation of this sentence implies the 
possibility of physical access whenever desired; for example, the computer is in his 
house or in his office and he can use it when he needs it.  Therefore, the relationship 
between the subject and the object is one of potential control.  Similarly, sentence 
(7c) has the same interpretation as (7b), which means that the sentential subject 
children and men can exert their right in a case where they need to do so.  To sum up, 
the commonality of sentences (7a-c) is that the respective grammatical subjects exert 
some kind of volitional energy force over the corresponding objects and the sentences 
express the relationship between a controller and a controllee, with their differences 
just lying in the degrees of controllability.  It follows from this that what motivates 
the interpretation implied by sentences (7a-c) stems from the construal of the domain 
of controllability being in focus.  On the other hand, in sentences (7d-f), even though 
each subject’s referent is human, the domain of controllability is irrelevant or 
backgrounded.  Rather, a relative foregrounding of the domain of relation motivates 
an interpretation of them as indicating that a certain relationship lies between the 
sentential subject and the object.  More specifically, sentence (7d) expresses a 
kinship, sentence (7e) a potential relation, and sentence (7f) an intrinsic relation.  
Furthermore, in sentences (7g-i), the respective sentential subjects denote the locus of 
the referents designated by the grammatical objects, which means that the domain of 
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location is foregrounded, in terms of which these sentences are interpreted.  In (7g), 
the subject we, as Langacker (1991:213) notes, indicates ‘people in general,’ allowing 
it to be metonymically interpreted as a space or a region associated with that entity, as 










In this respect, this house in (7h) and the Grand Canyon in (7i) are also interpreted as 
designating a space.  In the remaining sentences (7j, k), it is less dubious that the 
domain of existence is highlighted.  In (7j), John is a human being and it might 
therefore be possible that he exerts some control over the object a lot of things to do 
(in this construal, the domain of controllability is highlighted in terms of which the 
sentence is interpreted).  I would like to argue, however, that the semantic focus of 
this sentence is rather to refer to the existence of the referent itself which is designated 
by the grammatical object.  This perspective is more apparent in (7k), where the 
existence of a young person per se is in focus.    
 The discussions so far encourage us to characterize the verb have as follows: 
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(8) Conceptual nature of the verb have4 
 The English verb have designates a relationship between two entities in such a 
way that one entity serving as a trajector in the current discourse space is 
characterized by the other (i.e., landmark) which is in the dominion provided by 
the trajector.  The establishment of have’s import is based on the relative 
centrality of its constitutive domains, depending on which cognitive domain in 













This characterization of have in terms of the relative centrality of constitutive domains 
has certain viability to the extent that it can accommodate the linguistic phenomenon 
                                                 
4  This characterization is also applicable to the semantic difference between causative have 
 constructions (e.g., John had his men look at the car) and affected have constructions (e.g., Bill 
 had a man steal his money), because it is ascribable to the semantic status of the matrix subject 
 which can function either as an agent or an experiencer, and a crucial factor for determining the 
 semantics of the subject entity is the notion of controllability; i.e., it is a matter of degree to 
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that the same objective relationship between two entities may have multiple meanings 
depending on its construal, which is motivated by particular contexts 
 Observe the following sentences: 
 
(9) a. Be careful ― John has a gun in his hand.      (immediate control) 
 b. John has a gun in the drawer for use in self-defense. (potential control) 
 c. A: Where is my gun? 
  B: John has it.  (location) 
 d. John still has my gun in his car.  (location or existence) 
 
In (9a-d), each event describes the same objective relationship between John and a gun, 
but the perspectives from which the situation is construed are quite different and 
consequently the semantic differences of the expression (i.e., John has a gun) result.  
More specifically, in (9a), the sentential subject John holds a gun and therefore he 
exerts energy force of immediate control over it, which means that the domain of 
controllability is in focus.  In (9b), the subject John possesses a gun but it is not in 
his hand at the time of utterance and therefore the controllability the sentential subject 
exerts is lower than that of sentence (9a).  Thus, the subject potentially controls the 
object.  In the situation described by utterances in (9c), on the other hand, the 
utterance B specifies the location where the gun is, and hence the domain of location is 
foregrounded.  Lastly, in (9d), the expression my gun indicates that John is not the 
possessor and the sentence specifies the location or existence of that entity.  I argue 
therefore that an event is construed differently in accordance with the 
discourse-affected centrality of a specific cognitive domain within the domain matrix.  
 The discussion here is also supported by the following linguistic data: 
                                                                
137 
 
(10) a. We have a lot of skunks. 
 b. We have a lot of skunks around here.  (Langacker 1999: 185) 
 
The seeming difference between the two sentences above is whether or not the 
adverbial phrase around here is coded, but the interpretation of each sentence is quite 
different.  To put it concretely, the grammatical subject we in (10a) designates 
specific people, whereas the correspondent in (10b) indicates people in general ― 
precisely, a region associated with the subject we as a metonymic extension.  Thus, in 
(10a) the domain of controllability is foregrounded and the verb have is interpreted as 
expressing a possessive relationship between the grammatical subject and the object.  
On the other hand, in (10b) the domain of location or existence is highlighted and the 
sentence is interpreted as expressing the location or existence of a lot of skunks. 
 Furthermore, consider the following sentences (11a, b).   
 
(11) a. France has colonies in the Pacific. 
 b. France has mountains in the east. (Nakau 1998: 86) 
 
As for the linguistic data above, Nakau (1998) tried to account for the syntactic 
difference between the possessive have and the existential have, arguing that sentence 
(11a) has the structure of NP-have-NP whereas sentence (11b) has the structure of 
NP-have-NP-PP on the grounds that the prepositional phrase in the Pacific in (11a) can 
be deleted but the correspondent in the east in (11b) cannot.  From my perspective, 
however, France in (11a) designates a nation as the possessor of its power and 
therefore the domain of controllability is likely to be foregrounded, resulting in the 
interpretation of have as expressing a possessive relationship between the grammatical 
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subject and the object.  By contrast, France in (11b) means a geographical territory 
and in this case, the domain of controllability is not likely to be in focus.  Rather, the 
domain of location is relatively foregrounded and the grammatical subject is 
interpreted as a region in which the entity mountains is located. 
 I have thus far tried to demonstrate the validity of my perspective and the 
examples of linguistic data provided help support its viability.  In the next section, I 
will explore the nature of the S+ have + NP + V constructions in terms of the domain 
of controllability. 
 
5.5. S+ have +NP + V Constructions 
The primary concern in this subsection is to make explicit the semantic nature of 
the S+ have + NP + V constructions.  I begin by observing the following two 
sentences:   
 
(12) a.  Mary has a watch. 
 b.  Mary had John mend her watch. 
 
It should easily be noticed here is that the difference between (12a) and (12b) depends 
on whether the object’s referent denotes a thing or an event, as depicted in Figure 









Figure 5.6: S+have+NP/S+have+NP+V Constructions 
subject 
event 
experiential dominion of a subject entity 
tr lm tr 
lm 
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That is, the S + have + NP + V constructions represent the relationship between an 
entity which elaborates the trajector of a process designated by the verb have and an 
event instantiating the landmark.   
Another point is that this construction has two possible meanings, i.e., causative 
and affected meanings, as exemplified in (13):  
 
(13) a.  Then we had a burial party of Jews bury the bodies. 
 (causative meaning) 
 b.  Bill had a man rob him last night.           (affected meaning) 
 
The difference is ascribable to the semantic status of the matrix subject which can 
function either as an agent or an experiencer, as shown in (14): 
 
(14) a.  Agent      Event 
b.  Experiencer      Event    
 
A crucial factor determining the semantics of a subject entity in this construction is the 
notion of “controllability.”  What I am suggesting is that the semantics of 
S+have+NP+V construction can be elucidated in terms of cognitive domains, and that 
two possible meanings of this construction (i.e., causative meaning and affected 
meaning) are triggered by the activation of the domain of controllability and the 
degree of attenuation of the subject’s immediate physical control over its complement 
event (i.e., NP+V).   
 Observe the following linguistic data.  The examples (15) through (18) indicate 
facets of progressive attenuation of the degree of control exercised by the subject’s 





(15) a.  John had Bill empty his pocket. 
 b.  Donald had Paula learn the score of Beethoven’s Fifth. 
 c.  John has the water running in the bathtub. 
(16) a.  Bill had his shoes shined. 
 b.  Jane should have a mechanic look at the car before she buys it. 
(17) a.  Bob had two of his teeth knocked out in the fight. 
 b.  The houses had their roofs ripped off by the gale. 
 c.  John had a brother drafted into the army. 
(18) a.  Bill has two buttons missing on his jacket. 
 b.  We shall soon have the mists coming down on us. 
 c.  This room will soon have sunlight streaming in through the window. 
 d.  Mary had her hair streaming in the wind. 
 
In (15), the matrix subject is conceived of as a volitional and superior agent who has 
managed to bring about the complement event.  Here, the difference between (15a-b) 
and (15c) is ascribable to the construal of the event encoded in the complement clause.  
The former is construed as a perfective event whereas the latter as an imperfective 
event.  With regard to (16), the subject is interpreted as manifesting a dual function; 
i.e., a causer of the event and an experiencer (or benefactory) who enjoys the benefits 
from its occurrence.  On the other hand, in (17), the subject’s primary role is not a 
volitional agent but a passive undergoer with respect to the complement event.  And 
sentences in (18) indicate that the subject serves mainly as a locative reference point, 
and that there some notion of experience persists.  In this way, the two meanings (i.e., 
                                                                
141 
 
causative and affected meanings) depend on a degree of the matrix subject’s 
controllability over the event elaborating the landmark.   
Specifically, with regard to the causative have construction, Wierzbicka’s (1988: 
241) insightful remarks are full of suggestiveness for its better understanding.  She 
argues that the causer assumes the causee’s readiness to serve; the causee is treated as 
a cooperative performer of the causer’s will, as someone to whom the causer’s will can 
be communicated, and therefore the causee normally has to be human, as exemplified 
in (19):  
 
(19) a. * I had the squirrel leave its tree. 
 b. ? The trainer had the lion dance.     (Wierzbicka 1988: 241) 
 
Her analysis predicts that the subject of the causative have construction should also be 
human, as shown in (20b): 
 
(20) a.  Poverty made John work hard. 
 b. * Poverty had John work hard. 
 
These facts indicate that the causative have construction implies the direct causative 
relationship between the causer and causee.   
By contrast, with regard to the affected have construction, there is no energy 
force transmitted from the matrix subject to the object.  Rather, they exemplify 
greater attenuation in the degree of control exerted by the subject over its landmark, as 
exemplified in (21) and (22):  
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(21) a.  Bill had a man steal his money last night. 
 b.  Bill had his money stolen last night. 
(22) a.  John had a man praise his work. 
 b.  John had his work praised. 
 
From the observations above, the semantic difference between the two types of 










Figure 5.7(a) represents that the matrix subject exerts a direct energy force over the 
agent of the complement event.  On the other hand, Figure 5.7(b) shows that the 
matrix subject has a mental contact with the event.  The semantic roles of the 
respective subjects are different from each other accordingly: i.e., the former is 
interpreted as an agent whereas the latter is regarded as an experiencer. 
 
5.6. Perfect Constructions 
The primary concern of this subsection is to make it explicit that the auxiliary 
have shares the same conceptual structure as the main verb have.  This perspective 
Figure 5.7: Cansative/Affected have Constructions 
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may be convincing if the perfect construction is compared with the S + have + NP + V 
(-en/-ing) construction.  The difference between the two constructions lies in whether 
or not there exists a co-referential correspondence between the matrix subject and the 
agent of the complement event.  In the former, the two entities are elaborated by 
distinct persons, while in the latter, they are the same, as shown in (23 a-b): 
 
(23) a.  Bill must have a repairman fix the kitchen sink in his house. 
 b.  John has fixed the kitchen sink in his house. 
 









Our next concern is the conceptual difference between the past participle in the S 
+ have + NP + V-en and that in the perfect construction.  The former denotes the 
vantage point from which an event coded in the complement clause is viewed.  This 
type of past participle suspends the sequential scanning of a process to derive an 
atemporal relation, with all the component states of the underlying process in profile.  
Its primary function is to confer the cognitive status of primary figure on an entity that 
would otherwise be manifested as secondary figure in the complement event.  
Figure 5.8: The English Perfect Construction 
subject 
event 
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Observe the following sentences: 
 
(24) a.  Jane had a mechanic look at this car. 
 b.  Jane had this car looked at by a mechanic. 
 
The semantic difference between (24a) and (24b) results from the speaker’s construal 
of the same conceived situation in different ways; the alternation is simply a matter of 
different selection of primary figure in the complement event.  In (24a), the 
complement event is viewed from the vantage point of the agent, a mechanic, whereas 
in (24b) it is viewed from the patient, this car, and the asymmetric energy flow from 









On the other hand, with regard to the past participle in the perfect construction,  
the shift in vantage point is irrelevant.  The vantage point is fixed to the matrix 
subject because of the referential correspondence, shown in Figure 5.8.  It is true that 
the past participle in the perfect construction has the same function as that in the S + 
have + NP V-en construction in that both of them serve to atemporalize the process the 





(a) S + have + NP +V construction (b) S + have + NP + V-en construction 
Figure 5.9: S+have+NP+V/V-en Constructions 
tr  tr 
lm 
a mechanic this car this car a mechanic 
lm 
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of the underlying process are in profile, whereas the past participle in the perfect 
construction serves to enhance the salience of the terminal component state of an 
underlying process, implying the ‘completion’ of the event coded in the complement 
clause in the case where the process is construed to be perfective.  What should be 
noted here is that the past participle does not denote a definite past of real world time.  
The notion of completion is only associated with the notion of anteriority.   
Elucidation of the English perfect construction requires that we should realize 
that the auxiliary have carries a tense marker, which naturally explains the following 
examples: 
 
(25) a. *John has a book under his arm yesterday. 
 b. *John has finished his dissertation yesterday. 
(26) a. *Queen Victoria has an expensive car. 
 b. *Queen Victoria has visited Brighton. 
 
In (25), the have refuses to co-occur with adverbs that designate a specific past time 
while the unacceptability of sentences in (26) results from the fact that the subject 
referent denotes a departed person.  In Cognitive Grammar, the tenses are grounding 
elements which situate an event being described in a certain location relative to the 
ground (i.e., the speech event, its participants (the speaker and hearer) and its 
circumstances).  The present tense reflects the speaker’s construal of a described 
event as proximal; the event is situated in his/her epistemic dominion, as depicted in 
Figure 5.10(a).  On the other hand, the past tense represents the fact that the speaker 
construes an event as distal; it is situated out of his/her dominion, as diagrammed in 
Figure 5.10(b): 











Therefore, the present tense form have as a grounding element indicates that the event 
coded in the perfect construction as a whole is immediate to the speaker; it is within 











To sum up, the present perfect construction can be characterized in such a way 
that the epistemic dominion (D1) evoked by the grammatical subject (R) is situated in 
the speaker’s conceptual dominion (D2).  This means that a described event (e.g. 













Figure 5.10: Proximal and Distal Construal 
(a) (b) 
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present.  Even more importantly, the past participle does not imply a specific past 
time but serves to enhance the salience of a terminal component state of the underlying 
process; the notion of “completeness” of an event which it represents is only 
associated with the notion of anteriority.  This conceptualization is applicable to the 
case where the process in a complement is interpreted as perfective.  With regard to 
an imperfective process, its past participle does not imply the notion of completion, 
because its underlying process describes a stable situation.  More specifically, the 
component states of an imperfect process are homogeneous and the initial and end 
points are not included within the scope of predication.  Thus, the enhancing of the 
salience of its terminal component state does not imply the completion of the process, 
as shown in (27): 
 
(27)  John has known Mary well. 
 
 
In any case, the discussions thus far suffice to make the characterization of the perfect 
construction plausible.  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I argued that the establishment of have’s import is based on the 
relative centrality of its constitutive domains, depending on which cognitive domain in 
the matrix is in focus or foregrounded.  I also demonstrated that a crucial factor 
determining the semantics of the S+have+NP+V construction is the notion of 
“controllability.”  The difference between causative meaning and affected meaning 
depends on the degree of attenuation of controllability of the subject over the 
complement events. 
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Also, I revealed that the S+ have NP, the S + have + NP + V, and the perfect 
constructions are related to one another and can thus be characterized as instantiating 
the same conceptual structure.  The difference lies in the nature of the entity 
elaborating the landmark of the event (i.e., a thing or event) and in the co-referentiality 
between the matrix subject and the agent of a complement event.  However, the three 
constructions have the same conceptual structure in that they situate the entity being 




Chapter 6 The English Ditransitive Construction 
 
6.1. Introductory Remarks 
 The English language has a peculiar syntactic form referred to as the ditransitive 
construction, in which the matrix verb is followed by two juxtaposed nominals.  The 
construction is productive, but constrained to certain verbs.  For example, the 
ditransitive is not grammatical in the following:  
 
(1) a. *John explained Bill the plan. 
 b. *Chris obtained John a toy car. 
 c. *Joe whispered Mary a story.  
 
It is also well known that verbs which take two objects can be divided into three 
subclasses in terms of alternation; i.e., a to-alternation class, a for-alternation class, 
and a non-alternation class, as shown in (2)-(4): 
 
(2) a. John gave Mary a book. 
 b.  John gave a book to Mary. 
(3) a.  Bill bought his son a toy car. 
 b. Bill bought a toy car for his son. 
(4) a. Mary envies Jane her good looks. 
 b.*Mary envies her good looks to / for Jane.  
 
    In this chapter, I will consider the semantic relationship between the ditransitive 
construction and its prepositional counterpart within the theoretical framework of 
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Cognitive Grammar and argue that the respective constructions should be 
characterized by virtue of the centrality of constitutive domains in terms of which a 
particular conceived situation is conceptualized.   
     
6.2. Langacker’s (1986, 1991, 1999a) Analysis 
 In this section, I will make an overview of Langacker’s characterization of the 
two constructions in question.  First, let me begin by observing the following 
sentences, as in (5): 
 
(5) a. John sent a Christmas card to Mary. 
 b. John sent Mary a Christmas card. 
 
With regard to this semantic contrast, Langacker (1986: 51) argues that speakers have 
the conceptual freedom to construe a given situation in different ways and the two 
constructions in (5) differ in meaning because they embody subtly different images to 
construe the same conceived situation.  The essentials of the respective structures are 
sketched in Figure 6.1, where the small circles represent John, Mary, and a Christmas 
card; the large circles stand for John and Mary’s dominions respectively, and boldface 
indicates a certain degree of relative prominence.  Both sentences have the 
conception in which a Christmas card originates in the dominion under John's control 
and follows a path that results in its eventual location within the region under Mary's 
control.  Crucial here is that the semantic contrast resides in the relative salience.  
In (5a), the preposition to specifically designates the path followed by a Christmas 
card, thereby rendering this aspect of the conceptualization more prominent than other 
facets, as indicated in Figure 6.1(a).  In (5b), on the other hand, the juxtaposition of 
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the two nominals symbolizes a possessive relationship between them.  Consequently, 
sentence (5b) lends added prominence to the resulting configuration, as sketched in 
Figure 6.1(b).  
 
                                                                                 




                        
    With respect to the possessive relationship between two post-verbal nominals, 
Langacker has illustrated the validity with the following data: 
 
(6) a. I sent Harvey the walrus. 
 b.*I sent Antarctica the walrus.     (Langacker 1991: 360) 
 
The difference in the felicity between (6a) and (6b) is whether or not the first 
post-verbal nominal can be construed as a recipient.  In this respect, Antarctica in 
(6b), which denotes a location, does not meet this condition.  He also states that in 
sentences like those in (7a, b), drawing a picture for someone provides him with access 
to something that was previously unavailable whereas washing windows does not 
entail a change of possession, which is responsible for the contrast between them: 
 
(7) a. I drew him a picture. 
 b.*I washed him the windows.     (ibid.) 
(Langacker 1986: 14) 
(a) (b) 











 Furthermore, focusing on the semantic relationship between the two juxtaposed 
post-verbal nominals, Langacker (1999a) analyzes them as being linked by 
correspondence involving a reference point relationship which is defined as a 
manifestation of our fundamental ability to invoke the conception of one entity for 
purposes of establishing mental contact with another (i.e., the target).  This means by 
definition that the first post-verbal nominal is more accessible than the second one to 
the conceptualizer (i.e., the speaker and hearer).  This analysis can be supported by 
the following data: 
 
(8) a. ?*Who did John give a book? 
 b. What did John give Mary? 
 
In the case where the first post-verbal nominal is interrogated as exemplified in (8a), it 
can be said that no entity exists by which the conceptualizer can establish mental 
contact with the target.  A wh-word is low in accessibility because it has no referent 
and therefore it cannot function as a reference point.  Hence the unacceptability of 
sentence (8a) results.  By contrast, the well-formedness of sentence (8b) is on a 
parallel with that of the following linguistic phenomenon:  
 
(9)  Under the bed, what did you find?                 (Yasui ed. 1987: 712) 
 
It is not in doubt that the sentence-initial element under the bed serves as a reference 
point and the rest of the sentence is used to inquire about an entity to be identified 
within the dominion evoked by the reference point.  What I am suggesting is that a 
wh-word functions as a kind of a slot for a particular entity to be identified and it is 
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less suspicious for a wh-word to be regarded as the target as a special case.  
Therefore, what is crucial to the acceptability of sentence (9) is the fact that the 
reference point chain is successfully maintained.  It is this mechanism that gives a 
natural explication of the difference in felicity between (8a) and (8b). 
   Moreover, it is generally recognized that in the ditransitive construction pronouns 
cannot occur in the second post-verbal position, as in (10a): 
 
(10) a. *John gave the boy it. 
 b. John gave it to the boy. 
 
This phenomenon can also be straightforwardly accounted for from the present 
perspective.  In sentence (10a), the nominal the boy serves as a reference point and 
the pronoun it as its target.  As is well known, however, pronouns occupy a higher 
position in the hierarchy scale of accessibility than nouns (see Gundel et al. 1993).  
This conflicts with the principle of a reference point entity being more accessible than 
its target to the conceptualizer.  The unacceptability of the sentence results from this 
contradiction.  In passing, this analysis can accommodate the functional perspective 
because the second post-verbal nominal (i.e. the target) is the focus in this 
construction.   
   We have seen that the ditransitive and its corresponding prepositional 
constructions have commonality in that both of them describe the same conceived 
situation but differ in meaning because of their own conceptualization of the event.  
We have also found that the two juxtaposed entities in the ditransitive syntax are linked 
by a reference point relationship, which reveals their respective cognitive statuses.  In 
the following sections, I will consider what motivates a linguistic manifestation of a 
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conceived situation in either the ditransitive or the prepositional construction.  
 
6.3. Domains and Relative Centrality 
Following the basic tenets of Cognitive Grammar, as noted in Chapter 1, every 
expression involves a set of cognitive domains as the basis for its meaning.  
Langacker (1991) divided the notion of domain into two types: basic and non-basic 
domains.  He argues that basic domains (i.e., time, space, and so forth) are thought of 
as realms within which conceptualization can occur and specific concepts can emerge, 
whereas non-basic domains are regarded as a set of concepts in terms of which a 
conceived entity is construed.  Therefore, any kind of conceptualization counts as a 
non-basic domain capable of being exploited for semantic purposes (Langacker 
2002:2-15). 
   Langacker illustrates his points by stating that there are some domains that 
evidently figure in the conceptual characterization of the entity glass: (1) Space (as a 
basic domain), (2) Shape (this non-basic domain presupposes space), (3) Function 1 
(i.e., container for liquid), (4) Function 2 (i.e., role in the process of drinking), (5) 
Material, (6) Size (easily held in one hand), and (7) Others (domains pertaining to cost, 
washing, storage, dropping and breaking, and so on).  He also argues that non-basic 
domains overlap with one another, often to the extent of full inclusion, and that there 
exist varying degrees of centrality exhibited by the domains, which is one facet of 
linguistic meaning and important for the characterization of lexical items.     
   With this in mind, we may observe the difference between ditransitive and 
to/for-dative constructions in more detail. 
 
(11) a. I mailed the notice to Zelda. 
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 b. I mailed Zelda the notice. 
 
With regard to the alternation in (11), Langacker (1991:326) argues that it is simply a 
matter of co-existing constructions involving different selections of secondary figure 
(mover vs. recipient).  What should be noticed from his insightful remark is that the 
two constructions differ from each other in their communicative functions; i.e., 
sentence (11a) focuses on the relationship between the matrix subject and the thing 
whereas sentence (11b) focuses on an interpersonal relationship between the subject’s 
referent and the recipient.  It follows from this that taking into consideration that the 
two sentences describe the same event in different ways, both sentences share the same 
conceptual structure, but different aspects are more central in the respective sentences.  
Thus, we can postulate that the conceptualization of an event encoded in either 
construction can be analyzed as containing the two possible central domains; i.e., the 
domain of the interpersonal relationship and that of the source-path-goal image schema, 
as shown in Figure 6.2, and that the relative centrality between them has much to do 
with its linguistic manifestation, which results from the cognitive process that when 
one domain is activated as more central and conceived of as salient, the other domain 
recedes into the background. 
 
 a. interpersonal relationship 
      between a subject entity and a recipient 
 b.  source-path-goal image schema  
      along which a thing traverses 
                                    
 
 
My central point is that the ditransitive construction is a manifestation of the 
Figure 6.2: Constitutive Domains of Ditransitive Constructions 
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conceptualization in which the interpersonal relationship is construed as the more 
central domain, whereas the prepositional construction focuses on the source-path-coal 
image as the more central domain.  In other words, the two constructions reflect the 
cognitive distance between a matrix subject and a recipient or between a matrix subject 
and a thing sent.  Crucial at this point is that the two cognitive domains are not 
peculiar only to the construction in question, but rather, they are immanent in the 
conceptualization of events in general, independently.  Therefore, as far as the 
source-path-goal image schema is concerned, the directionality does not need to be 
fixed, which depends on the nature of the process a matrix verb designates.  That is, 
the direction which the path denotes hinges on which of the two participants (i.e. the 
subject and the first post-verbal nominal) is construed to be its source, as illustrated in 
(12) and (13) (see Izutsu 2001): 
 
(12) a. Joe paid Fred a dollar. 
 b. Myra brought Sam a flower. 
(13) a. The architect charged us a fee of 2000 dollars. 
 b. The cops fined me $ 500 for being drunk.     (Izutsu 2001) 
 
In sentences like those in (13), unlike sentences in (12), the first post-verbal nominal is 
construed as the source and the matrix subject as the goal.  In the following sections, 
I will demonstrate the viability of this analysis. 
 
6.4. The Ditransitive Construction with Non-alternation  
   In this section, I characterize ditransitive constructions by observing those 
which show non-alternation.  Let me begin by observing examples like the following: 
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(14) a.  Bill envies John his good looks. 
 b.*Bill envies his good looks to / for John. 
(15) a.  Jane envies Mary her fine garden.  
 b. *Jane envies her fine garden to / for Mary. 
(16) a. Cathy forgave Kevin his thoughtless remark. 
 b. *Cathy forgave his thoughtless remark to / for Kevin. 
 
It can easily be noticed that the second post-verbal nominal in sentences (14)-(16) does 
not follow a path from the subject.  Rather, the domain of the source-path-goal image 
schema recedes into the background to such an extent that it is thought to be just a 
mental path the matrix subject’s referent follows.  Thus, it is difficult for the 
attenuated domain to be construed as being the more central domain, resulting in the 
infelicity of the (b)-sentences.  The ditransitive construction of this type can be 
characterized as a manifestation of the conceptualization sketched in Figure 6.3: 
 
                






With regard to this type of sentence, to take sentence (14a) as an example, it is closely 
related to the expression Bill envies John, which manifests a profile/active-zone 
discrepancy motivated by the salience of a whole relative to its part.  That is, the 
Figure 6.3: Semantic Structure of Ditransitive Constructions  





second post-verbal nominal his good looks is thought to be an element which specifies 
the active-zone.  This observation makes explicit the distinctiveness of this type of 
ditransitive construction and naturally leads to the conclusion that the domain of the 
interpersonal relationship is exclusively conceived of as being more central in the 
prototypical situation, resulting in non-alternation.  
    Keeping this in mind, observe the following sentences: 
 
(17) a. Mary gave John a kiss. 
 b. *Mary gave a kiss to John. 
(18) a. Jane gave Bill some flak. 
 b. *Jane gave some flak to Bill. 
(19) a. Mary gave John a lift in her XKE. 
 b. *Mary gave a lift in her XKE to John. 
(20) a. Mary gave John a piece of her mind. 
 b. *Mary gave a piece of her mind to John. 
(21) a. Mary lent John a hand. 
 b. *Mary lent a hand to John. 
 
As far as the sentences above are concerned, the second post-verbal entities are 
eventive nouns which designate a relation.  Therefore, we can depict the semantic 














It is obvious from Figure 6.4 that there exists a tighter conceptual integration between 
the main verb and the second post-verbal nominal; i.e., the former highlights the 
causative facet of some action schematically and the latter specifies it.  The function 
of the matrix verb is to manifest an event in the recipient’s experiential dominion.  
For this reason, those events in (17)-(21) describe the acts between the two persons.  
What is important here is that observing sentence (22) reveals that the 
source-path-goal image schema, though attenuated, implicitly exists. 
 
(22)  ? John gave Mary a kiss and Bill gave one to Jane. 
 
 
The two clauses in (22) are instantiations of the same event type and the second one is 
encoded in the to-dative construction with the notion of a kiss being objectivized and 
thereby coded by the indefinite pronoun one.  This means that this event structure 
contains the source-path-goal image schema covertly as one of the constitutive 
domains.  This meets the well-formedness of the ditransitive syntax; i.e., the 
existence of the two domains and the higher centrality of the interpersonal relationship 
than the source-path-goal image schema. 
    Convincingly, our perspective can also be supported by the following data: 
Figure 6.4: Semantic Structure of Ditransitive  




(23) a. Mary gave John an idea. 
 b. Mary gave an idea to John. 
(24) a. Mary’s behavior gave John an idea. 
 b.* Mary’s behavior gave an idea to John. 
(25) a. The medicine lent John relief. 
 b.* The medicine lent relief to John. 
 
In (23), the nominal an idea is an abstract entity and therefore its transference is 
interpreted as a metaphorical extension.  In spite of this peculiarity, sentence (23b) is 
felicitous because the subject’s referent is an entity of high volitionality and its 
intentionality naturally leads to evoking the notion of a path, which encourages us to 
construe the event in alternate ways, yielding the two constructions.  In such a case, 
when the speaker chooses to construe the situation in which the domain of the 
source-path-goal image schema is more central, it manifests itself in the to-dative 
construction.  On the other hand, in the case where the subject is an inanimate entity, 
as exemplified in (24a) and (25a), it is difficult for the domain of the path to be 
construed as more central.  Instead, the interaction between the subject and the 
recipient crucially inspires the latter with a certain idea or feeling.  Thus, the speaker 
construes such an event metaphorically in such a way that the domain of the 
interpersonal relationship is more central.   
    From the observations thus far, we can characterize the nature of the ditransitive 
construction as Figure 6.5.  In Cognitive Grammar, every expression is thought to be 
an assembly of component structures which merge to form a coherent composite 
notion in such a way that a composite structure created at one level of organization can 
in turn function as one component of a higher-level structure.  The constituency 
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hierarchies thus merged reflect a basic psychological capacity for conceptual 
integration which is encouraged by a variety of factors (Langacker 1997,1999a).  
Figure 6.5 describes the semantic structure of the ditransitive syntax, which indicates 
that the matrix subject exerts some force of energy physically, mentally, or abstractly 
















As noted, they are linked by a reference point relationship; i.e. the latter is assumed to 
be in the dominion of the former.  Specifically, the distinctiveness of this 
construction lies in the cognitive statuses of the subject and the recipient as the first 
and second figures in a profiled event, which renders the domain of the interpersonal 













Figure 6.5: Composite Semantic Structure of S+V+NP1+NP2 
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exertion of energy with the second post-verbal entity indicates the attenuated salience 
of the source-path-goal image schema.  It follows that the three entities (i.e., the 
subject, the two post-verbal entities) are connected via the respective semantic 
relationships among them.  And the relations thus emerged, except the interpersonal 
relationship, recede into the background.   
 The characterization of the ditransitive construction (as a synergistic effect of the 
relative salience of the two cognitive domains: foregrounding of the interpersonal 
relationship and backgrounding of the source-path-goal image schema) can 
accommodate the following contrast by resorting to the difference in salience between 
the two constitutive domains. 
 
(26) a. Frank was sold a car which turned out to be a lemon. 
 b.  Mary was sent the letter. 
 c. The child was told a bedtime story. 
 d. John was offered a post in the administration. 
 e. Robin was promised an early departure.           (Okuno 1989:107) 
(27) a.?*A book was given John. 
 b. *A car was sold John. 
 c. *A record was given Anne. 
 d. *A telegram was sent Robert.  
 e. ?The book was given Mary.                    (ibid.) 
 
That is, in this construction, the domain of the interpersonal relationship is the more 
central domain and therefore the first post-verbal nominal is conceived as prominent, 
which responsible for the acceptability of sentences (26a-e).  By contrast, the domain 
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of the source-path-goal recedes into the background and the energetic relationship 
between the verb and the second object entity is construed to be covert.  Hence the 
marginality of sentences (27a-e) results, irrespectively of the semantic status of the 
passivized subject entity (i.e., indefinite/definite).  
 To make my point more explicit, observe the following sentences: 
 
(28) a. A car was given to John. 
 b. The book was sent to Mary. 
 
To-dative constructions reflect the conceptualization of the source-path-goal image 
schema being in the foreground.  This means that there exists an overt energetic 
interaction between the matrix subject and the theme, which is responsible for the 
acceptability of sentences in (28).  As noted, the ditransitive and its corresponding 
to-dative constructions are essentially the same in regard to the conceptual content.  
The basic difference lies in the relative degree in salience between the recipient and the 
theme.  Taken into consideration that the to-phrase, as Langacker (1991: 359) argues, 
is a relational complement and it specifies the theme’s path, which the verb saliently 
evokes but characterizes only schematically, the composite semantic structure of the 
























    The validity of the analysis in terms of the domain centrality can be reinforced by 
observing sentences like those in (29) in some detail: 
 
(29)  John telegraphed / faxed / e-mailed / wired Bill the news. 
 
Relevant here is a general tendency that verbalization of a noun retains its primary 
concept as a requisite subpart (e.g. fork (n) / fork (v)).  For example, nouns such as 
telegraph, fax, e-mail, and wire are thought to be an instrument of communication; i.e., 
a tool for sending a message or information to someone.  Therefore, as a natural 


















intrinsic, prominent substructure, as exemplified below: 
 
(30) a. telegraph (v): to send a message by telegraph 
 b. fax (v): to send someone a letter or message by fax machine 
 c. e-mail (v): to send a message by computer 
 d. wire (v): to send a TELEGRAM to someone.   
        (Longman English Dictionary) 
 
Thus, the domain of the source-path-goal image schema can be construed to be more 
central in the construal of the events these verbs designate.  It is by virtue of this 
conceptualization that those verbs can be used in the to-dative construction, as in (31): 
 
(31) a. Bill faxed the reply to John. 
 b. Mary telegraphed the result to Jane. 
 
What needs to be born in mind here to understand the ditransitivization of such verbs 
is that they also contain the concept of the interpersonal relationship between the 
subject and recipient as well as that of the source-path-goal image schema, which 
enables us to construe the same conceived situation differently.  In the case where the 
former’s domain is conceived of as being more central, the ditransitive construction 
should be motivated, as in (29).  These examples suffice to verify my claim that the 
existence of the two non-basic domains and their relative centrality have much to do 
with the manifestation of the construction, which results from the difference in 
construal of a given event, thereby rendering one of the two post-verbal entities more 
prominent than the other. 
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6.5. S+V+ NP1 + to NP2 Constructions 
My objective here is to show that the restricted manifestation of an event coding 
in the S+V+ NP1 + to NP2 construction is ascribable to the semantic nature of the event 
structure in which three entities (S, NP1, and NP2) within the scope of predication are 
construed in such a specific way that they are respectively coded in a subject, an object, 
and an oblique entity in accordance with the difference in salience among them.  This 
asymmetry reflects the construal of an interaction between an agent (S) and a thing 
(NP1) as being in focus on the one hand, and of a process that a verb (V) designates 
and the thing (NP1) as being construed as a conceptual group at the lower-level of 
organization on the other.  In this case, a to-phrase is appended at the higher-level to 
specify a location, a goal, or a direction the main verb implicitly evokes.  Therefore, 
the conceptual structure of an event of this kind is quite different from the semantic 
structure depicted in Figure 6.6, where a dative verb evokes a possessive relationship 
and the preposition to highlights a path which a mover follows. 
 My central point can be made explicit by observing the following sentences: 
 
(32) a The scientist suggested an important plan to the President. 
 b. * The scientist suggested the President an important plan. 
 c. The scientist suggested an important plan. 
(33) a. John explained the problem to the children. 
 b. * John explained the children the problem. 
 c. John explained the problem. 
(34) a. Bill reported the accident to the captain. 
 b. * Bill reported the captain the accident. 
 c. Bill reported the accident.                (Konishi: 1980) 
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In sentences like those in (32)-(34), the respective ditransitive versions are 
unacceptable.  Interesting here is that verbs of communication such as suggest, 
explain, and report include the concept of an addressee as a requisite subpart of their 
conceptualization but it can be schematic and remain unprofiled as exemplified in the 
(c)-sentences.  This means that in this type of event structure, the “conceptual 
content” which is suggested, explained, or reported is more likely to be conceived of 
as more prominent than the addressee.  In addition, the (b)-sentences explicitly 
indicate that these verbs do not take a relational complement which a dative verb does 
(as sketched in Figure 6.5).  It follows that in this conceptualization, the verb and its 
content are conceived of as a conceptual group at the lower level of organization and 






    
        
Thus, in this construal, the goal (or direction) is less salient, resulting in its 
manifestation as an oblique entity. 
 The anomaly of sentence (35a) can be accounted for in the same fashion: 
 
(35) a.* John said / shouted / screamed / murmured / whispered / yelled  
 Bill the news. 
 b. John said / shouted / screamed / murmured / whispered / yelled the  
 John  explained the problem   to the children 
Figure 6.7: Conceptual Groups of to-dative Constructions 
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 news to Bill. 
 c. John said his name again. 
 
An important fact regarding verbs of saying is that they are used to report the saying of 
words or to express a particular thought in words, as opposed to a verb like tell whose 
meaning is defined as giving someone facts or information about something.  This 
observation develops the idea that the act of saying itself (i.e., the process of 
pronouncing strings of words) is the “conceptual content” that is thereby built up, 
which strongly motivates the conceptualization of the two entities (i.e., say, etc. and 
the news) as a conceptual group.  The event structure may contain a hearer who 
perceives the utterance and understands its meaning, as in (35b).  However, sentence 
(35c) indicates that the notion of such an entity is not crucial to this kind of event 
structure.  Consequently, this conceptual process is the same as that depicted in 
Figure 6.7 and exclusively allows the event to be encoded in the S+V+ NP1 to NP2 
construction, but not in the ditransitive syntax.  
 Furthermore, observe the following sentences: 
 
(36) a.* Mary distributed the children apples. 
 b. Mary distributed apples to the children. 
 
The difference in the acceptability between sentences (36a) and (36b) can be predicted 
on the basis of the semantic value of the matrix verb.  The import of the verb 
distribute primarily specifies a thing and a place where it is distributed.  It may be 
argued from this that the nominal the children is regarded as a location (or goal) rather 
than a recipient.  Relevant data can be offered from this perspective, as in (37): 
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(37) a. The police delivered the girl safely to her parents. 
 b. John contributed his paper to the journal. 
 c. The man transported the products to the store. 
 d. The clerk credited the sum to my account. 
 e. The government released the facts to the press.  
 f. The whole school donated money to the Red Cross. 
 
The respective event structures in (37) have a commonality in that the subject’s 
referent situates a particular thing in a given location (or goal).  These linguistic facts 
indicate that an expression with to receives a purely spatial construal.   
 From the observations above, the composite semantic structure of S+V+ NP1 to 
NP2 can be sketched in Figure 6.8: 
 
 
             







                                                 











In Figure 6.8, the profile of NP1 corresponds to one of the focal participants in the 
process denoted by a matrix verb (V), while the profile of a matrix subject (S) 
corresponds to the other focal participant at the lower level.  At the higher-level of 
organization, the composite structure in turn combines with the atemporal relational 
predication designated by the preposition to, yielding the composite structure as a 
whole.  Crucial here is that Figure 6.8 contains the conceptual overlap between the 
two component structures; i.e., the semantic correspondence between the landmark of 
the process profiled by the matrix verb and the trajector of the atemporal relation 
profiled by the preposition.  This conceptualization results from the semantics of the 
verb which implies a directed action, concretely or abstractly.  The function of the 
preposition to is to encode a path sub-component of such an event as a dependent 
vector.  Therefore, the composite semantic structure is quite different from that 
diagrammed in Figure 6.6. 
 
6.6. For-dative Constructions 
 Turning our attention to the ditransitive construction which shows 
for-alternation, we find that it can easily be accommodated by the present perspective.  
To make my point explicit, I will begin by observing typical for-dative verbs:  
 
(38) a.  Verbs of creation: 
  bake, make, build, cook, knit, fix, etc. 
 b.  Verbs of obtaining: 
  get, buy, find, order, grab, earn, etc. 
 c.  Verbs of choosing; 
 choose, pick, select, etc.                    (Pinker 1989: 113-114) 
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It is obvious that as far as these types of verbs are concerned, the existence of a 
for-phrase is not essential to the event structure profiled by the verbs.  Therefore, the 
central domain of for-dative verbs is an asymmetrical energetic relationship between 
an agent and a patient, as sketched in Figure 6.9: 
 
 




This centrality of constitutive domains leads naturally to a linguistic manifestation of a 
transitive sentence, as in (39): 
 
(39) a. Mary baked a cake 
 b. John bought a new car. 
 c. Jane picked the dress she liked best. 
 
With regard to for-dative verbs, the source-path-goal image schema is not 
conceptualized.  Rather, the entity designated in the for-phrase is clause-external (or 
extrinsic) and the function of the for-phrase is to make explicit the intention of an act 
performed by a matrix subject.  Therefore, the for-dative construction has the 
composite semantic structure in which the event structure profiled by the matrix verb 
elaborates the trajector of the atemporal relationship profiled by the preposition for.  
The full conceptualization can be diagrammed in Figure 6.10: 
 
Agent Patient 
Figure 6.9: Asymmetrical Energetic Relationship  












                      
 
 
In Figure 6.10, the entity corresponding to the trajector of an atemporal relation 
profiled by the preposition for is the process profiled by the matrix verb.  This means 
that the for-phrase is regarded as a modifier, but not a complement (see Langacker 
1999 for further discussion about these notions).  We may offer an example as an 
instantiation of this semantic structure, as in (40a): 
 
(40) a. John opened the door for Mary. 
 b.* John opened Mary the door. 
 
Sentence (40a) does not entail a change of possession and thus Mary cannot be 
construed as a recipient, which is responsible for the unacceptability of sentence (40b).    
 Our central concern here is what motivates the ditransitivization of this type of 







Figure 6.10: Composite Semantic Structure of S+V+NP1 for NP2 
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kind of path in which a benefactive object of the preposition is construed to be a 
participant which is ultimately affected by the energy expended, which means that the 
semantic structure of the entire event implies the “indirect interpersonal relationship.”  
What I am suggesting is that the highest level of organization (i.e., the full composite 
structure) can be regarded as containing two requisite domains for the ditransitive (i.e., 
the indirect interpersonal relationship and the source-path-goal image schema), which 
has to do with the acceptability of the following sentences: 
 
(41) a. Mary knitted John a cardigan. 
 b. Jane roasted Jim a chicken. 
 c. Tom found Bill a taxi. 
 d. Chris got Jim a jacket. 
 
The manifestation of the ditransitive construction, as noted, reflects the synergistic 
effect of the relative salience of the two cognitive domains: foregrounding of the 
interpersonal relationship and backgrounding of the source-path-goal image schema.  
Sentences in (41) show that the construal of a given event as an instantiation of the 
semantic structure depicted in Figure 6.5, as a result of a semantic extension from that 
in Figure 6.10, facilitates its ditransitivization. 
 It should be noted here that the ditransitive construction with for-alternation has 
the peculiarity of its own, unlike its counterpart with to-alternation, which can be made 
explicit by observing the following sentences: 
 
(42) a. *Mary was bought a book by John. 
 b. *John was baked a cake by Jane. 
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 c. *John was carved a statue. 
 d. *Janice was got a new dress by Paul. 
 e. *Mary was built a table by Bill. 
 
The infelicity of the sentences in (42) is ascribable to the “indirectness” of the 
interpersonal relationship between the subject’s referent and the recipient.  This 
analysis can be reinforced by Bolinger’s (1977:10) insightful remarks on passive 
sentences.  He argues that the acceptability of a passive sentence has much to do with 
the notion of “affectedness” over the subject entity.  That is, the subject entity in a 
passivized sentence must be conceived of as being affected by the process designated 
by the matrix verb, which supports my characterization of the ditransitive construction 
which shows for-alternation.  
 Furthermore, observing sentences in (43) and (44) can also support the present 
perspective.  That is, the less centrality of the domain of the indirect interpersonal 
relationship renders the ditransitive syntax infelicitous, as exemplified in: 
 
(43) a.* Chris obtained Jim a jacket. 
 b. Chris obtained a jacket for Jim. 
(44) a.* Jane selected John a nice sweater. 
 b. Jane selected a nice sweater for John. 
 
The verb obtain contains as part of its meaning the notion of getting something 
through effort, skill or work, which renders the process of getting a thing more 
prominent.  By the same token, the verb select implies that the subject’s referent 
“chooses to do something by carefully thinking about which is the best.”  The 
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unacceptability of sentences (43a) and (44a) results from the cognition that the 
respective processes profiled by the verbs are in focus and it is only possible that the 
entities a jacket and a nice sweater are construed to be a secondary figure (i.e., 
landmark).  Therefore, those events are regarded as instantiations of the semantic 
structure sketched in Figure 6.10. 
 
6.7. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter, I made explicit the nature of the ditransitive construction on the 
basis of Langacker’s characterization.  The semantics of the ditransitive construction 
comes from the existence of three entities, their particular characteristics, and the 
interaction among them.  This interaction is threefold: the physical or mental 
interaction between a matrix subject and a thing, the possessive relationship between a 
recipient and the thing, and the interpersonal relationship between the subject and the 
recipient.  The present research argued that two possible central domains are highly 
relevant to a linguistic manifestation either in the form of the ditransitive or of 
to/for-dative constructions; i.e., the domain of the interpersonal interaction and that of 
the source-path-goal image schema.  At the same time, this distinction is reflected in 
the respective compositional paths the conceptualizer follows in building up the full 
conceptualization.  And the path depends on how the conceptualizer construes a 
conceived situation, in other words, it is a matter of which domains s/he focuses on for 
expressive purposes.   
 
Part III 
Conceptual Autonomy and Dependence 
 
 
In Chapter 1, I have overviewed the nature of fundamental grammatical categories in 
terms of the notions of autonomy and dependence ― any relational predications (i.e., 
verb, adjective, adverb, and preposition) can be regarded as conceptually dependent 
whereas nouns as conceptually autonomous.  I have stated that the distinction 
between the two notions is a matter of degree and ‘relational nouns’ and ‘deverbal 
nouns’ have a conceptually dependent structure.  Part III will argue the nature of 
those nouns from a cognitive perspective.  Chapter 7 will discuss the semantics of the 
English possessive constrictions; i.e., possessive genitives and of-constructions, and 
reveal that the head noun of the of-construction is regarded as conceptually dependent 
in that its requisite, intrinsic subpart is to be elaborated by an entity provided by the 
of-phrase to establish its semantic value.   In chapter 8, I will discuss nouns in terms 
of the notions of a type and an instance and the nature of modifiers (i.e., type modifiers 
and instance modifiers).  I will explore the conceptual difference between the two 
modifiers, and argue that nouns which designate instances are regarded as conceptually 
autonomous and modifiers to them function as identifying the referents, whereas nouns 
which represent a type are considered to be conceptually dependent and modifiers to 
them serve as establishing their semantic value, resulting in a higher specification of 
that entity.  More specifically, it is true that a type entity per se is regarded as 
conceptually autonomous, but seen from the interrelationship between the entity and a 
type modifier, the former is relational to the latter.  Chapter 9 will discuss the 
conceptual nature of deverbal nouns, and explore the nature of atypical object 
constructions (i.e., light verb constructions, certain V-NP-PP type idiomatic 
expressions, and cognate object constructions).  I will argue that in those 
constructions, the relationship between a main verb and its object is equated with that 
between a schema and its instantiation.  To put it another way, the object elaborates 
the overall structure of the process a verb denotes.  My point is that this semantic 
relationship stems from the cognition that the concept described by the object is 
conceptually dependent because it designates a relational notion and therefore can be 
construed as activating the underlying eventivity as a semi-active concept.  On the 
other hand, as stated in Chapter 1, the asymmetry between autonomy and dependence 
is not a fixed notion but a matter of degree.  Therefore, the concept described by an 
atypical object can be conceived of as being more autonomous when it is 
conceptualized as thing-like through the cognitive processing of its being objectivized 




Chapter 7  English Possessive Constructions:  
  [NP’s N] and [the N of NP] 
 
 In this chapter, I will discuss the semantics of the English possessive constructions.  
Attention is drawn to the conceptual difference between possessive genitives such as 
the ship’s funnel and the corresponding of-constructions like the funnel of the ship.  
This chapter provides a unified account of the alternation between the two 
constructions as a natural consequence of their distinct modes of conceptualization.  
More specifically, I will argue that possessive genitives, as Langacker (1993) argues, 
instantiate a reference point construction where both a possessive nominal and a 
possessed nominal are regarded as conceptually autonomous whereas in the 
of-construction the conception designated by an of-phrase is intrinsic to the 
characterization of the head, which means that the head noun in the of-construction is 
regarded as relational and reflects the construal of that noun as being conceptually 
dependent.  That is, in the case where two entities, which are conceptually 
autonomous in themselves, are regarded as holding an intrinsic interrelationship 
between them in such a way that one is construed to be an integrate subpart of the 
other, a possible tendency of our immanent cognition would be the recognition that the 
latter entity should be conceptually dependent.  The two constructions in question 
distinctively reflect the mechanism of the relationship between perception in visual 
field and conception in its corresponding conceptual sphere.  Recall here the 
semantic extension of the preposition ‘by’ in Chapter 1, where two entities in visual 
field are construed by the viewer in his conceptual sphere.  The chronological 
semantic extension of this word reflects how the conceptualizer construes the two 
entities in his viewing frame.  The crucial factor here lies in the mechanism of our 
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reference point ability.  In the case where we try to find the North Star in the sky, we 
often have experience in our daily life of trying to find the Big Dipper as a reference 
point because of its prominence.  This experience manifests that the two entities are 
conceptually autonomous respectively, and that more importantly, once the target (i.e., 
the North Star) is identified, the reference point (i.e., the Big Dipper) recedes into 
background or is out of sight.  On the other hand, in the case where two entities are 
regarded as holding an intrinsic interrelationship between them, the two entities are 
kept in salience in our conceptual sphere.  Our daily experience also witnesses this 
mechanism; i.e., when we focus on the crest of a fowl the body remains in prominence 
in our conception.  This chapter will reveal that the two mechanisms are crucial to 
characterize the two possessive constructions.  
 
7.1. Two Notable Analyses  
 Regarding the study on the selection between the possessive genitives and 
of-constructions, there has been a lot of literature, of which I will survey two notable 
analyses at the outset of our discussions: Hawkins (1981) and Deane (1987). 
 
7.1.1. Hawkins’s (1981) Analysis 
Hawkins proposes the semantic hierarchy shown in (1) to explain the alternation 
between possessive genitives and of-constructions: 
 
(1) human > human attribute > non-human animate > non-human inanimate 
 
 
His central claim is that the first constituent must be equal to or higher than the second 





(2) a. Mary’s brother ― the brother of Mary 
 b. the ship’s funnel ― the funnel of the ship 
 c.  the book’s cover ― the cover of the book 
(3) a. Mary’s car ― ?the car of Mary 
 b. the company’s car ― ?the car of the company 
 c. the library’s heater ― ?the heater of the library 
(4) a. the foot of the mountain ― ?the mountain’s foot 
 b. the mouth of the liver ― ?the river’s mouth 
 c. the bottom of the valley ― ?the valley’s bottom 
 
According to Hawkins, in the case where both possessor and possessed nouns are the 
same category on the hierarchy as in (2) either construction is felicitous, whereas in 
(3a) the noun Mary (human) is higher than the noun car (non-human) on the hierarchy, 
hence the low acceptability of the of-construction results.  With regard to the 
infelicity of the examples (3) and (4), he remarks that since collective nouns such as 
the company and the library in (3b, c) are interpreted as implying human reference, 
nouns of this kind are higher than nouns like car and heater on the semantic hierarchy, 
and that foot and mouth in (4a, b), which are originally body-part terms, have 
undergone metaphorical extension and therefore the construction in which the 
body-part term comes first is more appropriate than the construction where it comes 
second. 
His analysis, however, is insufficient in that it cannot account for the examples 
like the following: 
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(5)  a. *the problem’s part ― the part of the problem 
  b. *the house’s front ― the front of the house 
  c. *victory’s monument ― the monument of victory 
 
In the examples like those in (5), since both possessor and possessed nouns are the 
same category on the semantic hierarchy, his theory erroneously predicts that either 
construction is acceptable.  More crucially, the fact that the expression (6b) is 
perfectly felicitous contradicts his theory. 
 
(6) a.  Shakespeare’s sonnets 
 b.  the sonnets of Shakespeare 
 
With the residual problems in Hawkins’s analysis in mind, we will turn to making an 
overview of Deane’s (1987) analysis. 
 
7.1.2. Deane’s (1987) Analysis 
Deane (1987) tries to predict the selection between the two constructions in terms 
of the Silverstein hierarchy shown in (7), arguing that the higher a possessor NP is on 
the hierarchy, the more acceptable it will be in the possessive genitive construction, 
and that conversely the lower the NP is on the hierarchy, the more acceptable it will be 
in the of-construction. 
 
(7)  Silverstein hierarchy 
 1st person pronoun > 2nd person pronoun > 3rd person pronoun > 3rd person 
anaphor > 3rd person demonstrative > Proper name > Kin-term > Human and 
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animate NP > Concrete object > Container > Location > Perceivable > Abstract 
        (Deane 1987: 67) 
 
It should be noted here that his theory is more accurate than that of Hawkins in that the 
Silverstein hierarchy can correctly predict the difference in acceptability between the 
two expressions repeated as (8), which cannot be accounted for in terms of the 
semantic hierarchy presented by Hawkins: 
 
(8)  a. *victory’s monument 
  b. the monument of victory  (= 5) 
 
That is, the possessor NP victory, which designates an abstract concept, occupies the 
very bottom of the Silverstein hierarchy.  Hence the unacceptability of the expression 
(8a) results. 
Furthermore, what is noteworthy in Deane’s analysis is that he ascribes the 
selection between the two constructions to the respective discourse functions; i.e., the 
notions of topic and focus, which is compatible with the general principle of 
“information structure” because in both constructions the first element functions as a 
topic and the second as a focus, as illustrated in (9): 
 
(9)   Possessor NP      Possessed NP 
 Prenominal possessive    Relatively topical    Relatively in focus 
 Postnominal possessive     Relatively in focus   Relatively topical 




(10) a.  [NP’s  N]   
 topic   focus 
 b.  [the N of  NP] 
   topic   focus 
 
His claim is that possessive genitives occur in the case where a possessor NP is topical, 
whereas of-constructions occur in the case where a possessed NP is topical, as 
demonstrated in (11) and (12): 
 
(11)  a. (Public Poster): A meeting of Overeaters Anonymous will take place at the  
   home of Agnes Levy, 184 Elm St., on . . . 
  b. (Public Poster): ??A meeting of Overeaters Anonymous will take place at 
    Agnes Levy’s home, 184 Elm ST., on . . .  
          
    (ibid.) 
(12) What: A Birthday Party 
 Who: For Amy Lindsey 
 When: 2:00 on Saturday afternoon 
 Where: Amy’s house      
                      (ibid.) 
 
Deane argues that on a public poster, only (11a) makes sense because readers of a 
public poster cannot be expected to know who Agnes Levy is and therefore the 
possessor NP (i.e. Agnes Levy) cannot be treated as topical information.  By contrast, 
he also points out that since Amy in (12) is topical from the aim of the invitation the 
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possessive genitive construction is natural. 
Interestingly enough in his research, Deane argues that the Silverstein hierarchy 
is organized in accordance with the salience of a referent within the context of 
speaking, as shown in (13): 
 
(13)  Salience hierarchy: 
      anaphoric element > demonstrative > indexical NP such as kin-terms >  
 animate > movable concrete object > abstract 
 
Following him, the more salient a referent is likely to be within the situation of 
speaking and more tightly the NP’s reference is determined by the situation of 
speaking, the higher it will be on the Silverstein hierarchy and the likelier it will be 
construed as a topic in the absence of indications to the contrary.  Therefore, it 
follows from this analysis that the two constructions are different from each other in 
that each has a distinct function and meaning.  This insightful remark is compatible 
with the general tendency that the of-construction is more acceptable in the case where 
a possessor NP is indefinite or complex, as in (14) and (15): 
  
 
(14) That is the footprint of a deer. (vs. a deer’s footprint) 
(15) He crashed into  (a)  *?the car of the lady. 
  (b)   the car of the lady in front of him. 
  (c)  the car of the girl he hoped to marry. 
         




Evidently, Deane’s approach from the viewpoint of discourse function captures the 
nature of each construction.  It seems, however, that there still remains an unsolved 
problem in the matter of what motivates the preference for the of-construction in the 
case of (4) and (5). 
In the following sections, I will consider the nature of the genitive construction 
and that of the of-construction respectively from a cognitive perspective, and show that 
the two constructions differ from each other with respect to cognitive processing. 
 
7.2. From Cognitive Perspective 
7.2.1. Possessive Genitive Constructions 
Langacker (1993) characterizes the possessive genitive construction as a 
manifestation of a reference point organization which is defined as the ability to 
invoke the conception of one entity for purposes of establishing mental contact with 
another (i.e., the target).  As noted, crucial to this cognitive model is that an entity 
chosen as a reference point has a certain cognitive salience either intrinsically or 
contextually, and that the salience has a dynamic aspect.  That is, the notion which 
serves as a reference point must first be activated and thus established as a salient 
entity; however, when the notion is actually recognized as a reference point it is the 
target that becomes prominent in the sense of being the focus of the conceptualizer ’s 
attention. 
It is obvious that this principle has its own validity.  Significant at this point is a 
question of what factors have to do with the status of a reference point.  With regard 
to this, Taylor (1989) claims that the overwhelming majority of nouns are relational to 
some degree in that they invoke as part of their semantic structures various kinds of 
entities, concluding that a possessive genitive identifies the referent of a head noun by 
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elaboration of another thing which participates in an unprofiled relationship with it.  
He illustrates his theory with the following data: 
 
(16)  a John’s employer  
  b.  the car’s driver 
  c.  the president’s adviser 
  d. the child’s teacher 
(17)  a. John’s employee 
  b. the company’s appointees 
 
In (16) and (17), the respective head nouns are relational to the extent that their 
genitive nominals elaborate a participant within the conceptual base required in 
conceptualizing the head noun’s referent.  The following examples can also be 
accounted for in the same fashion: 
 
(18)  a. John’s friend 
  b. the secretary’s colleagues 
  c. Shakespeare’s contemporaries 
 
The head nouns in (18) are also relational in that they invoke in their semantic 
structures various kinds of interpersonal relationships.   
In this way, it is true that Taylor’s characterization of the possessive genitive 
construction is very insightful, but it seems that there remains a residual problem to be 
addressed in his analysis.  He points out, on the one hand, that temporal genitives are 





(19)  a. yesterday’s event 
  b. this morning’s car crash 
  c. tomorrow’s weather 
(20) a.  *London’s work 
 b. *York Road’s car crash 
 
However, on the other hand, he argues that some nouns do invoke the notion of place 
and that the acceptability of expressions like those in (21) lies in the fact that the 
referent of each head noun can be identified from the viewpoint of a place. 
 
(21)  a. Britain’s climate 
  b. West Germany’s birthrate 
  c. Bristol’s sales figure 
 
Therefore, further discussions need to be made with regard to what motivates the 
difference in acceptability between (20) and (21).  Crucially, his approach has 
difficulty in accounting for the following data: 
 
(22)  a. (*) the room’s teacher 
  b. (*) yesterday’s girlfriend 
  c. (*) today’s child 
 
The expressions like those in (22) are normally unacceptable; however, all the 
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expressions become appropriate when particular contexts are provided (see Hayase 
1993 for details).  The observations thus far might reveal that the possible 
inadequacy of Taylor’s analysis stems from the definition of the notion of ‘relational.’  
I am suggesting that in his theory, the notion in question may be based on pragmatic 
inferences in the current discourse space.  This means that we need more schematic 
characterization to capture the nature of the possessive genitive construction.   
    We have seen in Chapter 1 that every expression invokes a set of cognitive 
domains as the basis for its meaning, which is defined as any knowledge configuration 
which provides the context for the conceptualization of a semantic unit.  Recall here 
that Langacker (1991) divides the notion of domain into two types: basic and non-basis 
domains.  He argues that the basic domains (e.g. time and place) are realms within 
which conceptualization can occur and specific concepts can emerge.  He also 
remarks that the relative centrality of constitutive domains is one facet of linguistic 
meaning and is important for the characterization of lexical items.  I suggest that the 
acceptability of the possessive genitive construction depends on whether or not the 
relevant domain for identifying a head noun is successfully invoked by an entity coded 
in the genitive form.  In this respect, the basic domains (time and place) are likely to 
be conceived of as setting elements, but not as central domains for successfully 
identifying a target, which is responsible for the judgment of unacceptability of 
expressions in (20).  By contrast, the felicity of the expressions in (19) and (22) 
results from contextual factors, which can focus attention on a domain that might 
otherwise not be accessed at all, or only at a lower level of activation.1  Also, the 
                                                 
1  Hayase (1993) exemplifies the enhanced appropriateness of the expressions in (22), providing 
 the following contexts: 
 (i)  One day in Fall, in a small school in California, the SAT was being given, and all of the  
   tiny classrooms were filled with nervous, college-bound teenagers.  To each classroom  
was assigned a teacher who was to supervise the test.  One room’s teacher happened to 
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acceptability of examples in (21) lies in the “relevance” enough for the possessive 
genitive to identify the target entity.  I am suggesting here that each possessive 
genitive provides the immediate scope for the target to be identified.  This 
observation leads to the notions of an overall scope and an immediate scope of 
predication.  As noted in Chapter 1, the former is an expression’s maximal scope in 
some domain (i.e., the full extent of its coverage) and the latter is the portion directly 
relevant for a particular purpose (i.e., the immediately relevant portion at a given level 
of organization).   
To understand these notions more explicitly, observe the following sentences: 
 
(23)  a. A body has two arms. 
  b. An arm has an elbow and a hand. 
  c. A hand has five fingers. 
  d. A finger has three knuckles and a fingernail. 
 
(24)  a. ? A body has two elbows. 
  b. ? An arm has five fingers. 
  c.  ?? An arm has five fingernails and fourteen knuckles. 
  d. ??? A body has twenty-eight knuckles. 
        (Langacker 1987: 119) 
 
The marginality of sentences in (24) lies in the fact that although the conception body 
functions as the overall scope in conceptualizing the notions such as arm, hand, and 
                                                                                                                                               
be Mary Anderson, and it was on that day that her adventure began. 
 (ii) He always brings his girlfriend to football games, but he is quite a playboy, so today’s  
  girlfriend may be different from yesterday’s. 
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finger, each subject does not designate the portion of the body that serves as the 
immediate scope of the object entity.  In this respect, the infelicity of the expressions 
in (20) and (22) can be accounted for in the same fashion.  That is, each possessive 
genitive in these examples is interpreted as a basic domain and is not likely to be 
conceived of as the relevant scope for identifying the target.   
It follows that we can define the condition: possessive constructions are 
felicitous when the possessive genitive serves as the immediate scope of the relevant 
domain in terms of which a target conception is identified. 
 
7.2.2. Of Constructions 
The possessive genitive and the of-construction, as is well known, are not 
necessarily interchangeable.  Rather, the former has a broader range of use than the 
latter, which is exemplified by the fact that there exist many cases where the 
possessive genitives correspond to prepositional phrases other than the of-phrase, as 
shown in (25): 
 
(25)  b. the jar’s lid ― the lid on / to the jar 
  c. the city’s road ― the road in the city 
  d. Monday’s snowfall ― the snowfall on Monday 
  e. last year’s profit ― the profit for last year 
  f. the girl’s new dress ― the new dress for the girl 
  g. the lawn’s brown spot ― the brown spot in the lawn 
 
From the examples above it is evident that the of-construction has a different semantic 
property from that of the possessive genitive.  With regard to this, Langacker (1992) 
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argues that schematically of designates some kind of intrinsic relationship between two 
participants.2  He also states that a part-whole relation is the prototype of this 
construction in that one of them (i.e., part) constitutes an inherent, restricted subpart of 
the other (i.e., whole).  This analysis is in accordance with the general tendency of a 
part-whole relationship being likely to be coded in the of-construction rather than in 
the possessive genitive (see Deane 1987, Quirk et al. 1985), as exemplified in (26):   
 
(26)  a. the rest of the journey ― *the journey’s rest 
  b. the smaller portion of the army ― *??the army’s smaller portion 
  c. the front of the house ― *the house’s front 
  d. the part of the problem ― *the problem’s part 
 
It should be noted here that there are cases where either construction is 
acceptable, as illustrated in (27): 
 
(27)  a. the funnel of the ship ― the ship’s funnel 
  b. the door of the building ― the building’s door 
  c. the handle of the bicycle ― the bicycle’s handle 
 
The difference in acceptability of the possessive genitive constructions between (26) 
and (27) results from whether or not the head noun is conceived of as being a bounded 
region in the relevant domain.  What I am suggesting is that the conceptions like 
funnel, door, and handle can be construed as being a bounded entity, whereas the 
                                                 
2 Langacker characterizes the notion of intrinsicness as implying a minimal conceptual distance 




conceptions such as rest, small portion, front, and part can only be conceptualized in 
relation to the whole. 
Furthermore, what is important at this point is to recall the dynamic aspect of the 
possessive genitive construction; i.e., the salience of an entity used as a reference point 
is backgrounded when the referent of the head noun is established.  This dynamic 
mechanism of a reference point organization leads naturally to the idea that the felicity 
of the of-construction in (26) can be best described by postulating that the salience of 
the entity within the of-phrase still remains after the establishment of the referent 
designated by the head noun.  Consequently, this means that in the of-construction, 
both the head noun and the noun within the of-phrase are conceived of as salient.  
The salience of the former results from the very fact that it is a head noun and that of 
the latter comes from the conceptual structure of this construction.  I am suggesting 
that concerning the possessive construction in the form of the of-construction, the 
of-phrase serves as a complement with respect to the head noun.  This analysis is 
based on the observation that the concept designated by an of-phrase is intrinsic to 
characterization of the head and that the entity within the phrase, unlike the possessive 
genitive as a reference point, is a requisite concept for conceptualizing the referent 
described by the head noun.  It follows from this that the of-phrase has a descriptive 
function, rather than an identifying function (see Chapter 8 for the detail of the two 
functions).  This analysis can be supported by the following examples: 
 
(28)  a. John’s school 
 b. *the school of John 
 
The infelicity of the expression (28b) lies in the fact that it is difficult for John to be 
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interpreted as an entity that describes or characterizes the school.  Recall here that the 
expression repeated as (29b) is perfectly acceptable. 
 
(29)  a. Shakespeare’s sonnets 
  b. the sonnets of Shakespeare  (=6) 
 
In this expression (29b), it seems obvious for the noun Shakespeare to be interpreted 
as an entity that characterizes the head noun the sonnets. 
If the observation above is the case, it is less dubious that the difference between 
the two constructions is reflected in the respective conceptualizing processes.  As 
noted, the function of the possessive genitive is to serve as a unique identifier of the 
referent designated by a head noun and the conceptualization, to take the ship’s funnel 
as an example, can be illustrated in Figure 7.1: 
 
 
                                     




My intention of Figure 7.1 is to show that the conceptual processing proceeds from the 
scope 1 to the scope 2, with the conception the ship serving as a reference point to 
establish mental contact with the target (i.e., the funnel), and that the conception of the 
ship is backgrounded in the course of this process. 
 By contrast, with regard to the of-construction, the process of 
Figure 7.1: Conceptual Processing of NP’s N 
＞ 
Scope 1 (ship) 
Scope 1 (ship) 












The validity of this perspective can be supported by observing the linguistic data in 
(26a-d) again.  That is, the unbounded region designated by a head noun can only be 
cognized in relation to and by characterization of the whole that the noun within the 
of-phrase designates.  In this construction, as noted, the conception of the ship is not 
backgrounded, but still salient, which is supported by the frequent observation that the 
noun within the of-phrase is in focus.  It is obvious that the linguistic fact shown in 
(26) can be best accounted for from this perspective.   
 
7.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to make explicit the semantic difference between the 
two types of possessive constructions: the possessive genitive construction and the 
of-construction.  My central claim is that the possessive genitive and of-phrase are 
different from each other in that the former is thought to be a modifier to identify its 
target, whereas the latter is conceived of as a complement to describe or characterize 
its head noun.  This chapter has argued that the distinction between conceptual 
autonomy and dependence which nouns evoke depends on how the entities are 
construed.  More specifically, possessive genitives instantiate a reference point 
Figure 7.2: Conceptual Processing of the N of NP 
＞ 
Scope 1 (ship) 
Scope 2  
(funnel)  




construction, where initially a given entity serving as a reference point has a certain 
cognitive prominence and it is of high accessibility to the conceptualizer.  However, 
it is the target that becomes salient once it is identified, with the reference point entity 
receding into the background.  In this cognitive mechanism, the two entities should 
be regarded as conceptually autonomous because of the dynamicity of the prominence.  
In the of-construction, on the other hand, the concept designated by an of-phrase is 
intrinsic to the characterization of the head, which means that the head noun in the 
of-construction is regarded as relational, which reflects the construal of that noun as 
being conceptually dependent. 
 
                  
196 
 
Chapter 8  Construal of Entities and Semantics 
 of Modifiers 
 
8.1. Introductory Remarks  
As noted, the most important tenet of Cognitive Grammar is that meaning is 
equated with conceptualization, which naturally leads to the idea that every expression 
reflects conceptualizar’s construal of an entity described.  I will argue that there are 
two possible functions of a modifier of a head noun, and either of the two is activated 
by virtue of the construal of the relationship between the head noun and the modifier.  
The present chapter claims that the activation of either of the two functions should be 
determined depending on the conceptual plane (in the sense of Langacker 1991, 1999a, 
1999b) in which a modifier is conceptualized.  I will argue that type and instance 
conceptions are inherent in the conceptualization of any entity; i.e., they are two sides 
of the same coin; the type/instance distinction emerges as a salient aspect of how we 
understand the same entity.  The difference results from the conceptualization of an 
entity in terms of which aspect (i.e., either the notion per se or a particular instance of 
it) is in focus and accordingly type/instance modifiers have distinctive functions.  The 
characterization of the respective modifiers reveals that a type modifier is conceived of 
as an inner property of the referent that a head noun denotes, whereas an instance 
modifier is interpreted as a kind of referring expression by which a given entity can be 
identified.  The latter, by definition, works in the discourse space by distinguishing a 
particular entity from other instances of the same type.  I will also propose through 
the observation of linguistic data that there may be a conceptual gap between the 
speaker and hearer.  What I mean is that there are some cases in which the speaker 
conceives a described entity as an instance whereas the addressee construes it as a type.  
                  
197 
 
This chapter witnesses that the addressee’s construal of a described entity as a type 
licenses a discontinuous NP, which is triggered by the nature of the sentence (i.e., a 
presentation), the semantics of the modifier (i.e., a type modifier), and the context in 
which the sentence is interpreted.   
 
8.2. Construal of Entities      
As I have observed in Chapter 1, an expression’s meaning is not just the 
conceptual content it evokes; equally important is how that content is construed, which 
is a crucial part of the semantic value of the expression.  The viewing relationship 









Following Langacker (1991, 1999, 2001), the first dimension of construal is its 
conceptual “scope.”  An expression’s “maximal scope (MS)” is the full extent of the 
content it evokes as the base for the meaning, within which there exists an “immediate 
scope (IS)” comprising the content directly relevant for a particular purpose; i.e., the 
locus of attention (or the onstage region).  The next dimension is the “prominence” 
conferred on various elements.  Of the different kinds of prominence that need to be 
distinguished, the most important is “profiling (P)”: the specific focus of attention (i.e., 




Figure 8.1: Viewing Relationship 
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the object of conception).  The next step is the level of “specificity” at which an 
entity is characterized (e.g. an animal > a dog > a beagle, or a boy > a small boy > a 
small boy with long hair), which is the primary concern in this chapter and will be 
developed further.1  We will see in the subsequent sections that there exist two types 
of specification.   
Another concept that is relevant here is a type/instance distinction.  Langacker 
(1999a) argues that a noun which occurs alone (e.g. cat) or is incorporated as the first 
element of a compound (e.g. cat lover) is not equivalent semantically to a full nominal 
(e.g. a/the cat).  The former represents the conception of a type per se since it lacks 
the notion of instantiation.  By contrast, a nominal is construed as being anchored at a 
particular location in the domain of instantiation and specifically limits the profile to 
the single instance.   
Both type and instance conceptions share the property of profiling a particular 
entity; the difference between them lies in the construal of the entity.  The type 
specification per se is not grounded in the speech event and is thus independent of 
whether or not a discourse referent has been established.  Therefore, the notion of the 
(in)definiteness of that entity is irrelevant.  On the other hand, the conception of an 
instance arises when a profiled entity as a particular type is grounded.  Grounding 
elements, including the demonstratives, the articles, and certain quantifies, relate the 
profiled instance to the ground (i.e., the speech event, its participants (e.g. the speaker 
                                                 
1  In Cognitive Grammar, further dimensions are postulated, among which is the “perspective” 
 taken on a scene, one of which is the adoption of a particular “vantage point” (i.e., the position 
 from which a scene is viewed), for example, as shown by the choice go vs. come.  Moreover, the 
 “direction of mental scanning” can be added to the construal.  For instance, the contrast The 
 scar extends from his wrist to his elbow/ from his elbow to his wrist is ascribable to “subjective 
 motion” on the part of the conceptualizer, who mentally scans through the scene in one direction 
 or the other in building up to its full conceptualization. 
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and hearer), and its circumstances).     
On the basis of this distinction, Langacker (1999a, 1999b) proposes that two 
conceptual planes should be differentiated: the type plane and the instance plane.  
Figure 8.2(a) indicates that a type specification is an abstract entity from which its 
potential instances result and multiple instances may occur in such a way that they are 
distinguished from one another.  Figure 8.2(b) represents that the cognitive 
processing of grounding pertains to an instance and a nominal like this cat is 












8.3. Two Types of Modifiers 
The present research proposes that two types of modifiers should be 
differentiated according to the planes in which they are conceptualized.  I am 
suggesting that the conceptualization of a referent’s higher specification occurs either 
in the type plane or in the instance plane, illustrated in Figure 8.3(a) and (b), which 
yields the different cognitive and communicative functions of modifiers. 
 






Figure 8.2: Type Plane and Instance Plane 


















         
 
Figure 8.3(a) shows a “type modification,” which is a matter of accuracy when we 
build a conception of a given entity, resulting in a higher-order type specification (e.g. 
cat > black cat > black cat with beautiful hair).  A referent in the type plane 
designates a particular conception per se and its modifier serves as one of ingredients 
of the relevant conception.  Therefore, such a modifier is interpreted as a descriptive 
element and is construed to be a constitutive “internal property” of the notion that a 
head noun denotes.  It follows that such a type entity establishes its semantic value by 
virtue of a type modifier, which means that the entity is relational to the property the 
type modifier designates to form its higher order type specification.  This means 
therefore that it is regarded as conceptually dependent.  The lower portion of Figure 
8.3(a) indicates that a full-fledged nominal (e.g. a/the black cat) is obtained by 
appending a grounding predication (e.g. the articles) at the level of the instance plane, 
establishing its status as a discourse participant.  On the other hand, Figure 8.3(b) 
shows an “instance modification.”  This kind of modifier works in a discourse since a 
T : type 
t : instance 
   of type T 
M : modifier 












Current discourse space 
Figure 8.3:  Conceptual Difference between Type and Instance 
 Modification 
  
(b)  Instance modification (a)  Type modification 
G 
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referent in the instance plane is a grounded entity and a particular instance is 
interpreted by the speaker and hearer as being established as a discourse participant.  
A modifier in the instance plane serves to identify the entity which a nominal 
designates, resulting in the cognition that the entity is regarded as conceptually 
autonomous. 
Thus, we see that a referent exists in the physical or mental world in either mode 
of conceptualization, but that the cognitive process to its full conceptualization is not 
at all the same, as Figure 8.3(a) and (b) show.  This distinction in conceptualizing 
processes is both immanent and ubiquitous in our mental activities.  For example, 
consider the expression a dog with short legs and smooth hair as the definition of a 
beagle.  In such a case, it represents a type and there is no specific dog implied.  I 
claim that the modifier with short legs and smooth hair is conceived of as a 
substructure of a particular kind of dog (i.e., a beagle, among others) when we 
conceptualize it, as illustrated in Figure 8.4(a).  On the other hand, in a sentence like 
The dog with short legs and smooth hair bit Bob, the entity the dog denotes a specific 
instance and the modifier with short legs and smooth hair is construed as an element to 
identify the dog.  With regard to an instance modifier, in the case where there were 
two dogs in the discourse and one or the other of the two dogs bit Bob, the modifier 
with short legs and smooth hair can be said to function as a kind of referring 
expression because the modifier serves to differentiate one instance from the other.  
Figure 8.4(b) indicates that the two circles in the current discourse space on the left 
represent possible referents to be identified, and that in its counterpart on the right, the 
modifier represented by the small circle serves to identify the target entity. 
 
 




















In Figure 8.5, R and M stand for referents that a noun and a modifier designate 
respectively, and the arrow indicates the modifying relationship.  In Figure 8.5(a), the 
modifier is characterized as an integral subpart of a particular conception that a head 
noun designates, which is represented by cross-hatching.  On the other hand, Figure 
8.5(b) shows that a modifier is conceived of as identifying a specific instance denoted 
by a nominal.  Crucial here is the difference in salience between the two modifiers.  
A type modifier is conceived of as salient because it elaborates the substructure of the 







+ short legs 
+ smooth hair 
+ otter hunter 
> 
Figure 8.4: Type and Instance Modifiers 
 dog beagle 
(b) 
> 
current discourse space 
 
R M 
(b) Instance Modifier 
R M 
(a) Type Modifier 
Figure 8.5: Semantic Difference between Type and Instance Modifiers 
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them, which is represented by a double-headed arrow.  On the other hand, an instance 
modifier is thought to be a reference point in the sense of Langacker (1993).  It is 
usually an entity of high accessibility to the addressee and is conceived of as salient, 
but a specific instance viewed as the target becomes more salient when it is identified, 
as illustrated in Figure 8.5(b).  This difference is subtle but crucially important for 
understanding the mechanism of human conceptualization.  One aspect of this 
subtleness comes from the fact that the type and instance conceptions are simply two 
sides of the same coin and they are both immanent in actuality.  
My point may be supported by the following sentences: 
 
(1) a.  The father of a bride is overwhelmed with emotion at the wedding. 
 b.  The father of the bride was sitting alone in the waiting room. 
(2) a.  There lived a young girl with long blonde hair in a small town.   
   She had no one to talk with and played with a stray dog all day long. 
 b. The second door from the left is Dr. Langacker’s office. 
 c. The fifth man from the right is my father. 
 
Our first observation is the semantic difference between (1a) and (1b).  Motivated by 
the indefinite noun a bride, sentence (1a) is interpreted as a generic reading and no 
particular person is implied.  The noun father represents a type because it is not 
grounded.  This means that the modifier of a bride serves as a type modifier, 
specifying an internal property of the conception the head noun denotes; i.e., the 
essential content of the noun father is a kinship relation and the noun bride elaborates 
its salient substructure, as sketched in Figure 8.6(a).  On the other hand, induced by 
the definite noun the bride, the subject the father in (1b) is interpreted as a particular 
                  
204 
 
person (i.e., an instance) and the modifier of the bride, which also denotes a particular 
entity, serves to identify him.  Therefore, it functions as an instance modifier because 
the father bears to the ground with respect to fundamental notions such as time, reality, 











The next observation concerns the semantic difference between (2a) and (2b, c).  
Sentence (2a) is quite common at the beginning of a story.  The “existential” there 
provides a “presentational function” by which a new participant is to be introduced.  
With respect to the process of presentation, the conceptualization is necessarily part of 
the speaker’s knowledge, but not yet part of the addressee’s knowledge.  That is, the 
speaker evokes a specific entity in mind as an instance, but the addressee construes it 
to be a type instead, because the conceptualization of the entity a young girl with long 
blonde hair is the initial formation of the concept for the addressee and no specific 
person can thus be evoked.  In other words, from the addressee’s viewpoint, the 
referent is not interpreted as being established as a grounded entity with respect to 
reality and referential identity.  The modifier in this conceptualization serves as an 
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integral subpart of the entity to build up its full conceptualization.  Thus, the modifier 
in (2a) is conceived of as representing an internal property.  On the other hand, in 
sentences (2b, c), the respective subjects designate specific instances because the 
modifiers second ... from the left and fifth ... from the right make reference to ground 
elements within their scope of predication and contribute the hearer’s identification of 
the instances the speaker intends to refer to.  In my view, the modifiers are interpreted 
as indicating an external (or extrinsic) property because they serve just as referring 
expressions which are needed to identify the target entities.   
To sum up, both aspects of type and instance conceptions are inherent in the 
conceptualization of any entity.  The difference results from the degree to which each 
aspect is in focus.  It may thus be argued that this difference results from an 
internal/external view of conceptualization of an entity because in type 
conceptualization, individuality is irrelevant whereas in instance conceptualization, 
individuality is crucial.2   
The discussions thus far suffice for the evidence of two types of modifiers, as 
shown in (3): 
 
modifiers at the level of type plane ---  descriptive (or  
 elaborating) function 
(3) modifier  
modifiers at the level of instance plane --- identifying function 
                                                 
2  The observation of the following sentence can help to make my point more explicit: 
 (i) On Christmas Morning, three boys found a lump of coal in their stocking. 
 Following Langacker (1999: 272-273), the most likely interpretation of the sentence (i) is that 
 each boy finds a single lump of coal in his own stocking and therefore there are three instances of 
 the event type ‘X find a lump of coal in X’s stocking.’  He argues that the sentence constitutes a 
 mixture of two lexicalization strategies; i.e., while parts of the sentence lexicalize facets of the
 higher-order event and thus occur in the plural, other parts (i.e., a lump and stocking) occur in the 
 singular.  He analyzes them as lexicalizing facets of the type specification (‘X find a lump of 
 coal in X’s stocking) common to the three event instances that constitute the higher-order event.   
 It follows from this that in type expression, individuality is irrelevant.  
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8.4. Possibility of Extraposition from NP 
This section proposes that the difference in the acceptability of discontinuous 
constituents can be accounted for in terms of the semantic function of a modifier (i.e., 
type/instance modifier).  My central claim is that the conceptualization that occurs in 
the type plane motivates a head noun and a modifier to be conceived of as forming a 
semantically conceptual group, which is consonant with Langacker’s (1997) insightful 
analysis, and the conceptual relationship between the two elements licenses a 
discontinuous NP.   
I begin by recognizing that the linguistic phenomenon referred to as extraposition 
from NP is liable to manifest itself in a “presentation sentence.”  For example, 
Langacker (ibid.) argues on the basis of the notion of conceptual grouping that in (4) 
the letter participates simultaneously in two valence links.  The letter forms a 
conceptual constituent with the relative clause on the one hand, and it also forms a 
conceptual constituent with the matrix verb came on the other.  In (4), the latter’s 
grouping makes up a presentational unit, came serving to introduce a new participant 
into the discourse. 
 
(4) [The letter] came [that you were waiting for]. (Langacker 1997: 24)  
 
 In a similar vein, Guéron (1980) proposes a semantic distinction between a 
presentation and a predication and argues that extraposition from the subject NP of a 
predication sentence is blocked, as exemplified in (5) and (6):3   
                                                 
3  Guéron (1980: 645) defined the respective notions as follows: 
 a. Presentation S: 
The VP denotes, especially, the appearance of the subject in the world of the discourse. 
 b. Predication S: 
The subject refers to an individual or object whose existence in the world of the discourse is 
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(5) a. [A picture] is hanging on the wall [of John F. Kennedy].  
(Takami 1992: 111) 
 b. [A man] appeared [with green eyes].        (Guéron 1980: 637) 
(6)  a. *[A man] hit Bill [with green eyes]. 
 b. *[The picture] is hanging on the wall [of John F. Kennedy]. 
 c. *[The man] came into the room [with green eyes]. 
 
Our primary concern here is where this constraint comes from.  I propose in the 
following subsection that it result from the difference in cognitive processing between 
the subject entity of a presentation and that of a predication. 
 
8.5. Conceptualization of Nouns  
 To understand how a given subject entity is construed, it should be noted that we 
need to recognize two layers of conceptualization and epistemic control: one pertains 
to the speaker and the other to the addressee.  The speaker and hearer are the subjects 
of conception; i.e., the conceptualizers who entertain the situation described, and thus 
remain “offstage” and implicit, whereas the entity described is the object of conception 
and thus objectively construed to the extent that it is put “onstage” as an explicit, 
focused target of conception.  Important here is that the speaker and hearer are 
working with distinct layers of conceptualization.  Note that each subject in (5) and 
(6) is conceived of as definite by the speaker because it is within his dominion and 
thus under his mental (or conceptual) control.  The distinction between the definite 
and the indefinite articles in (5a) and (6b) depends on whether a given entity is in the 
                                                                                                                                               
presupposed: the thematic subject.  The VP denotes some property of the thematic subject.  
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addressee’s dominion or not.  I claim that the addressee may construe a described 


















In Figure 8.7, the ellipse labeled D represents the conceptualizer’s dominion: an entity 
within this conceptual region is under his control.  The broken-line box labeled F is 
the field which is defined in terms of potential interaction: if an entity exists inside the 
field, the conceptualizer can potentially interact with it.   
As far as presentation sentences like those in (5) are concerned, we may easily 
notice that from a semantic-functional point of view, they are closely related to a 















(a) A man with green eyes came in the room. 
(c) The man with green eyes hit John. 
S 
H D2 
OS D1 F1 
E S : speaker 
H : hearer 
E : entity described 
OS : on-stage region 
D : dominion 
F : field of potential interaction 
 
Figure 8.7: Cognitive Processes of Nouns 
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there-construction (e.g. sentence (2a)).  In this case, the addressee visualizes a newly 
introduced entity via the speaker’s conceptualization or “viewing frame” as the initial 
formation of the concept, reaching the recognition of it, as depicted in Figure 8.7(a).  
S/he cannot have any control over it or be able to manipulate it, and can only accept 
the entity as a potential object of consideration, regarding the modifier as representing 
an internal property by virtue of which s/he can conceive a more specific, vivid image 
of the referent.  Recall here that the term ‘ground’ refers to the speech event, its 
participant, and its circumstances.  Needless to say, its main participants are the 
speaker and hearer.  In addition, the cognitive processing of nominal grounding is the 
grammaticized means of specifying the status of a nominal referent vis-à-vis the 
ground.  In this respect, it can be said that the subject referent of a presentation 
sentence is not grounded from the addressee’s viewpoint.  This conceptualization 
leads the addressee to construe the subject nominal as a type with higher-order 
specification (i.e., s/he focuses on the formation of the conception rather than on the 
particular entity), and this is what is responsible for the acceptability of extraposition 
from the subject NP of a presentation sentence. 
 On the other hand, each sentence in (6) manifests a predication about a particular 
person and thus the existence of the subject entity is interpreted as being presupposed, 
which means that its existence is accepted as falling within the conceptualizer’s (i.e., 
the speaker and hearer) conception of reality.  The addressee, therefore, regards the 
referent as being a grounded instance.   
 The semantic difference in definiteness of a subject nominal of a predication 
sentence, shown in (6a) and (6b, c), results from a conceptual region in which the 
entity is situated.  The use of the definite article specifically suggests that a given 
entity is sufficient to put the addressee in mental contact with a uniquely determined 
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instance of the type in question, which means that the subject entity is in the 
addressee’s dominion of control or manipulability, as sketched in Figure 8.7(c).  On 
the other hand, the indefinite article indicates that the nominal itself does not render 
the choice of the entity unique in relation to the current discourse space.  What is 
crucial here is that the subject entity encoded by the indefinite nominal in (6a) 
designates a specific instance, and it is situated in the addressee’s conceptual field of 
possible interaction, diagrammed in Figure 8.7(b); i.e., its existence is accepted as part 
of his/her conception of reality. 
 To sum up, in a predication sentence, a particular person is in focus and a modifier 
added to such a noun is likely to be interpreted as an instance modifier, which is 
responsible for the unacceptability of sentences in (6). 
 
8.6. Difference in Salience between Type and Instance Modifiers 
  The present chapter has tried to make explicit my claim that there exist two types 
of modifiers (i.e., type/instance modifiers).  I characterized the respective modifiers 
by arguing that a type modifier is conceived of as salient because it constitutes an 
integral subpart of a particular concept being described, while an instance modifier 
serves as a reference point for identification of a specific instance and for this purpose 
it is usually of high accessibility and salient to the addressee, but it is the target entity 
that becomes thereby more salient when it is established. 
 The difference in salience of the respective modifiers, as depicted in Figure 8.5(a, 
b), can be corroborated by the following data: 
 
(7) A man with a gaudy jacket came into my office. 
(a) He wanted to see you. 
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(b) It had a narrow black stripe. 
(8)  A man with a gaudy jacket hit John. 
(a) He went into that building. 
(b)??It had a narrow black stripe. 
(9) A picture of John F. Kennedy was hanging on the wall. 
(a) It was set in a rich ornamented frame. 
(b) He was the 35th president of the United States. 
(10) The picture of John F. Kennedy was hanging on the wall. 
(a) It was set in a rich ornamented frame. 
(b)??He was the 35th president of the United States. 
 
In Cognitive Grammar, the analysis of pronominal anaphor is based on reference point 
organization; i.e., it occurs in the antecedent’s dominion (van Hoek 1995, 1997).  The 
antecedent is able to establish itself as a reference point by being conceived of as 
salient, while a pronoun portrays its referent as being immediately accessible in the 
current discourse context.  In the examples in (7) and (10), the fact should be ascribed 
to the cognitive salience of the entities that the pronouns can refer to the nouns within 
the modifiers in (7b) and (9b), unlike the counterparts in (8b) and (10b).  This 
observation supports our perspective; i.e., a modifier added to the subject of a 
presentation sentence is conceived of as salient, as depicted in Figure 8.5(a).  As 
noted, this conceptualization is crucial for a discontinuous NP to be licensed.  
 
8.7. Major Factors in Motivating Type Interpretation 
A type represents the conception that a noun designates and an instance indicates 
a particular entity as a manifestation of that conception.  I have argued that the type 
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and instance conceptions are inherent in the conceptualization of any entity; the 
distinction between them emerges as a salient aspect of the same entity; i.e., it results 
from the conceptualization of an entity in terms of which aspect (i.e., either the 
conception per se or the particular thing) is in focus.  What is important here is that, 
as has been discussed, we need to recognize two layers of conceptualization: one 
pertains to the speaker, and the other to the addressee.  The speaker evokes a 
particular instance irrespective of the difference between a presentation and a 
predication.  Crucial is how the addressee construes the entity that is being described.  
This subsection will witness that the addressee’s construal of a described entity as a 
type can be triggered by the nature of a sentence (i.e., a presentation), the semantics of 
a modifier (i.e., a type modifier) and the context in which the sentence is interpreted, 
which is responsible for the acceptability of a discontinuous NP. 
 Our first observation is the semantic difference between (11) and (12): 
 
(11)  a. [The order] was given [to evacuate the building]. 
  b. [The time] will come [when you will regret it]. 
  c. [The idea] occurred to me [that John is the best person for the job]. 
  d. [The claim] was made [that Dr. Johnson was the first man to argue the  
   theory]. 
(12)  a.* [The order] was cancelled [to evacuate the building]. 
  b.*[The claim] was rejected [that Dr. Johnson was the first man to argue the  
    theory]. 
 
In (11), each sentence serves to introduce the entity into the discourse.  In such a case, 
a type aspect that subsists in that entity is conceived of as salient to the addressee 
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because it is the initial formation of the conception.  The subject, for example, order 
to evacuate the building is construed as a type and the definite article is appended at 
the highest level of constituency in consistency with the principle of “unique 
identifiability.”  On the other hand, in (12), the existence of the subject’s referent is 
presupposed in the current discourse space.  This means that the entity is in the 
addressee’s epistemic dominion as well as in the speaker’s control.  Therefore, it is 
interpreted as representing an instance and the modifier as a referring expression in 
order for the addressee to successfully identify it, resulting in the anomaly of 
extraposition from NP. 
 The difference in felicity between (13a) and (13b) indicates that the semantics of a 
modifier triggers which aspect of the two (i.e., type and instance) is in focus. 
    
(13)  a.  * [The man] is here [who is carrying a large package]. 
  b. [The man] is here [who carries large packages]. 
 
The primary function of the modifier in (13a) is to identify the subject’s referent in the 
current discourse space while that of the modifier in (13b) is to elaborate the type 
specification; to be precise, it specifies a type of person who is engaged in a particular 
occupation without a specific instance implied. 
 Furthermore, observe the contrast between (14a) and (14b): 
 
(14) a. *[The letter] came [that has a blue stamp]. 
 b. [The letter] came [that you were waiting for].  (=4) 
 
Sentence (14a) is a predication about a particular thing which is presupposed in the 
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current discourse.  Therefore, the modifier is thought to be an element of high 
accessibility to the addressee.  In this case, s/he interprets the subject entity as an 
instance and can identify it by exploiting the expression that has a blue stamp as a 
reference point.  On the other hand, in (14b), the speaker has a particular instance in 
mind but the addressee does not.  What I am suggesting is that in a normal situation, 
the addressee imagines a particular type by the utterance (14b).  For example, s/he 
may wonder about the entity the speaker intends to refer to in such a way that it may 
be a letter of acceptance from the company s/he applied for.  In such a case, we can 
say that the addressee conceptualizes the entity as the initial formation of that 
conception and thus construes it as a particular type specified by the modifier. 
 We can offer further examples to support the viability of our perspective. 
 
 
(15)  [A man ] won a million dollars [who had never played lotto before]. 
 
It is true that sentence (15) is interpreted as a predication; i.e., it describes the event 
about a particular person.  Therefore, the subject entity is construed to be an instance.  
However, worthy to be addressed is the semantics of the modifier.  What I am 
suggesting is that the modifier does not serve to delimit the set of the possible 
instances.  Rather, it was conjured up by the speaker to characterize the type of the 
entity for expressive purposes.  His primary intention is to convey what type of 
person performed the described event; i.e., the point is to present the referent by 
resorting to a particular type specification.  In my view, this conceptualization 
involves a cognitive process of abstraction of the target entity; i.e., the characterization 
of the entity by referring to its type aspect.  The modifier of this kind may be 
interpreted as a type modifier.   
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 In some cases, a type aspect can be elicited from the context, as exemplified in 
(16b): 
 
(16)  a. *A man died from India 
  b. Several visitors from foreign countries died in the terrible accident.   
   A woman died from Peru and a man died from India. 
  (Guéron 1980: 653) 
 
In (16), both subject entities denote particular persons.  The judgment of acceptability 
of (16b) results from the recognition that in this context, it is not specific instances the 
subjects denote but their nationalities that are in focus, which can be supported by a 
general tendency that in a newspaper report on an aircraft accident, the first stage of 
information will focus on the nationalities of victims.  This interpretation renders the 
individuality of the referent less relevant.  For this reason, the relationship between a 
man and his nationality is conceived of as salient, which leads the addressee to 
construe the type aspect of the entities to be foregounded.  
  Moreover, the object referents in (17) and (18) represent specific instances.  
The contrast between them can be accounted for in terms of the addressee’s viewpoint.  
 
 
(17)   a. *We showed [Bill’s picture] to Mary [of Sam’s brand new car]. 
  b. *John read [that book] over the summer [by Chomsky]. 
(18)  a.  We showed [John’s book] to Mary [about traditional French cake decorating]. 
  b.  We heard [the story] from his own lips [of how he was stranded for days 
without food]. 
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In sentences like those in (18), each modifier is interpreted as a specific content of the 
head noun to which the addressee cannot have a direct access.  In such a case, the 
addressee accepts the entity which the nominal designates as a potential object of 
consideration and construes the modifier as elaborating an internal aspect of the 
semantics of a type designated by the head noun.  On the other hand, the respective 
modifiers in (17), which are highly accessible to the addressee, serve to identify the 
instances the head nouns denote, which is only possible at the level of the instance 
plane.  
 Furthermore, observe the following sentence:  
 
(19)  The man left [the book] on the seat [that I had been wanting to read for a  
  long time]. 
 
What should be noted here is that the speaker’s intention is to refer to a particular kind 
of book which the addressee cannot identify from the context.  This means that the 
addressee construes the entity as a higher-order type specification. 
 From the data above, we can say that modifiers which license discontinuous 
constituents do not serve as referring expressions.  In other words, the head nouns are 
not conceptualized in such a way that the conceptualizer differentiates them from other 
instances in the discourse.  Rather, in these sentences, the addressee construes each 
nominal to be a particular type and interprets the modifier as a type modifier which 
serves as a higher-order specification of that type. 
 
8.8. Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter proposed that two types of modifiers should be differentiated 
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depending on the planes in which they are conceptualized, and argued that a modifier 
conceptualized in the type plane is conceived of as a descriptive element whereas a 
modifier conceptualized in the instance plane is considered to be an identifying 
element which works on the discourse.  The characterization of the respective 
modifiers has revealed that a type modifier is conceived of as an inner property of a 
referent that a head noun denotes, whereas an instance modifier is interpreted as a kind 
of referring expression which serves to distinguish an entity from other possible 
instances.  I argued that a type entity, which is conceptually autonomous in itself, can 
establish its semantic value by virtue of a type modifier to form its higher order type 
specification.  This means that such an entity is regarded as relational, resulting in the 
recognition of its conceptual dependence, unlike an instance which has a referent in 
the relevant discourse.  
 This chapter also suggested that the type and instance conceptions are inherent in 
the conceptualization of any entity; i.e., they are two sides of the same coin; the 
type/instance distinction emerges as a salient aspect of the same entity.  The 
difference results from the conceptualization of an entity in terms of which aspect (i.e., 
either the notion per se or the particular thing) is in focus from the addressee’s 





Chapter 9 Atypical Objects and Conceptualization 
 
9.1. Component, Composite Structures, and Conceptual Overlap 
In Cognitive Grammar, as Langacker (1987,1991, 1999a) argues, every 
construction is regarded as assemblies of symbolic structures; i.e., an expression has 
component structures which are integrated to form a composite structure.  The 
component and composite structures of a symbolic assembly are linked by 
correspondence, which indicates conceptual overlap; i.e., it specifies that a particular 
element of one symbolic structure is taken as being identical to a particular element of 
another.  For example, in the expression near the door, the preposition near profiles a 
non-processual relationship of spatial proximity between two entities.  The schematic 












As exemplified, one component structure contains a schematic substructure 










Figure 9.1: Composite Structure of Symbolic Assembly 
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elaboration site (e-site).  
Langacker (2003a) argues that there exists a tighter conceptual integration 
between conceptual structures: a great degree of conceptual overlap relative to their 
full semantic values.  Following him, this closer integration can result from the 
construal in which the elaboration site constitutes a greater proportion of a component 
conception, as shown in (1b): 
 
 
(1) a.  He observed a brave death. 
 b.  He died a brave death.      (Langacker 2003a: 267) 
 
 
In (1a), the process designated by the verb and the one that is reified to form the object 
nominal are distinct; the reified event functions as the observed entity (i.e., the 
landmark), as depicted in Figure 9.2(a).  On the other hand, in (1b), the process 
reified to form the object nominal is actually identified with the one profiled by the 











Figure 9.2: Conceptual Integration between Conceptual Structures 
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In Figure 9.2(b), the dotted correspondence lines indicate that their trajectors are the 
same, as well as the processes themselves.  The composite semantic structure thus 
incorporates an abstract thing that fully overlaps with the verbal process, representing 
the conceptual reification of that process.   
The difference in construal exemplified above is crucial to explore the 
conceptual structures of linguistic expressions.  This chapter will witness, through an 
in-depth consideration of atypical object constructions, that the difference between 
partial and full overlap of component structures results from the dynamicity of 
conceptualization with respect to which we choose to construe a given entity in 
alternate ways.   
 
9.2. Light Verb Constructions 
In this section, I will make explicit the semantic relationship between a main 
verb and its object in ‘light’ verb constructions.  First, observe the sentences in (2), as 
a starting-point of our discussions: 
  
(2) a.  John had an expensive car. 
 b.  Mary had a rest. ( = rested)                                   
 
It is true that an expensive car in (2a) elaborates the landmark of the process the verb 
designates (as a partial conceptual overlap), but sentence (2b) cannot be interpreted as 
manifesting the same conceptual structure.  Rather, in the verb phrase have a rest, it 
is a rest that provides main information of such a phrase, whereas the verb have per se 
is semantically schematic.  It is well known that verbs subject to this kind of 
semantic generalization tend to be superordinate terms (also known as “hyperonyms”) 
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in the lexicon, as shown in (3): 
 
(3) a.  to make a decision  (= decide) 
 b.  to get possession of a house  (= possess a house) 
 c.  to take a bath  (= bathe) 
 
In sum, in ‘light’ verb constructions where a verb itself is skeletal and its 
semantic content is offered by the following deverbal nominal, it is obvious that the 
semantic structure of such a clause should be different from that of the transitive 
prototype (i.e., the canonical event model in the sense of Langacker 1991).  Rather, 
the semantic relationship between a verb and its object can be regarded as that between 
a schema and its instantiation, as shown in (4): 
  
(4)  [[A] − [B]] → [B]  A: schema,  B: instantiation of schema  
 schema:  Structure A is a schema with respect to structure B when A is  
  compatible with the specifications of B but characterizes corresponding entities  
  with less precision and detail.             
         (Langacker 1987b: 492)  
 
Formula (4) shows that nothing prevents a schema and its instantiation from merging 
into a unified conceptualization when there is full consistency between their 
specifications.  That is, a schema is in effect superimposed by its instantiation 
according to the schematic-transparency principle shown in (5) and the meaning of the 




(5)  Schematic-transparency principle: The tendency for the sanctioning and target 
structures to merge into a single, consistent conceptualization when there is full 
consistency between their specifications.  When a schema merges with its 
instantiation, the resulting structure is equivalent to the instantiation.   
 (Langacker 1987b: 492-493) 
 












Crucial to the conceptualization diagrammed in Figure 9.3 is that there is no cognitive 
conflict between a schema and its instantiation.  That is, the cognitive conflict of 
categorical difference between a verb and a noun is maximally neutralized because the 
noun in this construction has the underlying event as a semi-active concept.1  This 
                                                 
1. This perspective can be supported by Hopper and Thompson’s (1984) analysis: 
 (i) [...] a nominalization names an event as an entity, [...]  The event has not  
  ceased to be an event, but is treated grammatically as if it were an entity, so that it  
  can be commented as such. 
(Hopper and Thompson 1984: 745-746) 
composite structure 
schematic process deverbal noun 
Figure 9.3 Semantic Structure of ‘Light’ Verb Constructions 
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means that a deverbal nominal is conceptually dependent in the sense that it requires 
some intrinsic entities for its conceptualization. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the distinction between conceptual autonomy and 
dependence is crucial for the explication of the semantic structure of an entire clause.  
However, closer observation reveals that the distinction is a matter of degree rather 
than of either-or dichotomy.  That is, there are some cases where a deverbal nominal 
can be conceived of as an autonomous entity elaborating the substructure of a matrix 
verb (i.e., the landmark), through the cognitive process of its concept being 
objectivized and construed as thing-like by some reason or another.   
 We may offer the following data as examples worthy to be addressed from this 
perspective: 
 
(6) a. *A rest was had. 
 b. *A delightful bath was taken. 
 c. *A pleasant walk was taken across the fields. 
 d.  Several rests were taken on the way up the mountain. 
 e.  A ten-minute break was taken between classes. 
 f.  An offer of money was made to the police. 
 
It should be noticed in the examples (6b, c) that since the adjectives delightful and 
pleasant are a kind of ‘transferred epithet’ it is an agent (though unprofiled) that feels 
delightful or pleasant by the action of bathing or walking.  It follows from this that 
the conceptualization of the expressions like a delightful bath and a pleasant walk 
requires the notion of the underlying process and a particular agent involved in the 
activity.  The conceptual dependency resists passivization; the unacceptability of the 
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sentences (6a-c) results.  On the other hand, in (6d-f), the addition of the modifiers 
such as several, a ten-minute and of money to the head nouns crucially allows us to 
construe the expressions several rests, a ten-minute walk and an offer of money as 
being conceptually delimited entities and to interpret them as objectivized concepts.  
The designatums can thus be established by conventionalization as a generalized 
concept which is conceptualized without activating the notion of a particular agent, 
resulting in conceptual autonomy of the designatum.  The acceptability of sentences 
(6d-f) can resort to the cognitive processing of the transition from conceptual 
dependence to autonomy.  I claim that the conceptualization of an entity 
characterizes the nature of the construction in which it participates, and has much to do 
with the felicity of its passivizability.  In the next section, I will argue that the same 
cognitive principle equally applies to internal objects in V-NP-PP type idioms.  
 
9.3. V-NP-PP Type Idioms  
9.3.1. Bresnan's (1982) Analysis    
Bresnan (1982) argues that the expressions take advantage of, make much of, 
make use of, find fault with, and the like have double analysis.  For example, take 
advantage of is assigned two structures in the lexicon.  On one analysis, the verb 
consists only of take, with the NP advantage functioning as its object, and on the other, 
the string take advantage is interpreted as a morphologically complex transitive verb, 
as illustrated in (7a, b), respectively: 
  
(7) a.   take: V, ‘TAKE-ADVANTAGE-OF ((SUBJ),(OF OBJ))’ 
                               (OBJ FORM) = ADVANTAGE 
  b.  [take]V[advantage]N:V,‘TAKE-ADVANTAGE-OF ((SUBJ),(OF OBJ))’  
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                                         (Bresnan 1982: 61) 
 
She also remarks that the double analysis of this type of idiom allows two passives to 
be generated.  That is, one is the passivization which applies directly to (7a) and the 
other is the one which applies to (7b) only after V-P Incorporation that converts (OF 
OBJ) to (OBJ) and incorporates the preposition of into the verb [take advantage]V.  
The results are shown in (8a) and (8b), respectively:2 
 
(8) a.   [S[NPAdvantage] [VPwas[Vtaken][PPof John]]]    
 b.  [S[NPJohn][VPwas [V[Vtaken advantage] of]]]            (ibid.) 
 
What is important here is that according to this analysis of the double passive 
construction, the unacceptability of the passive sentence (9b) lies in the assumption 
that the idiom make fun of has the only one structure in the lexicon; i.e., the one 
analogous to (7b) where the “internal” noun is incorporated into the verb. 
 
(9) a.  Harry made fun of Fred. 
 b. * Fun was made of Fred by Harry. 
 
This analysis is compelling, but the reason why such an incorporation rule must 
obligatorily be applied is left unexplained, the elucidation of which is my primary 
                                                 
2  In Bresnan’s lexical theory, V-P Incorporation is a lexical rule which morphologically 
incorporates a verb and an adjacent preposition into a single complex verb that governs a direct 
object, as in:  
 (i) V-P Incorporation 
 Operation on the lexical form : (P OBJ) → (OBJ) 




concern in the following subsection.   
 
9.3.2. Cognitive Perspective 
My central claim is that the difference in construal of an internal NP either as an 
object or as an incorporated element should be ascribable to a matter of degree 
between conceptual autonomy and dependence.  This is rather a natural consequence 
because the essence of the cognitive approach to semantics is that a linguistic meaning 
is not based on objective properties of a conceived entity, but on the subjective 
perspective that represents how a conceptualizer construes a given situation for 
expressive purposes.   
 To make my point more explicit, observe the idiom take advantage of in more 
detail: 
 
(10) John took advantage of Fred. 
 
In my view, the internal NP advantage imposes double construal: one analysis is that 
the internal NP is conceived of as a relational noun in the sense that it is 
conceptualized as part of a particular relationship set up between the subject and 
prepositional object (e.g. John and Fred in (10)).  And the other analysis is that the 
internal NP is conceived of as more autonomous, which is straightforwardly motivated 
by the very construal that it is not incorporated into the verb because this cognitive 
processing per se involves the objectivization of the concept it denotes.  This 
observation provides a natural explanation for the acceptability of inner or outer 
passive.  What I am suggesting is that on the assumption that passivization is 
motivated by transition of prominence as illustrated in the formula (11), the subject of 
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a passive sentence is conceived of as the primary figure in a conceived situation. 
  
(11)  [[AG (ent)===> TH (eme)] ---> [AG ===> TH ]] 
                            (Langacker 1991:341) 
 
   
(12)  a. (internal NP: conceptually dependent noun)          
 
  (internal NP: conceptually autonomous noun) 
         
Thus, in the case where the internal NP is conceptualized as a relational noun, it is 
conceived of as being less salient than the subject or the prepositional object.  In this 
case, it is the prepositional object that is highlighted through the semantic extension 
(11), as indicated in (12a), yielding the passivized sentence.  On the other hand, in 
the case where the internal NP is conceived of as being more autonomous, the 
attention of the conceptualizer can be paid to it, resulting in the felicity of the inner 
passive, as indicated in (12b).   
Similarly, the acceptability of sentences (13a, b) results from the fact that the 
entities tabs and fault designate ‘things’ and therefore they are regarded as being more 
autonomous.  
 
(13) a.  Tabs were kept on all persons entering the station. 
 b.   No fault could be found with Inge’s performance. 
 
Crucial to the analysis presented here, as we have seen, is that the degree of 
conceptual autonomy or dependence corresponds to whether an internal NP is 
construed as an objectivized entity or as a relational noun which is conceptualized as 




part of a particular relation set up between a subject and a prepositional object, thereby 
perceived as foregrounded or backgrounded, accordingly.  In either way, the internal 
NP elaborates the landmark of the process designated by a verb, as diagrammed in 
Figure 9.4:    
 
        





It is, however, difficult to regard the idiomatic expressions in sentences like (14) 
as manifestations of the semantic structure sketched in Figure 9.4. 
 
(14) a. *Sight was caught of Mary in the crowd. 
 b *Hold was gotten of the rope. 
 c. *Fun was being made of John by his students.  (Bresnan 1982:57,60) 
 
The difference lies in the fact that such internal NPs as sight, hold, and fun are 
eventive nouns and they are conceptually dependent because of involving relational 
notions in themselves.  In my view, the idiomatic expressions in (14) have the 
semantic structure similar to that of the ‘light’ verb construction diagrammed in Figure 
9.3, with the main verbs catch, get, and make manifesting schemas and the internal 
NPs sight, hold, and fun manifesting the corresponding instantiations.  It should be 











the idioms like catch sight of, get hold of, and make fun of cannot be considered to be 
the very same as that of ‘light’ verb constructions.  In these idioms, as Nunberg and 
Wasow (1994) point out, the internal NP is difficult to be modified, as exemplified in 
(15): 
 
(15) a. * Pat took clammy hold of Chris's hand.   (N & W 1994:524)  
 b. *Mary caught accidental/distinct sight of Jane. 
 c. *John made malicious fun of the boy. 
 
This phenomenon can be given a unified explanation from our perspective.  I claim 
that since the idioms in sentences (15) are highly fixed expressions in the sense that 
the tight merger between a schema and its instantiation causes the difficulty in 
recognizing the boundary the internal NP denotes, which means that the compositional 
path merging into a composite structure is invisible because the categorical difference 
between the verb and object noun is maximally neutralized.  Hence, the high 











composite structure preposition 
object 
schematic process / instantiation 




In Figure 9.5, since the main verb functions as a schema which represents the notion of 
skeletal process and the following noun gives the semantic content to the schema, the 
composite structure is conceived of as a single semantic unit.  As a consequence, 
there exist only two participants in this semantic structure: one is a clausal subject and 
the other is a prepositional object.  Therefore, the unacceptability of sentences like 
(14) can be best accounted for by arguing that the passivized subjects are not 
conceived of as a participant.   
    However, there is a problem which arises at this point; i.e., the following 
sentences (16) seemingly appear to run counter to this analysis: 
  
(16) a.  Use was made of Sikolsky's pigeon-holing lemma.   (Ross 1986:136) 
 b.  Care was taken of the infants. (N & W 1994: 502) 
 c.  Heed was paid to John. 
  d.  No notice was taken of Simone.      (Bresnan 1982:60)  
   e.  Close attention is being paid to present movements in the money  
    market.                  (Shimada 1985:116)    
 f. Reference was made to the book during the debate.       (ibid.:114) 
                                 
That is, the internal NPs in the idioms (i.e., use, care, etc.) are deverbal nouns, which 
predicts erroneously that all the sentences in (16) should be unacceptable because the 
semantic structure is expected to be analogous to that depicted in Figure 9.5.  
However, this issue is surmountable by the following argumentation without any 
contradiction.  That is, it is true that both idioms in (14) and (16) have similarity in 
that the semantic relationship between the main verb and its internal NP amounts to 
that between the schema and its instantiation, and in this sense they instantiate the 
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same semantic structure.  Important here is that each idiomatic expression in (16) can 
also be interpreted as an instantiation of the semantic structure analogous to that 
sketched in Figure 9.4, because its compositional path is visible in the sense that 
idioms of this kind are dissoluble.  A strong support for this analysis is the examples 
in (17), which show that the modification of internal NP is possible, as opposed to 
(15):  
  
(17) a.  Bill made fruitful use of the facilities 
 b.  Mary took excellent care of the orphans. 
 
Thus, we can say that this relatively high analyzability provides a crucial basis for an 
internal NP to be objectivized.  Hence, the acceptability of the passive sentence 
results.  Interestingly enough, the observation of sentences in (18) reinforces the 
viability of this perspective. 
  
(18) a. *I thought Pat would take hold of the rope, but he took it of the rail instead. 
 b.   Care was taken of the infants, but it was insufficient.  
                        (N & W 1994: 502, 524) 
 
The fact that the pronoun it in (18b) can refer to the noun care, as opposed to (18a), 
corroborates that care is conceived as a discrete, bounded entity.  
 
9.4. Cognate Object Constructions 
9.4.1. Definition of Cognate Object  
At the outset of our discussions, I define the notion of a cognate object for 
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present purposes.  It is useful in this regard to refer to two notable analyses: Kasai 
(1980) and Langacker (1991). 
 Kasai (1980) differentiates (19a) from (19b) on the grounds that in (19a), the 
process of dreaming per se amounts to ‘a strange dream,’ whereas in (19b), ‘a hole’ is 
a resultant entity from the process of digging, concluding that the notion of the cognate 
object cannot be subsumed under the category of “object of result” in a strict sense 
although Jespersen (1961, 1965) takes the position that the former is in the subdivision 
under the latter. 
 
(19) a.  to dream a strange dream 
 b.  to dig a hole           (Kasai 1980) 
 
 Similarly, Langacker (1991: 362-367) argues that a cognate object is an episodic 
nominalization of the specific process designated by a verb and therefore its existence 
is limited to the timespan of the verb’s temporal profile.  He also points out that a 
correspondence between the verbal landmark and nominal profile effects the 
integration of the two component structure, but the nominal is peripheral to the 
direct-object category owing to the difficulty of construing the reified event as a 
participant.  Thus, following these analyses, I offer the definition of the cognate 
object as (20): 
 
(20) Cognate Object:    
A cognate object represents the nominal conceptualization of a process described 
by an action verb and the existence of the entity is prototypically limited to the 
timespan of the action the verb designates. 
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It should be noted here that the noun phrases following the verbs in (21) have 
distinctive cognitive statuses, respectively:                             
 
(21) a. Mary sang a famous song.     ‘genuine object’    
 b. Mary sang a beautiful song.      ‘genuine object or cognate object’ 
 c. Mary danced a sexy dance.     ‘cognate object’ 
                             
In (21a) a famous song designates a particular song whose existence is independent of 
the event described by the sentence.  To put it another way, the existence of the entity 
is not limited to the timespan of the action the verb designates.   This may simply 
mean that the sentence is interpreted as a prototypical transitive construction, and a 
famous song is conceived of not as a cognate object but as a genuine object.  On the 
other hand, the expression a beautiful song in (21b) is ambiguous in two meanings: 
one is the reading that the expression has the same interpretation as that of a famous 
song, and the other possible or more likely reading is the one that a beautiful song is 
an event nominalization of the process of Mary’s singing, and therefore the existence 
of the entity is limited to the timespan of the action.  Furthermore, the latter reading 
is more apparent in sentence (21c); i.e., it is difficult to interpret the entity denoted by 
the expression a sexy dance as being out of the timespan of the process the verb 
describes.  
Further observation to be made is with the contrast between (22a) and (22b-c), 
which provides a valuable piece of evidence for the current research:  
 
(22) a.  John sang her famous song.     
  b. *John danced her sexy dance. 
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  c. *John smiled her wise smile. 
 
The point here is the difference in possibility of adding to the cognitive object nominal 
the determiner (i.e., her) which is not co-referential to the subject.  The linguistic 
data in (22) reveal that only the entity famous song in (22a) is an independently 
existing conception.  The adjective famous does not have the property of limiting the 
scope of predication to the timespan of the process described, but rather provides 
“objective information” about a particular conception which already exists 
independently of the process.  On the other hand, it is possible to regard beautiful and 
sexy in (21b, c) as expressing “subjective (or personal) judgment by the speaker” in the 
course of the event nominalization of the process (i.e., Mary’s singing or Mary’s 
dancing).   
 
9.4.2. Two Modes of Conceptualization  
My objective in this subsection is to argue that there exist two modes in terms of 
which a cognate object entity is conceptualized.  Our observation begins with the 
semantic contrast between (23) and (24): 
 
(23) a.  Mary danced a sexy dance. 
 b. Mary danced sexily.       (a = b) 
(24) a. Sam danced a merry dance. 
 b. Sam danced merrily.       (a≠b) 
 
Obviously, the contrast lies in whether the cognate object construction is semantically 
equivalent to its adverbial counterpart or not, which results from the difference in 
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construal of the conceptual content a cognate object nominal designates.  In (23), the 
speaker chooses to construe the event with an INTERNAL VIEW; its component states 
being mentally scanned.  Consequently, the cognitive processing of this 
nominalization tightly overlaps the process the verb designates.  Hence, the semantic 
equivalence between (23a) and (23b) results.   On the other hand, in (24), the 
cognate object is construed in terms of a GLOBAL VIEW in the sense of Langacker 
(2001a), in which the nominalized event is holistically viewed as a unitary entity.  
This conceptualization imposes the objectivization of an entity, which leads to the 
construal of it as thing-like, resulting in the semantic difference between (24a) and 
(24b).   
The viability of this perspective can be supported by the following contrast: 
 
(25) a.  Mary sang a comical song sadly. 
 b. *Bill smiled a bright smile sadly. 
 
In (25), both noun phrases a comical song and a bright smile can be interpreted as an 
event nominalization and therefore meet the definition of a cognate object in (20).  
Here, the acceptability of sentence (25a) should be ascribed to the cognition that 
comical modifies song which is conceptualized as a unitary entity (i.e., a thing-like 
entity), whereas sadly modifies the verb sang, so that one feels that each modifier has 
its corresponding element to be modified, respectively.  On the other hand, the 
unacceptability of sentence (25b) can be best accounted for by clarifying that the 
cognate object smile should represent the nominal conceptualization activating the 
underlying event as a semi-active concept and therefore the conceptualization of the 
verb tightly overlaps with that of the object.  Hence, the semantic conflict between 
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bright and sadly results. 
 
9.4.3. Two Modes and the Function of Modifiers 
My next concern is what triggers the two modes of conceptualization discussed 
in the previous subsection.  Related to this problem seem to be several factors, of 
which I will focus on two important factors here: one is the norm of judgment on 
which the speaker depends when s/he describes the designatum of a cognate object by 
using a particular adjective, the other is the function of the modifier added in this way.  
I have characterized the nature of a modifier added to a cognate object nominal 
as expressing “subjective (or personal) judgment by the speaker.”  Here, to make the 
nature of modifiers more explicit, I divide the norm of the judgment in two types: the 
speaker-related and object-related norms on the basis of the assumption that the 
difference in whether or not a cognate object activates the underlying eventivity as a 
semi-active concept correlates with that in the norm of judgment and in the function of 







What I mean by the speaker-related norm is that the judgment results from a 
conceptualizer’s subjectivity itself.  For example, observe the following sentence as a 
typical example: 
 









Table 9.1: Two Modes and Functions of Modifiers 
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(26) My wife was sleeping a sound sleep. 
 
In (26), the expression a sound sleep does not mean that it represents a certain type of 
sleep which results from objectivizing the notion of sleep and comparing it with other 
similar one.  Rather, the speaker depicts the event by using the adjective sound from 
his/her subjective viewpoint in the course of the nominal conceptualization.  
Therefore, the modifier in this case serves as an evaluative function, but not a 
restrictive one. 
On the other hand, the modifier in sentence (27) does not manifest the same 
function as that in (26): 
 
(27) Fred sang a comical song.  
 
Here, the expression a comical song is thought to be conceptualized as such through 
the cognitive processing of its being identified by comparison with other similar notion 
which is in the short or long term memory of the conceptualizer.  This means that the 
norm of judgment on which the speaker depends is rather object-related; this cognitive 
processing involves the process of construing the event nominalization (i.e., song) as 
thing-like, which may be represented by the phrase for a song, as indicated in (28): 
 
(28)   a song which is comical for a song 
 
The modifier comical can be regarded as serving as an identifying function which 
enables the hearer to identify the entity the speaker intends to refer to.  This cognitive 
processing is straightforward in the sentences like the following: 
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(29) a.  He died the death of a Christian.     (Jespersen 1961: 235) 
b. The old man laughed one of those short Pict laughs     like a fox  
 barking on a frosty night.                (ibid.) 
  c. Mr. Hamlin smiled the smile which he had before worn on the  
   Wingdam coach.                         (Yamakawa 1968: 37) 
  d. She lived a life that was a repetition of her parents’. 
 
In (29), each modifier clearly shows from the content it denotes that it is in the short or 
long term memory of the conceptualizer. 
 
9.4.4. Semantic Structure of Cognate Object Constructions  
It is less suspicious from the discussions above to argue that the difference in 
construal of a cognate object nominal shown in Table 1 should affect the semantic 
structure of the construction as a whole.  Figure 9.6(a) diagrams the semantic 
structure of a predication involving a cognate object conceptualized by the mode in 








In both semantic structures, the circle labeled tr (i.e., the trajector) represents a 
grammatical subject, and the arrow attached to it stands for the action a cognate verb 
(a) (b) 
tr 
lm tr lm 
Figure 9.6: Semantic Structures of Cognate Object Constructions 
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designates, and the circle labeled lm (i.e., the landmark ) indicates a cognate object 
nominal, respectively.  It should be noted here, however, that each diagram differs in 
the representation of the cognate object nominal, depending on whether it activates the 
underlying event as a semi-active concept or not.  This contrast is indicated as the 
difference in notation between a broken line and a solid line. 
In Figure 9.6(a), it is true that since the existence of an entity described by a 
cognate object nominal is limited to the timespan of the action a verb designates, the 
entity cannot be cognized as a participant, but there is an apparent cognitive 
correspondence between the process and the entity because of the latter being the 
nominal conceptualization of the former.  The dotted-line linking them indicates this 
relationship.  On the other hand, Figure 9.6(b) represents that an entity described by a 
cognate object nominal, which is also in the timespan of the action a verb designates, 
is construed as a participant through the cognitive processing of the entity being 
identified by a similar concept which is out of the timespan of the process.  It is by 
this cognitive status as a participant that the entire clause is cognized as manifesting 
the semantic structure similar to a transitive clause. 
Thus, from the discussions above, we can elucidate the nature of the cognate 
object construction by reducing to the matter of which is activated of the two semantic 
structures diagrammed in Figure 9.6(a) and (b).   
 
9.4.5. Passivizability of Cognate Object Constructions 
The semantic structures depicted in Figure 9.6(a) and (b) account for the 
acceptability of passivized versions of cognate object constructions in a unified 
fashion.   
First, observe the following sentences: 
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(30) a.  John died a gruesome death. 
 b.  John died gruesomely. 
 c. *A gruesome death was died by John. 
(31) a. Harry smiled a nervous smile. 
 b. Harry smiled nervously. 
 c. *A nervous smile was smiled by Harry. 
(32) a. Mary laughed an unpleasant laugh. 
 b. Mary laughed unpleasantly. 
 c. *An unpleasant laugh was laughed by Mary. 
(33) a.  Bill lived an uneventful life. 
 b.  Bill lived uneventfully. 
 c. *An uneventful life was lived by Harry. 
 
The (a)-sentences are linguistic manifestations of the semantic structure diagrammed 
in Figure 9.6(a).  The cognate object nominals in these sentences evoke the notion of 
the underlying event as semi-active concepts and therefore they conceptually overlap 
the processes the verbs designate, thereby resulting in the semantic equivalence with 
(b)-sentences.  Crucial here is that in this semantic structure, the cognate object 
nominal is not construed as a participant.  Therefore, the low transitivity of this 
construction resists its passivizability. 
 On the other hand, the acceptability of sentences in (34), which are the passivized 
versions of (29), is ascribable to the conceptualization in which the cognate object is 
construed to be a thing-like entity by being objectivized through the cognitive 
processing of comparing it with the similar notion which is in the short or long term 
memory of the conceptualizer.  The entity that is thereby built up establishes itself as 
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a participant and the semantic structure of the entire clause is the one sketched in 
Figure 9.6(b).  Hence, the acceptability of sentences (34) results: 
 
(34) a.  The death of a Christian was died by Harry. 
 b.  The smile which he had before worn on the Wingdam coach was  
   smiled by Mr. Hamlin. 
  c. One of those short Pict laughs was laughed by the old man.  
  d.  A life that was a repetition of her parents' was lived by Mary. 
 
The felicity of sentence (35b) can be accounted for in the same fashion: 
 
(35) a. *A blood-curdling scream was screamed by one of the campers. 
 b.  The blood-curdling scream that they had all heard in countless horror  
   movies was screamed by one of the campers.    
             (Langacker 1991:363) 
 
Here, closely related to the acceptability of sentence (35b) is that the modifier added to 
the cognate object serves as an identifying function by which its referent is interpreted 
as more accessible and discrete (i.e., as a participant) to the hearer and the cognate 
object nominal is conceived of as being conceptualized as thing-like through the 
cognitive processing of its being judged by the object-related norm.  This means that 
the clause structure as a whole is recognized as a manifestation of the semantic 
structure diagrammed in Figure 9.6(b). 
It is true that the passivizability can be motivated by several factors which affect 
the transitivity of an entire clause structure, and in this sense, a cognate object, which 
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is the nominal conceptualization of a process designated by a verb, does not have the 
same cognitive status as a patient of the Canonical Event Model in the sense of 
Langacker (1991).  However, the above observations reveal that the construal of a 
cognate object nominal as a participant, which is established by its objectivization as a 
delimited entity, enhances the felicity of the passive sentence.  This perspective is in 
consistency with the tenets of Cognitive Grammar that our ability to form prototypes 
and assess the relative deviation of a given clause from such prototypes is a productive 
mechanism of our conceptual system. 
 
9.5. Conclusion 
This chapter attempted to characterize atypical object constructions.  The 
discussions thus far have revealed that the atypicality of objects in the clause structures 
described above (i.e., light verb constructions, certain V-NP-PP type idiomatic 
expressions, and cognate object constructions) results from the shared semantic nature.  
That is, the characteristic of the semantic structure is that the relationship between a 
main verb and an object is equated with that between a schema and its instantiation.  
To put it another way, the object elaborates the overall structure of the process a verb 
denotes.  I argued that this semantic relationship stems from the cognition that the 
concept described by the object is conceptually dependent because it designates a 
relational notion and therefore can be construed as activating the underlying eventivity 
as a semi-active concept.   
However, as stated in Chapter 1, the asymmetry between autonomy and 
dependence is not a fixed notion but a matter of degree.  Therefore, the concept 
described by an atypical object can be conceived of as being more autonomous when it 
is conceptualized as thing-like through the cognitive processing of its being 
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Chapter 10  Conclusion 
  I have thus far tried to explicate the nature of language in terms of human 
cognition.  For this specific purpose, my dissertation is twofold.  One is the 
investigation of the relationship between the ways of the conceptualizer’s viewing the 
world and of linguistic manifestations.  The other is, based on the discussion about 
the relationship between perception and conception, to reveal how conceptual 
structures of linguistic constructions are based on or originated in perception.   
 Concerning the first query, I made explicit the mechanisms of the formation of a 
concept and of the cognition of an entity in the brain, through the consideration of the 
relationship between perception and conception.  More specifically, the cognition of 
an entity is an automatic or unconscious process in which we match the representation 
of a perceived entity with its corresponding mental representation in the brain.  It 
follows that when we view an entity and understand what it is, our perception and 
conception occur almost simultaneously.  What should be immediately noticed is that 
we can observe on-going actions of our own objectively in our mind.  This ability is 
termed metacognition, which results from the cognitive operation where conception is 
detached from perception.  I argued that the two phases of cognition (i.e., to fuse with 
or detach from perception and cognition) is crucial to elucidate the relationship 
between the human mind and language.  In Chapter1, I explored the nature of 
language diversity in terms of the two modes (or phases) of cognition and argued with 
a variety of linguistic data that the conventionalized view of the world by the 
conceptualizer in the course of his native language acquisition influences his construal 
of entities and linguistic manifestations.   
 Regarding the second query, I argued that the full elucidation of the relationship 
between human cognition and language needs to posit the role of our visual experience 
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as a vital facet, which is based on the finding in cognitive sciences that there exists 
extensive parallelism between perception and cognition, and that numeral aspects of 
human conceptualization can be interpreted as general conceptual analogs of visual 
perception.  On the basis of this understanding, I presented how cognition originated 
in or abstracted from perception influences the ways of the conceptualizar’s viewing 
entities (i.e., things or events) and linguistic manifestations, and therefore 
constructions can be regarded as conventionalized patterns which are resorted to by 
speakers of a given language. 
 In Part I, I focused on the importance of conceptual space which is analogous to 
a perceptual one.  More specifically, when we perceive an entity we are likely to feel 
it to be proximal or distal in our visual field.  This means that there exists a boundary 
or a region in which we feel an entity to be proximal.   Cognitive Grammar posits 
that proximal/distal contrast in visual perception has the corresponding analog in the 
epistemic sphere, which is crucially important to elucidate the semantics of linguistic 
phenomena.  On this basis, I argued that the notion of the domain of epistemic control 
is crucial to explicate the relationship between the conceptualization of an entity and 
its expressive ways by referring to the semantic difference between infinitival 
complements and gerundive complements, and to the peculiarity of 
there-constructions. 
 In Part II, I argued the importance of cognitive domains to elucidate the 
meanings of linguistic expressions.  In Cognitive Grammar, every expression invokes 
a set of cognitive domains as the basis for its meaning.  The domains indicate any 
kind of conception or realm of experience and knowledge with respect to which a 
given entity is construed.  I suggested that the origin of cognitive domains lies in our 
direct interaction with entities in the physical world; that is, they come from our 
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perceptual activities through our bodily experience, and the cognitive domains thus 
established, in turn, render us a certain viewpoint by which to construe an entity to be 
described.  I exemplified the importance of the domain centrality to elucidate the 
nature of linguistic structures by referring to the have constructions and the semantic 
difference between the English ditransitive constructions and their to/for-dative 
counterparts   
 In Part III, I presented the nature of nominal predications in terms of the notions 
of conceptual autonomy and dependence.  Based on the discussion in Chapter1; i.e., 
the importance of our visual perception to explicate the nature of language, I stated 
that the distinction between the two notions is a matter of degree and that ‘relational 
nouns’ and ‘deverbal nouns’ have a conceptually dependent structure.  I demonstrated 
the importance of these notions by referring to two types of possessive constructions 
(i.e., possessive genitives and of-constructions), the semantic difference between type 
modifiers and instance modifiers, and atypical object constructions (i.e., light verb 
constructions, V-NP-PP type idiomatic expressions, and cognate object constructions). 
 As my closing remarks, there is no doubt that the essence of studies in language 
lies in the elucidation of the relationship between human cognition and linguistic 
manifestations, which is apparent from the fact that language does not exist 
independently of the human mind.  This perspective naturally leads to the idea that 
the reality of the description of linguistic phenomena lies in the mental processing of 
the conceptualizer in his conceptual sphere, which is congruent with the basic tenet of 
Cognitive Grammar; i.e., “meaning resides in conceptualization.”  In other words, the 
purpose of my research strives to find a viable answer to the ultimate query about what 
we actually mean by characterizing or describing language.  A possible key to this is 
to realize that our linguistic knowledge is conceptually grounded and the locus of 
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meaning a given linguistic expression evokes is in our mind (or in the brain).  This 
perspective naturally leads to the idea that the reality of the description of linguistic 
phenomena lies in the mental processing of the conceptualizer in his conceptual 
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